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Fiscal sustainability and economic growth are key concerns at the current juncture. The focus of tax policy has 
now shifted away from stimulus measures towards a much needed consolidation of public finances, made even 
more necessary in light of the difficulties currently faced by some Member States in refinancing their sovereign 
debt. At the same time, tax policies may play an important role in enhancing the growth potential of the EU 
economy, which is a goal per se but also a condition for making public finance sustainable. 
A growth-friendly tax structure is particularly important to cope with today's policy challenges. As a background 
for the analysis, the 2011 issue of the report ‘Tax reforms in EU Member States’, subtitled this year as ‘Tax 
policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal sustainability’, provides an overview of recent trends in tax 
revenues and of tax measures adopted in Member States in 2010 and the first half of 2011.  
In addition to these descriptive chapters, this year's report provides an analytical focus on two topics of particular 
relevance at the current juncture. The first analytical chapter of the report addresses the multi-faceted concept of 
the quality of taxation – particularly relevant for any future tax reforms – with a particular focus on the tax 
structure. A ‘good’ tax system should design taxes so as to reduce distortions to the minimum possible and, 
where appropriate, correct market failures. Well-designed tax reforms promoting employment and growth can go 
hand in hand with social equity. To avoid adverse interaction between cross-country tax systems, tax policies 
should benefit from an efficient coordination at the EU level.  
The second analytical chapter discusses three types of potential challenges in the area of tax policy currently 
faced by EU Member States: (i) addressing severe fiscal consolidation challenges also on the revenue side, (ii) 
making the overall tax structure more growth friendly and (iii) improving the design of the tax system for 
individual types of taxes. Applying an indicator-based approach, the report identifies in which euro-area Member 
States higher tax revenues might potentially contribute to consolidation and which countries might benefit from a 
shift from labour taxes, in particular those bearing on vulnerable groups, to consumption and real estate taxes. 
Analysing more specific horizontal challenges related to the design of individual taxes, the report concludes that 
almost all euro-area Member States face at least one challenge.  
We trust that the analysis in this year's report will contribute to the tax policy debate in the European Union. In 
particular, it might stimulate a constructive dialogue between the Commission and Member States on this policy 
area, of relevance for achieving economic growth, job creation and macroeconomic stability. The tax challenges 
identified tentatively in this report therefore deserve further investigation in the framework of the integrated 
economic policy coordination within the EU, i.e. the ‘Semester’. They may also be discussed in the context of 
the structured discussions on tax policy foreseen by the Euro Plus Pact. 
 
 
Marco Buti  Walter Deffaa 
Director-General  Director-General 
Economic and Financial Affairs  Taxation and Customs Union 
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The consequences of the financial and economic crisis are, and will be, deeply reflected in EU Member 
States’ government revenues. Having implemented a wide range of tax stimulus measures over the period 
2008-10, the focus of tax policy in several Member States is now clearly shifting towards a much needed 
consolidation of public finances.  
Recent macroeconomic developments show that tax revenues (as a share of GDP) are on the rise again 
after a sizeable drop observed in 2008 and 2009. This is partly due to a discretionary move from 
temporary stimulus measures implemented in most Member States in the midst of the economic crisis to 
more neutral or even consolidation-oriented tax policies. Overall, tax policy in the EU was slightly 
contractionary in 2010, although tax measures in some Member States were still expansionary to cushion 
the adverse effect of the crisis. Given the need to consolidate public finances, tax measures adopted so far 
in 2011 have, in almost all Member States, focused on raising tax revenues.  
The general move towards increasing taxes in 2011 has also been accompanied in some Member States 
by measures amending the tax structure with a view to supporting growth. This consists in shifting tax 
revenues from distortionary taxes (i.e. corporate income tax and personal income tax) towards less 
distortionary taxes (e.g. consumption tax and indirect taxation in general). Tax policies to enhance the 
growth potential of the EU economy are a goal per se but also a condition for making public finances 
sustainable. 
The tax structure is one important aspect of the multi-faceted concept of the quality of taxation. It deals 
with the design of tax policy to achieve desired policy objectives, while at the same time promoting 
economic growth, minimising distortions and reducing the cost of tax collection. This report focuses on 
the effects of taxation on economic growth. This reflects the key priority for Europe of achieving smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. A ‘good’ tax system should design taxes so as to reduce tax distortions 
to the minimum possible, and, when appropriate, correct market failures. Adverse interaction between 
cross-country tax systems, chiefly within the EU, should also be avoided.  
Model-based simulations and empirical evidence have found recurrent taxes on real estate, followed by 
consumption taxes, to be the least detrimental to growth. Personal income taxes, social security 
contributions and in particular corporate income taxes are found to be more detrimental to economic 
growth. Cutting personal income taxes and social security contributions has the potential for increasing 
both labour supply and labour demand, leading to higher employment, lower unemployment and higher 
labour utilisation. Reducing corporate income tax will reduce the cost of capital and stimulate capital 
accumulation and investment in R&D, which should translate into stronger productivity and economic 
growth. In contrast, a well-designed increase in taxes on consumption and recurrent taxes on real estate 
does not directly affect the accumulation of specific production factors, and therefore limit the negative 
impact on growth.  
A growth-friendly tax structure could go hand in hand with social equity, if tax reforms are adequately 
designed. Labour taxes are indeed often high and particularly detrimental to the low-skilled and second 
earners, contributing to persistent exclusion of these groups from the labour market. High labour taxes 
(including social security contribution) can reduce the incentives either for the low-skilled to work or for 
employers to hire them, or both. Moreover, increasing tax expenditures in the area of personal income tax 
may be less efficient in achieving their initial objectives than direct support to low income households. 
Reducing tax expenditure and other loopholes in corporate taxation would generate higher tax revenues 
that could (partly) be used for growth-enhancing rate reductions. It would also decrease compliance costs, 
which are especially high for small and medium-sized firms. Higher consumption taxes could be 
accompanied by measures to compensate the loss incurred by low-income groups, e.g. through the 
personal income tax schedule or targeted transfers. The latter could directly target those really in need, 
avoiding the windfall generated by many VAT reduced rates or exemptions. Lastly, the correction of 
negative externalities, via for instance environmental taxation or excises on tobacco and alcohol, would 
help to promote a better environment and better public health.  
Summary and conclusions 
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The new framework of integrated economic policy coordination within the EU, labelled the ‘European 
Semester’, calls for particular attention to be paid to the quality of tax systems as both a complement to 
and a catalyst of fiscal consolidation. In its 2011 Annual Growth Survey the Commission acknowledges 
that a contribution from additional taxes to fiscal consolidation will be needed in some Member States. At 
the same time, the Commission called on Member States to carefully design their tax systems by pointing 
out the key principles of growth-friendliness. With the March 2011 ‘Euro Plus Pact’, Heads of State and 
Government in euro-area Member States and other volunteering EU countries highlighted the need for 
labour tax reforms to boost employment and stressed the importance of pragmatic tax coordination in the 
form of structured discussions on tax issues and exchange of good practice. The identification of key tax 
challenges in this report contributes to the Commission’s analysis in the context of the European Semester 
and to the related discussions in the Council. 
EU Member States are currently facing various challenges in the area of taxation and tax policy. As a first 
step, this report concentrates on the euro-area Member States and analyses three types of potential 
challenges: (i) addressing severe fiscal consolidation challenges also on the revenue side, (ii) making the 
tax structure more growth-friendly and (iii) improving the design of the tax system for individual types of 
taxes.  
According to the analysis, several countries could consider making use of taxation – as a complement to 
expenditure control – to consolidate their public finances and put them on a more sustainable path. These 
countries show unsustainable budgetary situations (characterised by an adverse initial budgetary starting 
position and, additionally, significant ageing-related implicit liabilities) but, at the same time, have room 
for potential tax revenue increases, through discretionary tax hikes or enhancing tax compliance. Some 
euro-area Member States are identified as borderline cases, where some room is still available for higher 
tax revenues to respond to fairly demanding consolidation needs. An in-depth assessment of the 
microeconomic effects of increasing specific types of tax, including a comparison with economic and 
budgetary costs and benefits of cutting government expenditure would be necessary before drawing firm 
tax policy conclusions but remains beyond the scope of this report. Ultimately, such country-specific 
assessment should determine the best policy choices, possibly leading to different priorities as to the 
contribution of taxes and expenditure cuts to consolidation needs. Nevertheless, the horizontal analysis of 
taxation and its contribution to consolidation and macroeconomic performance represents a useful starting 
point for such analysis. While this report represents an analysis for euro-area Member States only, the 
Commission services will continue to expand the analysis to other Member States, in particular those 
participating voluntarily in the Euro Plus Pact. 
Around one third of the euro-area Member States might enhance economic growth by shifting their tax 
structure away from labour, although the impact on inflation would need to be taken into account and 
second round effects, especially through links between wage increases and the inflation rate, should be 
avoided. In these Member States, a high tax burden on labour, especially for vulnerable groups, is 
matched by a relatively low share of revenues from consumption and other indirect taxes. High tax 
burdens on vulnerable groups in some countries might call for a re-profiling of labour taxation away from 
low-skilled workers and second earners towards other categories of taxpayers. However, shifting the tax 
structure away from labour taxes falling on vulnerable groups towards housing taxes might also be an 
option, while redistributive consequences of such a policy change would need to be carefully analysed. A 
potential for raising housing taxation or, at least, for rebalancing housing taxation in a revenue-neutral 
way by shifting taxes on real estate transactions to recurrent taxes on immovable properties appears to be 
available in several countries.  
In addition to the two overarching challenges of fiscal consolidation and growth-friendliness of tax 
structures, there are more specific challenges related to the design of individual types of tax. Almost all 
euro-area Member States face at least one additional horizontal challenge, which warrants amendments to 
the design of their tax system. These more specific issues are key either for raising tax revenues without 
hitting growth prospects, or for preserving overall tax revenues while reducing tax distortions. Some tax 
European Commission 
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policy challenges are, however, very country-specific and much depends on the detailed institutional set-
up at national level. Such challenges are therefore outside the scope of this report.  
A review of tax expenditure in either personal or corporate income taxation (or both) should be 
considered in a number of euro-area countries. Tax expenditure implies revenue forgone, can distort 
economic activity, increases complexity, compliance and collection costs, and could be used to ‘escape’ 
fiscal discipline. The case of reduced tax rates for incorporated SMEs suggests that it is crucial to 
ascertain their economic efficiency, by clearly identifying the targeted market failure and checking that 
taxation is the best way to correct it.  
The debt bias in direct taxation affecting both corporate and housing financing is also an issue concerning 
most euro-area Member States, which needs to be addressed in order to reduce the risk of macroeconomic 
instability. A debt bias may aggravate unsustainable patterns in credit growth in good times and 
contribute to growth-adverse credit tightening in bad times. Viable policy options to solve the debt-bias 
issue in corporate taxation in most Member States are either to eliminate interest deductibility from taxes 
via a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) or to introduce an equivalent allowance for corporate 
equity (ACE), or a combination thereof. Against the background of current consolidation needs, the 
budgetary consequences of the different policy options would need to be duly taken into account. A debt 
bias in housing investments, stemming from the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments for 
owner-occupied housing, arises in around half of the euro-area Member States.  
Increasing VAT efficiency and broadening the VAT tax base, through the removal of exemptions and 
reduced rates currently applied to a wide range of goods and services, could substantially help increase 
revenues and reduce economic distortions in many euro-area Member States. Several countries also face a 
substantial revenue shortfall due to VAT fraud. 
Taxation could also be made more environmentally friendly in a majority of euro-area Member States. 
Despite their increasing importance in the policy debate, environmental tax revenues have been falling in 
recent years in the EU on average. A good tax system should create the right incentives for using scarce 
energy resources in a more intelligent manner and lay the groundwork for green growth. In particular, 
hidden tax subsidies on polluting and carbon-intensive activities should be reviewed. As an example, 
reduced VAT rates on energy in place in more than half of the euro-area countries should be reviewed. 
Taxation should better internalise the external (non-marketed) effects into the price system, so as to 
reduce incentives to engage in polluting activity and for taking social costs more fully into account. For 
instance, company car tax provisions tend to have an adverse environmental impact as they encourage car 
ownership and more intensive driving in several countries. In addition, more than half of the euro-area 
Member States subsidise diesel compared to petrol, despite comparably higher environmental costs.  
Lastly, one third of the euro-area Member States also face the challenge of improving the efficiency of 
their tax collection and better preventing tax evasion. More efficient tax administration would be less 
wasteful of public money by reducing the cost of tax collection and possibly make tax collection more 
acceptable to EU citizens. Fighting against the shadow economy and tax evasion is also likely to 
substantially enhance tax collection in several countries. 
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Mandate and main purpose  
In 2009, the first edition of the report entitled 
‘Monitoring revenue trends and tax reforms in EU 
Member States’ was published. (1) The report title 
has now been shortened to ‘Tax reforms in EU 
Member States’ both for ease of communication 
and to better reflect the content of the report. The 
report has been drawn up in response to the request 
by the 5 June 2007 ECOFIN Council ‘for Member 
States to exchange information on current and 
planned tax reforms and their impact on growth 
and employment within existing procedures’.  
Based on the mandate of the ECOFIN Council, the 
present report reviews recent developments on the 
revenue side of government budgets in the context 
of regular macroeconomic surveillance. In 
particular, it provides an analytical basis for 
informed policy choices aimed at improving the 
quality of public finances in the EU. In the face of 
unsustainable public finances in some euro-area 
countries, the report also aims at lending analytical 
support to policies addressing necessary fiscal 
consolidation efforts.  
The report pursues several objectives. First, it 
identifies the way in which European revenue 
systems are evolving following past reforms and 
other developments, such as the business cycle. 
Second, it takes stock of tax reforms that have 
been enacted in the Member States. Third, it 
reviews various policy issues for future reforms, 
which are presently considered in the policy 
debate, such as using taxation to supplement 
expenditure-based consolidation, improving the 
structure of taxation, closing tax loopholes to 
broaden the tax base, mitigating the bias towards 
debt financing introduced by some taxes, 
enhancing VAT efficiency, making taxation more 
environmentally friendly and improving tax 
governance. Bringing the findings on these various 
topical policy issues together, the report 
contributes to the analytical assessment carried out 
by the Commission in the context of integrated 
economic policy surveillance. These may be 
considered by Member States when designing 
future reforms of their national tax systems.  
                                                          
(1) See European Commission (2009a). 
The report also aims to contribute to more 
effective communication and exchange of best 
practice among Member States on tax reforms and 
to encourage fruitful debates on the role of 
efficient revenue systems for growth, employment 
and social equity. Better communication can reveal 
common challenges and inter-linkages between 
countries. Thus, it may suggest ways for Member 
States to cooperate so as to achieve better 
outcomes for Europe’s economy.  
In line with previous editions, the 2011 report 
presents a succinct analysis of tax revenue trends 
and an overview of recent major tax reforms, as 
well as a discussion of selected topical tax policy 
issues, relevant to any future tax reforms. This 
year, the report provides a thorough analysis of the 
quality of taxation at macro- and micro-level. A 
list of country-specific macroeconomic challenges 
in the area of taxation is derived from this and 
other analyses. Meeting these challenges via 
proper tax reforms would contribute to the 
sustainability of public finances and underpin the 
quality of tax systems in times where room for 
reducing the overall tax burden is limited and the 
need to raise revenues remains particularly acute in 
some countries. 
The report is prepared jointly by DG ECFIN and 
DG TAXUD of the European Commission. It 
builds on a substantial body of work carried out by 
the Commission services, including assessments of 
budgetary implications of tax reforms, analyses of 
the key role of revenue systems for the 
sustainability of public finances and their effects 
on employment, growth and equity as well as their 
contribution to achievement of environmental 
policy objectives. (2) Given its focus on specific 
policy aspects and recent developments which are 
relevant to fiscal sustainability, growth and jobs, 
the present report complements the annual report 
entitled ‘Taxation Trends in the European Union’ 
prepared by DG TAXUD and Eurostat, which 
yields a comprehensive overview of the level and 
structure of revenue systems in the EU. (3)  
                                                          
(2) See, e.g., European Commission (2008a, 2010a, 2010b). 
(3) European Commission (2011a).  
European Commission 
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Enhanced relevance in the context of the new 
cycle of integrated economic coordination  
The recent financial and economic crisis continues 
to have a significant impact on Member States’ 
government revenues. Tax breaks were adopted to 
counter the effect of the financial crisis on the real 
economy in the period 2008-2010. In 2011, many 
Member States have raised taxes to contribute to 
the consolidation of public finances. Apart from 
the general orientation of fiscal and tax policy 
towards consolidation, quality of taxation has 
increasingly moved into the spotlight of both 
academic and political debate. 
The new framework of integrated economic policy 
coordination within the EU, labelled ‘European 
Semester’, calls for particular attention to be given 
to the quality of the revenue/tax system (see Box 
1.1 for details). The European Semester is 
launched in early January of each year with the 
publication of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 
by the Commission, (4) where horizontal policy 
guidance is addressed to Member States, to help 
them shape their national policy strategy. The first 
AGS, issued in January 2011, argues that while 
fiscal adjustment should primarily come from the 
expenditure side of the budget, a contribution from 
additional taxes will be necessary in some Member 
States, given the need for rigorous fiscal 
consolidation in the aftermath of the crisis.  
The 2011 AGS points to some general principles 
as regards taxation: ‘indirect taxes are more 
growth-friendly than direct taxes and broadening 
tax bases is preferable to increasing tax rates. 
Unjustified subsidies, e.g. environmentally harmful 
subsidies, should be eliminated’. Given the 
worryingly low participation rates of low income 
earners, young people and second earners, the 
2011 AGS stipulates that shifting taxes away from 
labour should be a priority for most Member States 
in order to stimulate demand for labour and create 
growth.  
The March 2011 ‘Euro Plus Pact’, (5) which is 
embedded in the European Semester and reflects 
the political will expressed at the level of Heads of 
State and Government of euro-area Member States 
and other volunteering countries, stipulates that 
                                                          
(4) See European Commission (2011b). 
(5) Heads of State of euro area (2011). 
labour tax reforms will be instrumental in raising 
employment. The pact also highlights the 
importance of pragmatic tax coordination in the 
form of structured discussions on tax issues, 
exchange of good practices and adoption of the 
Commission proposal for a common 
(consolidated) corporate tax base. (6)  
The identification of tax challenges in the last 
chapter of the report will help shape structured 
discussions on tax issues, called for by the Euro 
Plus Pact, and it also contributes to the 
Commission’s analysis in the context of the 
European Semester (see Box 1.1).  
Outline of the report 
The report is structured as follows:   
Chapter 2 describes the structure of tax systems in 
the EU and their evolution over time. These trends 
reflect past tax reforms and other developments, 
such as the business cycle. There is a particular 
focus on tax developments since the beginning of 
the crisis, and its impact on the level and structure 
of tax revenues is analysed. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of tax reforms 
implemented by Member States in 2010 and 2011. 
On the basis of individual country information, an 
attempt is made to identify common trends across 
countries. These include VAT reforms, reforms of 
direct taxation and reforms in financial sector 
taxation as well as in the area of tax governance.  
Chapter 4 discusses the multi-faceted concept of 
‘quality of taxation’, reviewing the theoretical and 
empirical literature. The focus of this discussion is 
on the effects of taxation and tax reforms on GDP 
and on sustainable economic growth. The structure 
of taxation by main types of taxes and how it can 
be made more growth-friendly is examined. 
Specific issues related to the design of particular 
types of tax with a view to making them more 
growth-friendly are also addressed. Lastly, 
interactions between different tax systems in the 
EU are discussed.  
Chapter 5 aims to identify the macroeconomic 
challenges that individual euro-area Member 
  
                                                          
(6) See European Commission (2011c). 
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States are facing in the area of taxation and tax 
policy in difficult times. The first part of the 
analysis consists of a preliminary horizontal 
quantitative screening of euro-area Member States 
to identify countries that may need to consider tax 
policy actions to support fiscal consolidation. 
Based on the analysis of the quality of taxation set 
out in Chapter 4, a preliminary quantitative 
screening is then used to determine which euro-
area Member States could enhance the growth-
friendliness of their tax structure. Countries are  
  
then screened against a list of additional horizontal 
challenges, namely reducing tax expenditures 
affecting direct taxation, mitigating the debt bias in 
the tax system, increasing VAT efficiency, moving 
towards environmentally friendly taxation, and 
enhancing tax governance. Chapter 5 considers 
only euro-area Member States. This first attempt to 
identify macroeconomic challenges in the area of 
taxation and revenue-raising policy thus deals with 
a more tractable set of countries and reflects the 
particular emphasis placed by the Euro Plus Pact 
on taxation in the euro area. 
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Box 1.1: Importance of taxation in different policy processes
The European Semester, including the Annual Growth Survey and Europe 2020 strategy 
The Europe 2020 strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth stresses the importance of the revenue side of the budget. (1) It calls 
for particular attention to be given to the quality of revenue/tax systems with a view to making them more ‘growth-friendly’. This strategy 
is embedded in an annual assessment of each Member State’s broad policy strategy, called the European Semester.  
Moreover, the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) for 2011 states that, given the need for rigorous fiscal consolidation in the aftermath of the 
crisis, a contribution from additional taxes will be necessary in some Member States. The AGS also recommends making more use of 
indirect taxes and broadening tax bases rather than increasing tax rates. 
Given the worryingly low participation rates of low income earners, young people and second earners, the AGS stipulates that shifting 
taxes away from labour should be a priority for most Member States in order to stimulate demand for labour and create jobs. Reforms to tax 
and benefit systems are also called for in order to facilitate the participation of second earners in the workforce and to reduce undeclared 
work and benefit dependency. With a view to getting the unemployed back to work, Member States have to ensure that work pays through 
greater coherence between in-work net take-home pay and out-of-work net benefits. 
Macro-structural bottlenecks, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council 
Another important recent policy initiative is the analysis of bottlenecks to growth, by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and the 
Alternates of the Economic and Financial Committee (AEFC) in June 2010. Growth bottlenecks related to taxation policy were identified in 
the area of labour utilisation and fiscal policy. Most of the bottlenecks identified by the EPC-AEFC have already been endorsed by the draft 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs) submitted in late 2010.  
Bottlenecks in the area of fiscal policy/long-term sustainability (high debt/deficit and/or ageing-related costs) were identified for the great 
majority of Member States. Some fiscal bottlenecks also explicitly refer to the quality of public finance, but on the expenditure side rather 
than on the quality of taxation. They stress the need to prioritise growth-friendly expenditures (R&D, education and infrastructure).  
The EPC work identified relatively few explicit bottlenecks in the area of taxation. However, for many countries growth bottlenecks refer 
implicitly to tax policy issues, namely on labour taxation, by pointing to labour market participation and inclusiveness issues or the need for 
better utilisation of the labour potential.   
Euro Plus Pact 
On 24 and 25 March 2011 the European Council agreed to adopt a ‘Euro Plus Pact’ (EPP), previously called the Competitiveness Pact or 
Pact for the Euro, to strengthen the economic pillar of monetary union, achieve a new quality of economic policy coordination in the euro 
area and improve competitiveness, thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence. This Pact focuses primarily on areas that fall under 
national competence. It has been agreed by the euro area Heads of State and Government joined by Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania. Four countries, namely Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have decided to opt out, 
partly to retain their tax independence. The EPP is fully embedded in the institutional setup of the EU, including the European Semester, 
and adds a political impetus to the Europe 2020 growth strategy and steps taken to reinforce economic governance in EMU. The 
Commission will assess the application of the Pact in the context of its enhanced surveillance. 
Member States are committed to taking all necessary measures to pursue the following four objectives: i) foster competitiveness, ii) foster 
employment, not least by amending labour taxation with a view to making work pay, iii) contribute further to the sustainability of public 
finances and iv) reinforce financial stability. Although not explicitly mentioned, taxation appears relevant not only for fostering 
employment but also for enhancing competitiveness and further contributing to public finance sustainability.  
In addition to these four objectives, the Euro Plus Pact explicitly calls for pragmatic coordination of tax policies, as a necessary element in 
supporting fiscal consolidation and economic growth, while acknowledging that direct taxation remains a national competence. In this 
context, Member States commit ‘to engage in structured discussions on tax policy issues, notably to ensure the exchange of best practices, 
avoidance of harmful practices and proposals to fight against fraud and tax evasion.’  
Besides exchanging best practices, Member States could engage in the development of a common corporate tax base, which would be a 
revenue-neutral way of working towards a consistent tax framework in the euro-area. To this end, the Commission issued a legislative 
proposal on a common consolidated corporate tax base in April 2011 (see European Commission, 2011c). 
The assessment of national reform strategies by the Commission and the Council  
The European Semester is closed in June each year by the assessment of national policy strategies by the Commission and the Council. The 
national policy strategy of each Member State is set out in its Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) – measures to ensure sound 
public finance – and in its National Reform Programmes (NRPs) – stating the measures planned to boost growth and jobs and reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances. The Euro Plus Pact commitments of the participating Member States are also assessed by the Commission to 
the extent that they are included in the NRPs. 
The examination of the SCPs and NRPs for EU countries by the Commission suggests that tax structures should be adapted to support 
growth, while tax increases may complement the control of government expenditure to help meet the sizeable consolidation challenges in 
some Member States. Growth-friendly tax policies should continue to broaden tax bases and raise indirect taxation, when needed, while 
avoiding increasing direct taxation. The SCPs and NRPs show that Member States with problems of debt sustainability intend to raise 
taxes, in addition to curbing public spending. They also underline an effort to reduce the labour tax burden, especially on low incomes, by 
shifting revenue sources towards indirect taxation. This often takes the form of reducing the scope of reduced VAT rates and increasing 
excise duties, including energy taxes. New special provisions have been introduced, generally to support R&D, green innovation or SMEs. 
When the SCPs and NRPs are assessed, many euro-area Member States could continue their policies to improve tax structures by moving 
from direct to indirect taxation. Reducing tax loopholes also seems to be a priority in order to broaden tax bases and lower tax rates, thus 
supporting both growth and fiscal sustainability. Moreover, it appears advisable to rigorously review and assess new tax expenditures ex 
ante and ex post. 
                                                          
(1) See European Commission (2010c).  
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This section provides an overview of the structure 
of revenue systems in the EU and their evolution 
over time, thereby setting the stage for the 
discussion of key tax policy issues in the following 
sections. There is a particular focus on tax 
developments since the beginning of the crisis, 
analysing its impact on the level and structure of 
tax revenues. (7) 
2.1. LEVEL AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
OVERALL TAX BURDEN 
Economic and financial crisis putting public 
finances under stress 
The economic and financial crisis that started in 
2008 has brought the EU Member States into a 
precarious fiscal situation. In 2009, the peak year 
of the crisis, the EU-27 deficit reached 6.8 % of 
GDP (8), and stayed at a similarly high level in 
2010. Government debt increased from 62.3 % of 
GDP in 2008 to 80.3 % in 2010, and is expected to 
rise further. The increase in the deficit was largely 
due to the economic cycle, but also the result of 
financial aid given to the banking sector as well as 
measures taken to counter the effects of the crisis. 
Indeed, the EU-27’s real GDP shrank by 4.2 % in 
2009 with all Member States but Poland 
experiencing negative real GDP growth rates. In 
addition to the operation of automatic stabilisers, 
most countries sought to provide additional 
discretionary fiscal stimulus. Some countries, such 
as Ireland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, had 
already in 2009 taken substantial consolidation 
measures aimed at containing (or even reducing) 
their deficits. 
Expenditure worse affected than revenues 
The observed deficit increase was mainly due to 
the increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio by 
4 % of GDP (see Graph 2.2). Revenues to GDP (of 
                                                          
(7) The data up to 2009 in this chapter are – unless indicated 
otherwise — based on European Commission (2011a). 
Information from DG ECFIN’s AMECO database, 
Commission’s spring 2011 forecast — adjusted for 
differences in the definition of the tax indicators — was 
used to extrapolate some of the time series for the years 
2010 and 2011. 
(8) Unless stated otherwise, averages quoted in the report are 
GDP-weighted. 
which tax revenues account for roughly 90 %) only 
decreased by 0.6 per cent of GDP. While an 
increase in the expenditure to GDP ratio was 
observed in all EU Member States but Malta, more 
than one third of countries actually saw their tax 
revenues increase as a share of GDP. However, 
according to European Commission (2011), three 
quarters of the Member States for which data (9) 
are available introduced tax-reducing measures in 
2009. Even though revenue-raising measures were 
on average slightly higher, discretionary measures 
reduced tax revenues by around ½% (10) of GDP 
on the EU average. This resulted in an average EU 
tax-to-GDP ratio (including social security 
contributions) of 38.4 % in 2009. Notwithstanding 
the decrease in the tax burden in the EU since 
2007, it is still relatively high by international 
standards.  
Tax decrease lower than expected 
The fall in the tax-to-GDP ratio experienced in the 
EU-27 since the beginning of the crisis is, 
however, not as strong as might have been 
expected. During the economic downturn in the 
period 2001-2003 the tax-to-GDP ratio fell by 1.5 
percentage points, despite still positive GDP 
growth rates of above 1 % (see Graph 2.1).  
Graph 2.1: Tax-to-GDP ratio in EU-27 and EA-17, 1995-2011 
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
in
 %
EU-27 EA-17
Source: Commission services. 
The decrease in the tax-to-GDP ratio during the 
2008/2009 crisis was considerably less pronounced  
 
                                                          
(9) Data quantifying the effect of tax measures on GDP are 
available for 20 Member States. 
(10) Calculations based on European Commission (2010d) and 
the Stability and Convergence Programmes of the Member 
States. 
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(-1.2 pp over 2007-2009, -0.9 pp over 2008-2009). 
This is because the recession was driven in 
particular by a sharp fall in exports and private 
investment, while the main tax bases (private 
consumption and wages) developed less 
unfavourably than in the previous downturn. 
Moreover, given the size of the slump some 
Member Sates could not afford to let automatic 
stabilisers play and had in 2009 already engaged in 
procyclical tax-increasing measures. As indicated 
in the graph, tax-to-GDP ratios have gained 
momentum from 2010 onwards, mostly due to 
discretionary tax measures (for details see Chapter 
3). 
Tax ratios differ widely in the EU … 
As illustrated by Graph 2.3, there are wide 
differences in tax levels across the Union. While 
the EU-15 average tax burden is approaching 39 % 
of GDP, the Member States that acceded to the EU 
after 2004 display a considerably lower average 
tax burden of only 32 % of GDP. Most of the EU-
15 countries (except for Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom) are ranked 
above the EU-27 median, i.e. to the left side of the 
graph, while only three new Member States, 
namely Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia display an 
above median tax burden. The highest overall tax 
burden in 2009 was recorded in Denmark, 
amounting to above 48 % of GDP, whereas 
Latvia’s tax ratio amounted to a mere 26.6 % of 
GDP. 
…and the crisis has brought convergence to a 
halt 
The wide dispersion of tax ratios — as measured 
by the coefficient of variation (11) — in the 
European Union is not new. However, as indicated 
by Graph 2.4, the dispersion of tax burdens 
diminished quite steadily for the current 27 
Member States between 1996 and 2007.  
Graph 2.3: Dispersion (coefficient of variation) of total taxes, 
% of GDP 
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Since 2008 it has gone up as a consequence of the 
uneven impact of the crisis on tax revenues. With 
the effects of the crisis on tax revenues gradually 
abating, the dispersion of tax burdens 
 
                                                          
(11) The coefficient of variation is a normalised dispersion 
measure. It is computed as the standard deviation divided 
by the mean (both unweighted). 
Graph 2.2: Change in budget balance, 2008-2009 
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has resumed its downward trend since 2010, 
mirroring the increasing prevalence of 
consolidation-oriented tax policy stances across 
Member States. 
Reasons for the heterogeneous development 
of tax-to-GDP ratios in Member States 
While some countries experienced severe drops in 
their tax-to-GDP ratios, tax ratios stabilised or 
even rose in some others (see Graph 2.3). This 
uneven impact is not only the result of tax 
measures taken, and the different degree of 
automatic stabilisation, but also reflects differences 
in economic structures. (12) As the recession was 
generally characterised by a sharp decline in 
exports, countries heavily dependent on exports 
saw a larger decrease in their GDP compared to 
other countries. Internal demand was, however, not 
necessarily affected equally badly, with the major 
tax bases, consumption and wages, remaining 
relatively stable. Relatively stable tax bases imply, 
ceteris paribus, relatively stable tax revenues. In 
the context of a plunging GDP, this results in an 
increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio, as can be 
observed for e.g. Germany. Moreover, 
Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden saw 
rising/stabilising tax-to-GDP ratios despite 
important — revenue-reducing — tax reforms. The 
significant increase in Estonia was, in addition to 
                                                          
(12) While European Commission (2010l) states that all 
Member States but Poland were affected by the recession, 
the extent of the fall in production and housing prices 
differed considerably. This might also have impacted on 
tax revenues. 
an export-driven slump in GDP, also the result of 
tax-increasing measures such as an increase in 
VAT rates and changes in the social security 
system and higher non-tax revenues. 
2.2. TAX COMPOSITION 
The tax composition can be considered in terms of 
the type of tax levied, i.e. indirect taxes, direct 
taxes and social security contributions (SSCs) 
(sub-section 2.2.1), or in terms of a classification 
of taxes according to economic function, i.e. 
consumption taxes, taxes on labour and capital and 
environmental taxes (sub-section 2.2.2). (13) 
2.2.1. Decomposition by type of tax 
The three main types of taxes that will be analysed 
are indirect taxes (VAT and other taxes on 
consumption, production and imports, excise 
duties), direct taxes (current taxes on income and 
wealth, capital taxes) and social security 
contributions. When considering the evolution of 
tax revenues from these three broad categories, it 
is important to bear in mind that tax revenues from 
different sources are differently affected by the 
                                                          
(13) There are, of course, potentially other ways to decompose 
tax revenues. The current decomposition follows the one 
applied in European Commission (2011a). ‘Annex C: 
Methodology and explanatory notes’ of that publication 
gives extensive details on the underlying methodology. The 
tax data may also be found in electronic format on the 
Eurostat web page and via the following link to the DG 
Taxation and Customs Union homepage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxtrends.  
Graph 2.4: Overall tax-to-GDP ratio (incl. SSC) in the EU, 2008/2009, in % 
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business cycle. This complicates the interpretation 
of changes in the importance of these tax 
components over time. 
Unequal impact of the business cycle on tax 
categories 
Direct taxes are the most pro-cyclical because they 
contain both personal and corporate income taxes. 
The tax base of corporate income taxes, namely 
corporate profits, is very sensitive to the business 
cycle. The progressive nature of personal income 
taxes implies that personal income tax revenues 
will react more pronouncedly than the tax base – 
the wage bill – indicates. Social security 
contributions, which are closely related to the 
aggregate wage bill, tend to be less responsive to 
the cycle, reflecting proportionality and caps on 
maximum contributions and the relative inertia of 
the wage bill. Finally, indirect taxes, which are 
mostly proportional, should evolve in line with 
their tax base, i.e. broadly consumption 
expenditure. 
Graph 2.5: Indirect tax revenues and final consumption 
expenditure, as % of GDP 
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At the current juncture it must also be borne in 
mind that any change observed in the different tax-
to-GDP ratios might also be due to the fact that the 
share of the tax base in GDP has changed 
(composition effects). A drop in exports, for 
example, reduces GDP, while the tax bases, such 
as wages and consumption, would ceteris paribus 
increase their share in GDP. Hence the changes in 
the tax-to-GDP ratio will be put into perspective 
using changes in (proxies of) the tax bases’ shares 
in GDP. 
Graph 2.5 displays the evolution of EU-27 average 
tax revenues from indirect taxes and the share of 
final consumption expenditure in GDP. The 
significant fall in the ratio of indirect taxes to GDP 
since 2008 greatly exceeds the (moderate) previous 
increase until 2006/07. Interestingly, following the 
severe fall in 2008, the 2009 fall in consumption 
taxes in % of GDP was rather modest compared to 
previous years with decelerating growth (e.g. 
2001). This is due to the cushioning effect from the 
rather stable (proxy of) the tax base (consumption 
expenditure), falling by much less than GDP. 
However, shortfalls in other indirect taxes, for 
example those in real estate taxation generated by 
drops in asset prices and slumping transaction 
volumes, still resulted in an overall lower indirect 
tax-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the observed decline 
in the ratio of indirect taxes to GDP seems to 
reflect discretionary tax cuts implemented in a 
number of countries in 2009 to counter the effects 
of the crisis on consumption. (14) Reflecting VAT 
and excise duty hikes in a number of countries 
since 2010, the share of indirect taxes in GDP has 
been rebounding in 2010 and 2011. 
Graph 2.6: Social security contributions and compensation of 
employees, as % of GDP 
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Apart from a large fall in 1998, which mirrors 
significant reductions due to reforms in two big 
Member States (France and Italy), SSCs as a 
percentage of GDP evolve in a relatively stable 
manner over the sample period, displaying, as 
expected, relatively limited reaction to the cycle. 
After a gentle downward trend until 2007, which 
might reflect governments’ efforts to reduce the 
taxes on labour, revenues from social security 
contributions as a percentage of GDP picked up 
markedly in 2008 and 2009. This can be explained 
by the schemes implemented in many countries to 
shield the labour market from the severe impact of  
 
                                                          
(14) For an overview of the main tax measures see European 
Commission (2010d). 
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the crisis on output, leading to a considerable 
degree of labour-hoarding, and thus robustness of 
the base of social security contributions. Indeed, 
the losses in employment in 2009 were relatively 
moderate compared to those in output (-1.8 % 
against -4.2 %). This is reflected as an increase in 
the share of the wage bill to GDP (Graph 2.6), 
which even compensated some (limited) SSC cuts. 
Graph 2.8: Direct tax revenues and wages and profits, as % of 
GDP 
11
12
13
14
15
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
in
 %
 o
f G
D
P
51
52
53
54
55
in
 %
 o
f G
D
P
Direct taxes Wages and profits
Source: Commission services. 
Direct taxes exhibit the expected pronounced 
cyclical pattern, with two peaks in 2000 and 2007 
in line with the evolution of GDP growth. The fall 
in 2008 was still relatively contained, due to stable 
wages and retained corporate tax revenues, which 
usually react with a lag to corporate profit 
developments. In 2009, a number of tax cuts, 
mainly with respect to the tax base and payment 
deferrals, aggravated the cyclical drop in corporate 
taxes. Together with a decreasing share of wages 
and net profits in GDP these tax cuts resulted in a 
slump of revenues from direct taxes as a 
percentage of GDP in 2009. Following a small 
further decline in 2010, the ratio of direct taxes to 
GDP is expected to rebound somewhat in 2011. 
Large differences in tax composition across 
countries 
There is substantial variation across Member 
States in the importance of indirect taxes, direct 
taxes and SSCs (Graph 2.8). In 2009, indirect taxes 
accounted for less than 30 % of total taxation in 
Belgium and Spain but for over 50 % in Bulgaria. 
The share of direct taxes in total taxation varied 
from less than 20 % in Slovakia to almost 63 % in 
Denmark, where the social security system is 
financed out of general tax revenues. Finally, 
social security contributions represented only 
about 2 % of total taxation in Denmark, and also 
played quite a small role (less than 20 %) in 
Sweden, Malta and the UK, but made up almost 
45 % of total taxes in the Czech Republic. 
However, these large differences in the tax 
composition of Member States in 2009 cannot be 
attributed to the crisis. The dispersion across 
Member States in tax revenues from indirect taxes, 
direct taxes and social security contributions has 
remained relatively stable over time (Graph 2.10). 
The dispersion of direct taxes is the highest. While 
some convergence took place in 2006 and 2007, 
the dispersion measure broadly returned to its 
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average level during the crisis. The dispersion of 
SSCs appears to display a slight downward trend, 
although this decline had been levelling off prior to 
the crisis. The reduced dispersion of SSCs 
compared to 1995 might reflect some convergence 
in the financing of social protection across the EU. 
Graph 2.10: Convergence in indirect, direct taxes and SSC in the 
EU-27 
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Some Member States that traditionally rely mostly 
on SSCs to finance social spending have 
introduced several elements of tax financing. 
Moreover, a shift towards private-funded pension 
systems has decreased general government SSC 
revenues. However, recently some Member States 
have redirected social security contributions to 
funded pension systems in the general government 
sector. 
Indirect taxes are the least dispersed in the EU, 
reflecting the comparably high level of 
harmonisation, e.g. in the form of minimum VAT 
and minimum energy tax rates. While the late 
1990s saw some further convergence, revenues 
from indirect taxes have been slowly diverging 
again since 2000. While this increase points to the 
impact of discretionary rate cuts in some countries 
till 2007, the increase since 2008 reflects the 
different reaction to the crisis across Member 
States. While some tried to stimulate the economy 
by rate cuts and special base regimes (particularly 
for VAT), others were already focusing on 
increasing revenues. In 2010 and 2011, the 
dispersion of indirect taxes across Member States 
is levelling off again. 
2.2.2. Decomposition by economic function 
Taxation of consumption, labour, capital 
and … 
Graph 2.9 ranks Member States by the overall tax 
burden and displays a breakdown of revenue by 
economic function — taxes on consumption, 
labour (employed and non-employed) and capital 
(capital and business income and stocks) — for the 
year 2009. The graph shows quite a lot of variation 
both in terms of the overall level and in its 
composition. In particular it indicates that, on 
average, those Member States that acceded after 
 
Graph 2.9: Total tax burden, decomposition by economic function, 2009, % of GDP 
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2004 rely to a larger extent on consumption taxes, 
while EU-15 countries levy most of their taxes on 
labour. The differences reflected in the graph are 
not only the result of different tax rates applied. 
They also display the size and importance of the 
different tax bases with respect to each other and 
the respective shares in GDP. Hence, despite the 
fact that the most important indirect taxes are — to 
some extent — harmonised at EU level, namely 
VAT and certain excise duties, there is substantial 
variation in consumption taxes. This is due to the 
fact that the share of the consumption tax base in 
GDP diverges by around 35 percentage points 
across Member States. Moreover, harmonisation 
does not directly translate into the setting of actual 
tax rates, but only sets structures and minimum 
requirements (e.g. minimum excise duties on 
mineral oils). 
Given the lack of harmonisation in labour and 
capital taxation, the variation is even greater. In 
these cases a larger part of the observed variations 
can be explained by differences in the actual tax 
systems, i.e., by different rates, progressivity, etc. 
Nevertheless, differences in tax bases are still an 
important factor in explaining the observed 
variation in revenue. 
Smaller revenue sources, such as taxation of stocks 
of capital/wealth and taxation of non-employed 
labour (essentially pensions and social security 
 
benefits), range from the significant to the 
negligible. This primarily reflects choices made in 
different Member States to provide social benefits 
and pensions on either a gross or a net basis. 
Overall, the taxes levied on (employed) labour 
income, which are usually withheld at source (i.e. 
personal income tax levied on wages and salaries 
income plus social contributions), represent the 
most prominent source of revenue, contributing 
almost 50 % to overall receipts on EU-average, 
followed by taxes on consumption at over one 
third and on capital at over one fifth. 
…environmental taxation  
Environmental taxes are ‘taxes levied on tax bases 
that have a proven specific, negative impact on the 
environment.’ (15) However, charges and fees on 
environmentally harmful tax bases are not included 
in this definition, as they represent requited 
payments — i.e. there is a link between the service 
and the payment. Statistically, environmental taxes 
are divided into four broad categories, namely 
energy, transport, pollution and resource taxes. 
Environmental taxes can in principle be levied on 
all three tax bases — consumption, labour and 
capital. In practice, however, environmental taxes 
fall mostly on consumption, usually in the form of  
 
                                                          
(15) Definition as in European Commission (2001). 
Graph 2.11: Decomposition of environmental taxes, 2009, % of GDP 
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excise duties. Denmark and Sweden are the only 
countries which in addition levy a significant part 
of environmental taxes on capital. Despite their 
increasing importance in the policy debate, 
environmental tax revenues have been falling in 
recent years in the EU on average. In 2009, 
revenues from environmental taxes accounted for 
2.4 % of GDP in the EU-27, which constitutes a 
significant fall when compared to the peak of 
2.8 % of GDP in 1999. While almost all EU-15 
Member States recorded decreasing environmental 
taxes, some EU-12 Member States were steadily 
increasing them. This increase has been largely 
driven by the EU accession process, which 
requires minimum rates for some environmental 
taxes (16). Currently, both EU-15 and EU-12 
Member States raise around 2.4 % of their GDP 
from environmental taxes, translating into 7.2 % of 
total taxation for EU-12 Member States but only 
6 % of total taxation in EU-15 Member States. 
As graph 2.11 shows, energy taxes — taxes on 
energy products such as mineral oils, gas and 
electricity as well as CO2 taxes — are by far the 
most significant, representing around three 
quarters of environmental tax receipts. What 
becomes evident from graph 2.11 is that most 
energy taxes are levied on road transport fuel. The 
 
                                                          
(16) European Commission (2003), and European Commission 
(2004 a, b). 
high share of revenues derived from the use of 
fuels for transport purposes is due to the existence 
of EU legislation which sets minimum tax rates for 
energy products and electricity(17). Minimum tax 
rates for petrol, which is almost exclusively used 
for transport purposes, are the highest among all 
products covered by the Energy Tax Directive. In 
addition, most of the Member States apply tax 
rates far above the minima set by the EU 
legislation. 
Change in tax composition up to the 
beginning of the crisis  
Until the crisis took full hold in 2008, the 
composition of tax systems — i.e. the tax mix — 
had seen little change in the EU on average. Graph 
2.12 illustrates the limited nature of the tax shift 
between 2001 and 2008. (18) (19) As similar 
economic conditions prevailed in the years 2001 
and 2008 they should be broadly comparable in 
terms of the impact of the cycle on the tax 
composition. Thus, the observed tax shift can be 
largely interpreted as changes in tax policy. 
                                                          
(17) Transport fuels are fuels used only for transportation 
purposes and do not include fuels used for heating or 
business purposes. 
(18) The tax shift is measured by the change of the revenue 
share by economic function in total taxation. 
(19) By its nature, this graph does not contain any information 
on the development of the overall tax-to-GDP ratio; it only 
contains information on shifts within the tax system. 
Graph 2.12: Tax Shift between 2001 and 2008, % of GDP 
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While the share of consumption and labour in total 
taxation decreased by 0.6 and 0.8 percentage 
points respectively, the capital share increased by 
roughly 1.4 percentage points in the EU-27. 
Comparing developments in EU-15 and EU-12 
Member States, however, displays large variations. 
In the EU-12 the labour tax share decreased by 3.4 
percentage points, whereas the consumption share 
increased by 1.6 percentage points. Contrastingly, 
the EU-15 experienced a basically unchanged 
labour tax share and a decreasing consumption 
share. However, this masks important 
developments in individual Member States, as 
displayed by Graph 2.12. 
Change in tax composition since the 
beginning of the crisis 
Graph 2.13 displays the tax shift between 2007 and 
2009. It indicates a much more pronounced overall 
change in the tax mix compared to the changes 
observed before the crisis. However, these figures 
have to be interpreted with care given the large 
economic downturn in 2009. As 2007 and 2009 
represent two years with completely different 
cyclical situations, large parts of the indicated tax 
shifts are arguably driven by the economic cycle. 
Thus, instead of displaying the effects of tax policy 
measures such as tax hikes in labour taxation, the 
graph mostly reflects the effects of the changed 
importance of tax bases relative to one another. 
 
While the importance of business profits fell 
considerably over the last two years, the relative 
importance of the wage bill increased. This 
translates into similar developments with respect to 
tax revenues in the tax categories labour and 
capital. The share of consumption taxes stayed 
virtually unchanged on EU average.  
2.3. IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON CONSUMPTION, 
LABOUR, CAPITAL AND ENERGY 
Given the impact on tax revenues of changes in tax 
bases it appears useful to look at a measure which 
tries to abstract from these developments of tax 
bases. Implicit tax rates (ITR) serve this intention, 
as they try to estimate the economy-wide average 
tax rate. They are computed as the ratio of total tax 
revenues (as observed in the data) to a proxy of the 
corresponding tax base. The resulting ratio can 
then be interpreted as a fictitious average tax rate 
that would prevail if all the activities forming the 
proxy for the tax base were taxed at the same rate. 
It might still reflect some cyclical fluctuations, for 
example, because many tax systems are nonlinear 
so that average tax rates increase with average 
incomes or profits. 
While ITRs provide a useful instrument for 
interpreting tax developments and making them 
comparable across Member States, they should not 
  
Graph 2.13: Tax shift between 2007 and 2009, % of GDP 
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be taken at face value. (20) They should usefully be 
complemented by a ‘bottom-up’ analysis of policy 
changes (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of 
discretionary tax measures implemented in 2010-
2011).  
Graph 2.15 displays the evolution of the three 
main implicit tax rates. (21) They follow the 
distinction of taxes according to economic function 
and therefore display the ITRs on consumption, on 
labour and on capital. 
Graph 2.15: Implicit tax rates, EU-25 averages 
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(20) Using the same denominator for all countries ITRs cannot 
take into account country peculiarities. Moreover, there are 
limitations to data availability needed for an exact 
calculation of the ITRs. 
(21) For more information on the calculation of the implicit tax 
rates see European Commission (2011a). 
Consumption taxes  
The economic and financial crisis has interrupted 
the rather stable development of the taxes on 
consumption in the first decade of the century. 
Overall, the EU-27 (as well as the EA-17) average 
ITR has decreased by more than one percentage 
point since 2007, to 18.9 % (EA-17: 18.5 %). This 
represents both the greatest slump and the lowest 
level observed since 1995. Over the last two years, 
the ITR has decreased in 20 EU Member States 
(see Table A1.3 in Annex 1), which partly reflects 
demand-stimulating tax measures. 
Among those Member States experiencing a 
decrease in the ITR and driving the EU weighted 
average, the UK lowered its standard VAT rate by 
2.5 percentage points. France and Italy 
(temporarily) decreased their tax bases by applying 
reduced rates to a wider range of services – for 
hospitality services in France and on housing 
renovating activities in Italy. Moreover, France, 
Italy and in particular Spain took measures 
changing the timing of VAT payments or 
accelerating reimbursements, thereby reducing 
consumption tax revenues. 
Moreover, a decreasing ITR can be the 
consequence of a shift in consumption patterns 
towards primary goods, which are normally  
  
Graph 2.14: Decomposition of the implicit tax rate on consumption, 2009 
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subject to lower VAT rates. In addition, there is 
evidence that tax planning, avoidance and evasion 
activities rise during times of economic distress, 
resulting in lower tax revenues relative to the 
corresponding base. (22) 
The aggregate level of the ITR on consumption 
combines a number of taxes, which are different in 
nature and justification. Graph 2.14 displays the 
ITR on consumption and disaggregates it into three 
main subcomponents: VAT, energy and excise 
duties on tobacco and alcohol, plus a residual. As 
shown in the graph, the lowest ITR on 
consumption throughout the whole Union in 2009 
is for Spain (12.3 %) followed by Greece (14 %), 
and Portugal (16.2 %). Among countries with a 
high ITR on consumption, Denmark stands out 
with 31.5 %, thus over three percentage points 
above the Member State with the second highest 
ITR, i.e. Hungary (28.2 %), followed by Estonia 
and Sweden (both 27.6 %). These two groups of 
Member States with high and low ITRs on 
consumption have been relatively stable with 
respect to the status quo before the crisis with the 
exception of Portugal and Estonia. For Estonia the 
hike in the ITR (by 6.5 percentage points in 2009) 
reflects VAT rate and base increases and increases 
in excise duty rates. 
                                                          
(22) Sancak et al. (2010). 
Labour taxes 
Labour taxation in the EU and in the euro area 
(EA) – as measured by the ITR on labour – has 
remained relatively stable over the last one and a 
half decades and even since the beginning of the 
crisis. In 2009, the EU-27 average amounted to 
36.0 % (EA-17: 38.2 %), only 1.5 percentage 
points below (also for EA-17) its peak level 
recorded in 1998. However, this pattern masks 
quite diverse developments in labour taxation 
across Member States. Almost all of the ten 
Central and Eastern European Member States that 
acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 show a much 
stronger decline than the EU-27 average. The 
average in these Member States has gone down by 
about 4.3 percentage points since 2000, resulting 
in an average ITR on labour in the EU-12 of 
30.6 % in 2009. The Member States that have 
experienced the highest reductions are Bulgaria, 
Lithuania and Romania (all above 8 percentage 
points).  
While the first year of the crisis was characterised 
by an increase in labour taxation, 2009 saw a drop 
in the EU-27 ITR on labour by 0.7 percentage 
points.(23) This decrease clearly reflects the tax 
measures in the areas of personal income taxation 
and social security contributions. Most of the 
  
                                                          
(23) See Table A1.3 in Annex 1. 
Graph 2.16: Decomposition of the implicit tax rate on labour, 2009 
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measures focused on reducing the tax base, usually 
by increasing allowances, but some Member States 
also enacted significant tax rate cuts. 
Graph 2.16 shows significant differences in the 
ITR of Member States. At one extreme, three 
Member States stand out with ITR below 25 %, 
while six EU-15 Member States and Hungary have 
an ITR on labour in excess of 40 %. There is wide 
variation across Member States as regards not only 
the level but also the composition of labour 
taxation. On average, nearly two thirds of the 
overall ITR on labour consists of social security 
contributions paid by employees and employers. 
Only in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
do personal income taxes have a share above 50 % 
in total charges paid on labour income. This 
reflects the choice of Member States on how to 
finance their social security system and which 
(pension) services to provide. In some of the 
Member States, namely Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia, less than 20 % of the ITR on labour 
consists of personal income tax. 
Taxes on capital 
In recent years growing policy attention has been 
devoted to the taxation of capital and in particular 
to corporate income taxation. Corporate income 
tax, although considered the main tax on capital, is 
not a major source of revenue in the vast majority 
of EU Member States. In 2009, it represented on 
average 2.3 % of GDP in the EU (24) and was less 
than 4 % of GDP in all but three countries. With 
the inclusion of the other capital taxes, namely on 
capital income of the self-employed (2.0 %), of 
households (0.9 %), and on the stock of capital 
(wealth) (2.6 %), the EU average of capital taxes 
amounted to 7.9 % of GDP. 
In contrast to the ITRs on consumption and labour, 
the ITR on capital for the EU-25 shows 
considerable fluctuation since 1995 (see Graph 
2.14). It increased dramatically between 1995 and 
2001, before showing a three-year decrease and 
then a new rise from 2003 to 2006. Since 2007, the 
ITR has decreased by more than three percentage 
points, amounting to 30.2 % in 2009. Since the 
beginning of the century the ITR on capital 
displays strongly differing trends between Member 
States (compare Table A1.3 in Annex 1); the 
                                                          
(24) See Table A1.3 in Annex 1. 
overall ITR on capital has decreased in eleven 
Member States, while it has increased in eight 
countries. 
The strong decrease observed in the ITR on capital 
since the beginning of the crisis is driven by the 
development of the ITR on corporate income, 
which has slumped by more than seven percentage 
points since 2007 to below 21 %. This mainly 
reflects the trend in the European Union towards 
lower corporate income tax rates, becoming fully 
visible only in times of crisis. The average general 
corporate tax rate in the EU-27 was reduced by 
12.1 percentage points in the period from 1995 to 
2011. This policy was usually part of a tax-cut-
cum-base-widening strategy, where the base was 
widened by e.g. reducing deductions, exemptions 
and less generous depreciation rules. As the crisis 
took effect, many countries (temporarily) reversed 
some of these base-broadening measures or 
allowed for payment deferrals. 
Graph 2.17: Implicit tax rate on capital income, 2009 
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Graph 2.17 presents an overview of the ITR on 
capital in the European Union in 2009. As the UK 
experienced a drop in the ITR on capital of almost 
six percentage points in 2009, Denmark now heads 
the ranking with an ITR of 43.8 %. An even higher 
slump in the ITR on capital was seen in Latvia, 
now ranking last. 
Environmental taxation 
The development of environmental taxation is in 
most countries driven by the development of 
energy taxes, which amount to 70 % of 
environmental tax revenues on average in the EU. 
However, a decrease in environmental taxation,  
 
2. Level, structure and trends of tax revenues in the EU 
 
29 
and in particular in energy taxation – as analysed 
in sub-section 2.2.2 – does not necessarily indicate 
that environmental issues do not rank high on the 
policy agenda. If environmental taxes are effective 
they should reduce the use of environmentally 
harmful goods and hence erode the tax base. 
Indeed, between 2000 and 2009, final energy 
consumption, which is the tax base for energy 
taxes, increased at a much slower pace than the tax 
bases for the other taxes analysed in section 2.2 as 
well as GDP. A look at the deflated implicit tax 
rate (ITR) on energy(25) (26) — setting energy tax 
revenues in perspective with final energy 
consumption — confirms that the real ITR on 
energy has increased in almost all the new Member 
States, and decreased in only nine – mostly EU-15 
– Member States. The decrease in the ITR in these 
Member States can be directly linked to lower 
taxation in real terms despite unchanged nominal 
rates. In general, excise duties on energy products 
are levied on measures per unit and not indexed to 
inflation, so their real value decreases over time. 
On the other hand the increase in the EU-12 was 
mostly driven by the need to achieve the minimum  
  
                                                          
(25) The ITR on energy shows the amount of energy tax, in 
euro, levied per unit of final energy consumption. 
(26) See Table A1.5 in Annex 1. 
EU rates (as explained above) by 2010. It is 
particularly interesting that after a period of 
decreasing real ITRs an increase is noticed in 2009 
in almost all Member States, reflecting the 
discretionary increase in tax rates. As in recent 
years, Denmark displays the highest ITR on energy 
by a wide margin, followed by Germany and the 
Netherlands. Generally, EU-12 countries display 
markedly lower levels of energy taxation. 
The overall decrease in environmental taxation as 
a percentage of GDP might not only be due to the 
reduction of the tax base as a percentage of GDP 
and the loss in real value due to lack of indexation 
but could partly reflect a change in policy 
instruments. It has become common to levy fees 
instead of lump-sum taxes such as road pricing, 
fees on waste and waste water disposal, etc., which 
are not recorded as taxes. This of course impacts 
on the tax share and the respective changes 
observed. However, neither increasing nor 
decreasing tax shares can guarantee that 
corresponding climate and environmental 
objectives have been achieved – this has to be 
assessed separately. 
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This chapter reviews the tax reforms implemented 
in the 27 EU Member States in 2010 and the first 
half of 2011. General developments across the EU 
are reviewed in section 3.1. Section 3.2 goes on to 
describe tax reforms in the Member States in more 
detail, looking at each type of tax systematically. 
3.1. GENERAL TRENDS IN TAX REFORMS 
When the financial and economic crisis hit Europe 
at the end of 2008, Member States responded with 
coordinated action in the form of the European 
Economic Recovery Programme (EERP) to 
temporarily stimulate aggregate demand in 2009 
and to a lesser extent in 2010, and to limit the 
sizeable contraction in output. At the same time, 
the crisis resulted in unsustainable public finances, 
due to the recession-driven collapse in revenues, 
the tax shortfall generated by the sharp drop in 
asset prices and the discretionary tax and 
expenditure measures taken to support the 
economy during the crisis. 
Therefore, in 2010 and 2011, most Member States 
have faced the challenge of consolidating public 
finances, while at the same time improving their 
tax structure to make it more growth-friendly, 
where possible by shifting direct to indirect 
taxation or by base broadening. In 2011, 24 of the 
27 Member States are subject to the excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) and have received 
recommendations from the Council to take 
effective corrective action with the aim of bringing 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3 % by country-
specific deadlines ranging from 2011 to 2015. The 
national policies presented in the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform 
Programmes show that Member States (with an 
unsustainable fiscal path) generally intend to raise 
taxes in 2011, to complement the curb on public 
spending. 
3.1.1. OVERALL TAX POLICY DIRECTION 
Tax policy in 2010-11 has been strongly 
influenced by the response to the financial and 
economic crisis that began in the latter part of 
2008. 2010 was a year of transition, with no clear 
overall tendency to increase or decrease taxes. Tax 
reforms implemented in some countries 
 
were still focusing on expansionary measures to 
bolster aggregate demand in order to reduce the 
impact of the crisis. In other countries, the need to 
consolidate public finances and increase revenues 
resulted in measures to increase taxes during 2010. 
In almost all EU Member States, the tax reforms 
implemented in 2011 have focused on increasing 
revenues, although most countries have chosen to 
concentrate their consolidation efforts more on the 
expenditure side than on the revenue side. (27) 
However, there is clearly a variation in the extent 
to which Member States need to tighten fiscal 
policy and increase revenue, as discussed in 
section 1 of Chapter 5. 
2011 appears to be a turning point for measures on 
the revenue side, as reflected by the development 
in overall tax burden. The EU27-average of the 
total tax burden (including social security 
contributions) remained unchanged at 39.8 % of 
GDP from 2009 to 2010, but it is forecast to 
increase to 40.2 % of GDP in 2011; however, it is 
not expected to reach the 2008 level of 40.6 % (see 
section 2 in Chapter 2). This development is 
mainly due to discretionary measures. The 
budgetary impact of discretionary measures on the 
revenue is forecast to amount to 0.1 % of GDP in 
2010 and increase to 0.5 % of GDP in 2011 on the 
EU average. For the euro area, discretionary 
measures account for 0.0 % and 0.4 % of GDP in 
2010 and 2011 respectively. 
3.1.2. THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF TAXATION 
Table 3.1 briefly summarises the direction of tax 
changes implemented in the EU Member States in 
2010 and 2011. 
Most Member States have increased taxes in 2010 
or 2011 to speed up fiscal consolidation. A 
majority of Member States have increased personal 
income tax, sometimes by raising statutory rates 
(Greece, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), 
although measures to broaden the tax base are 
prevalent. VAT and excise duties have also been 
increased in many countries, most frequently in the 
form of rate increases. 
                                                          
(27) For an analysis of expenditure-based consolidations as 
compared to consolidations based on tax increases see 
European Commission (2010a). 
European Commission 
Tax reforms in EU Member States 
 
32 
 
Table 3.1: Tax changes in 2010 and 2011 
Statutory rates Base or special regimes
Increase EL, ES, FR, IE, LV, LU, PT, UK
AT, CZ, DK, EE, ES, 
FR, IE, LV, PT, RO, 
SK, UK
Decrease DE, DK, FI, HU, NL AT, BG, DE, FI, IT, LT, SE
Increase EL, PT LU, RO
Decrease CZ, EL, HU, LT, NL, UK
AT, BE, DE, ES, LT, 
NL
Increase IE, LV BG, CZ, IE, LT, PT, RO, SK
Decrease BG, HU
Increase
CZ, EL, ES, FI, HU, 
LV, PL, PT, RO, SK, 
UK
BG, CY, EL, ES, FR, 
PT, LV
Decrease IE BE, DE, HU, LT, NL, PL
Increase
AT, BG, CY, CZ, 
DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, 
FI, FR, IE, HU, LV, 
MT, NL, PL, RO, 
SL, SK, UK
DK, IE, IT, LV
Decrease AT, BG, SK BE, NL
Increase CZ, DE, EL, FR, LV, PT LV
Decrease
Taxation of 
Property
Excise Duties
Personal Income 
Tax
Corporate Income 
Tax
Social Security 
Contributions
Value Added Tax
Note: The table encompasses tax changes implemented in 2010 and 
2011 including temporary but significant changes. Minor changes are 
not included. Introduction of new taxes is listed as an increase in 
statutory rate. Cut-off date is 30 June 2011. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The urgent need for fiscal consolidation has 
resulted in the overturning of the decade-long 
trend of shifting revenue from direct to indirect 
taxes in more than half of EU Member States. 
Shifting taxation from corporate income and 
personal income to other sources, primarily to 
consumption, continued during the outbreak of the 
crisis in 2008 and 2009. However, this tendency 
has been less evident in the tax reforms undertaken 
in 2010 and 2011, as a large number of countries 
have recently increased personal income tax. 
Countries with large budgetary deficits, such as 
Greece and Portugal, have increased taxation on 
both labour income (personal income tax and 
and/or social security contributions) and corporate 
income. VAT and a number of excise duties were 
also increased. 
Around one third of Member States have taken 
revenue-increasing measures in 2011 in 
combination with reforms of tax systems aimed at 
stimulating long term growth. In most of these 
countries, tax policy initiatives have taken the form 
of major tax reforms, shifting a proportion of the 
tax burden from labour or capital to consumption 
(Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania 
and the Netherlands). Such a shift corresponds to a 
move towards less distortive tax bases, as 
discussed in section 1 of Chapter 4. Measures have 
also been taken in fifteen countries to widen the 
tax base for personal income tax and social 
security contributions, which may also have a 
positive impact on growth by limiting the need for 
distortionary increases in tax rates. However, in 
around 10 countries, tax changes aimed at 
fostering growth have taken the form of special 
arrangements targeted at specific sectors or 
activities, and thus involving the introduction of 
new tax expenditures in personal and corporate 
income taxes. 
Overall, despite the fact that a large number of 
Member States have increased personal income 
taxes, there are signs of a modest shift in the 
composition of the overall tax burden from direct 
to indirect taxation in 2010 and 2011 in the EU as 
a whole. The share of indirect taxes in the total tax 
burden is forecast to increase from 33.9 % in 2009 
to 34.9 % in 2011, whereas the share of direct taxes 
is forecast to decrease slightly from 32.6 % in 2009 
to 32.3 % in 2011. However, the share of indirect 
taxes was low in 2009 due to temporary measures 
in several Member States that allowed deferred 
payment of VAT. 
3.2. MAIN TAX REFORMS IN THE MEMBER 
STATES 
This section covers the main measures carried out 
in direct taxation (personal income tax and 
corporate income tax), and social security 
contributions, followed by reforms in indirect 
taxes (VAT and excise duties); it ends with a 
section on other measures including housing 
taxation, taxation of the financial sector and 
measures against tax evasion. Further details on 
tax reforms in each of the 27 Member States are 
outlined in Table 3.3 at the end of this chapter. 
3.2.1. DIRECT TAXATION 
Personal Income Tax 
Many Member States have implemented what are, 
in some cases, substantial changes to personal 
income tax during 2010 and 2011. The current 
economic situation has resulted in marked 
differences across Member States as regards the 
direction of these tax changes. 
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Several Member States have lowered personal 
income taxes (Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands and 
Sweden), as has indeed been the trend across the 
EU during the last decade. However, a larger 
number of countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Ireland, France, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and the United 
Kingdom) raised personal income taxes, although 
on a more varied scale and often by means of 
changes to the tax base. In Denmark, personal 
income taxes were somewhat increased in 2011, 
following the reform which lowered them in 2010. 
For Member States which have room to 
manoeuvre in shifting the tax burden away from 
personal income tax, most tax reforms have been 
aimed at increasing work incentives. The focus has 
been partly on participation incentives and partly 
on incentives to work extra hours along the 
intensive margin. A notable shift away from 
personal income tax to other sources of taxation 
has taken place in Denmark, Finland, Germany 
and Hungary. 
The progressive nature of the personal income tax 
system has been enhanced in several Member 
States. France increased the highest marginal tax 
rates as well as tax rates on capital income. Spain 
introduced two additional top personal income tax 
brackets of 46 % and 47 %, and increased tax rates 
on capital income from savings in 2010. In the 
United Kingdom, personal income tax has been 
made more progressive, with higher tax 
allowances and an additional top rate of 50 % — 
10 percentage points higher than the previous 
maximum. (28) Greece and Portugal both 
introduced a new 45 %-top rate in addition to the 
previous top rates of 40 % and 42 %, respectively. 
Latvia increased the top rate in 2010 and 
Luxembourg did likewise in 2011.(29) In Ireland a 
combination of measures to personal income tax 
and social security contributions means the top 
marginal rate has increased to 52 % for employees 
and 55 % for the self-employed and applies from a 
lower threshold. Lastly, Germany increased 
allowances (basic allowance and allowance for 
                                                          
(28) Furthermore, the United Kingdom has introduced an 
income ceiling of £ 100 000 for receiving the basic 
allowance from April 2011. 
(29) Latvia increased the top rate from 23 % to 26 % in 2010 but 
lowered the rate slightly to 25 % in 2011. 
children) and improved the deductibility of social 
security contributions. 
Only in two Member States has there been a 
change towards less progressive personal income 
tax schedules, in 2010 and 2011, with the 
introduction of a flat tax regime (Hungary) and a 
marked reduction in the top statutory income tax 
rate (Denmark). The Hungarian flat tax reform in 
2011 brought the highest marginal tax rate down 
from 32 % (36 % in 2009) to the 16 % flat rate, 
whereas in Denmark, the 2010 reform lowered the 
highest marginal tax rate from 63.0 % to 56.1 %. 
This overall tendency towards a steeper 
progression in personal income tax might reflect 
the fact that personal income tax is the only tax 
that is well suited to redistribute consumption 
possibilities among different income groups, 
whereas other taxes which increased in response to 
the need for consolidation tend to be flat or even 
regressive. 
In 2010, for the first time in several years, the EU-
27 average top personal income tax rate rose, but 
decreased again slightly in 2011, mainly as a result 
of the Hungarian reform. Table A1.4 in Annex 1 
presents the statutory top personal income tax rates 
since 1995. 
In Austria, a dual income tax system was 
implemented in 2011, taxing capital gains of 
financial assets — together with income from 
interests, dividends, etc. — by a withholding tax of 
25 % independent of the holding period. Also, 
Portugal introduced a new flat tax on capital gains, 
which are now also taxed independently of the 
holding period, and Romania broadened the 
personal income tax base to include incomes from 
capital gains and interests on bank deposits. 
Several countries also introduced measures to 
broaden the tax base, often by reducing tax 
expenditure items. In Denmark, the reduction of 
statutory rates was partly financed by a broadening 
of the personal income tax base itself through 
reductions in the deductibility of work related 
expenses and interest payments. France replaced 
the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments 
with more targeted subsidised loan schemes in 
2010. In Spain, the housing investment deduction 
in personal income tax was removed for incomes 
above € 24 170.2 in order to reduce the bias 
towards investment in owner occupied housing. In 
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the Netherlands, a new top bracket was introduced 
in the imputed income for owner-occupied 
housing, increasing the imputed income for the 
part of the value in excess of € 1 million from 
0.55 % in 2009 to 1.05 % in 2011, bringing it 
closer to the 4 % imputed income that applies to 
other assets. Significant broadening of the personal 
income tax base was also seen in Latvia. In Italy, a 
lower proportional tax rate of between 19-21 % 
was introduced on rental income from buildings 
for residential purposes, replacing the inclusion of 
85 % of the rental income in the personal income 
tax base (with a marginal tax rate of around 30 % 
on average). 
Corporate Income Tax 
The strong tendency towards lowering the 
statutory tax rates across the EU has continued, 
albeit at a slower pace, as most Member States 
have left corporate income tax rates broadly 
unchanged. 
However, some Member States have made 
substantial changes. The majority of reforms have 
led to a decrease in corporate income taxation. 
Reductions of the statutory rate have taken place as 
follows in 2010-2011: Hungary introduced a lower 
rate of 10 %, applicable up to HUF 250 million of 
the tax base in 2011, which will gradually become 
the top statutory rate from 2013 (replacing the 
current 19 %-rate); Lithuania cut the rate to 15 % in 
2010 after having increased it from 15 % to 20 % in 
2009. The United Kingdom reduced both corporate 
income tax rates by 1 percentage point to 27 % and 
20 % respectively, and announced a further 
decrease in the standard rate by 1 percentage point 
per year until it reaches 24 %; in Greece, the 
statutory rate is reduced from 25 % in 2009, to 
24 % in 2010 and to 20 % for income earned as of 
2011. Greece introduced a temporary special 
contribution for enterprises with a net income 
above € 100 000 in 2009 and beyond. Portugal was 
the only country to increase the statutory corporate 
income tax rate, introducing an 
additional state corporate income tax (IRC) of 
2.5 % on taxable profits exceeding € 2 million. 
Table A1.4 in Annex 1 provides an overview of 
the statutory top corporate income tax rates in 
2011 compared to previous years. 
Some Member States which reduced the tax 
burden on corporate profits did so by narrowing 
the tax base rather than reducing general tax rates 
(or both, as in the case of Lithuania and the 
Netherlands). In Germany, the corporate income 
tax base was reduced by means of a (temporary) 
increase in depreciation allowances, which has the 
same economic effect on the marginal tax rate on 
investment as a decrease in the statutory rate. 
Other countries introduced special credits for R&D 
investment (Belgium) or a reduction in taxable 
profits for firms carrying out investments in certain 
assets (Lithuania). 
In France, the local business tax (taxe 
professionnelle) has been replaced by a new 
‘economic territorial contribution’ (contribution 
économique territoriale) as of 2010. The tax is no 
longer based on the annual value of commercial 
and industrial equipment, but on the annual rental 
value of immovable property (cotisation locale 
d’activité). The tax also consists of a new tax of 
1.5 % on the added value of the business which 
applies to taxpayers with a turnover exceeding 
€ 152 500 and allowances depending on the amount 
of turnover (cotisation complémentaire). 
Over the last decade or so, the broadening of the 
corporate income tax base and reduction of tax 
expenditures has often been one of the sources of 
financing the general reduction of the statutory 
corporate income tax rates seen across the EU. 
However, this has not been the case in 2010 and 
2011. On the contrary, several Member States have 
also introduced new special tax provisions 
favouring particular sectors. France, Spain and the 
Netherlands have expanded preferential tax 
schemes for small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). For a discussion on the effect of reduced 
corporate tax rates for small and medium sized 
enterprises, see sub-section 2.1 in Chapter 5. 
3.2.2. SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS 
Social security contributions have remained 
virtually unchanged in the majority of Member 
States through 2010 and 2011, except for the usual 
adjustments of contribution thresholds etc. 
Where changes have been made, they were mainly 
in the form of increases. Most often, the increase 
was achieved by amendments to the base rather 
than by raising the rates. Standard rates were only 
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increased in Ireland and Latvia.(30) In the Czech 
Republic and Ireland, social security contributions 
were increased for high income earners by means 
of an increase in the contribution ceilings. In most 
of the Member States where social security 
contributions were increased, this measure played 
a major role in increasing tax revenues. 
The exceptions were Hungary and Bulgaria 
(primarily a temporary measure in 2010), which 
have reduced contribution rates significantly in 
order to save jobs. Lithuania has introduced a 
relief in the employer social security contribution 
for first time employees in order to address the 
increase in youth unemployment. 
Some Member States (e.g. Hungary and Poland) 
have opted to reallocate social security 
contributions accruing to pension insurance 
schemes outside the public sector to the central 
government budget. 
3.2.3. INDIRECT TAXATION 
VAT 
A remarkably high proportion of Member States 
raised the VAT standard rate in 2010 or 2011, in 
several cases by a considerable amount. Hungary 
and Romania increased the standard VAT rate by 5 
percentage points from 20 % to 25 % and from 
19 % to 24 % respectively. Greece increased the 
standard VAT rate in two stages by 4 percentage 
points overall from 19 % to 23 %, Portugal 
increased the standard VAT in two steps by 3 
points from 20 % to 23 %, Spain increased the 
standard rate from 16 % to 18 % and, in the United 
Kingdom, the standard rate was increased from 
17.5 % to 20 %, following the temporary reduction 
to 15 % in 2009. Standard rates also increased in 
Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Poland and 
Slovakia. At the same time, Greece and Portugal 
also increased the reduced rates and repealed the 
exemptions. Moreover, other Member States 
increased VAT by increasing reduced rates or 
limiting their scope (notably Cyprus, Latvia and 
Spain). An exception was Ireland, where the VAT 
rate was reduced by 0.5 percentage points in 2010 
                                                          
(30) In Latvia increase in social security contribution rate was 
compensated through decreasing personal income tax 
standard rate and increasing non-taxable-minimum and 
allowance for dependants. 
back to the level of 21 % before the steep rise in 
December 2008. 
This development has resulted in a convergence 
towards the EU maximum standard VAT rate of 
25 % or close to it. Whereas the average standard 
VAT rate in EU-27 was 19.8 % in 2009, the 
average in 2011 is 20.7 % (see also Table A1.3 in 
Annex 1). Graph 3.1 shows the convergence of 
standard VAT rates across Member States from 
2009 to 2011. 
In Hungary and Denmark, the increase in the 
statutory VAT rate and the base broadening 
measures have directly served as an instrument to 
finance tax reforms for lowering taxes on labour 
income and the corporate income tax, whereas in 
other Member States the increases are likely to 
lead to higher overall tax revenues. 
It is interesting to note that several of the Member 
States which have increased the standard VAT rate 
— and also some Member States who have not — 
have extended the use of reduced VAT rates to 
include additional categories of goods (Belgium, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland). (31) 
These changes involve a movement away from the 
economically desirable simple and evasion-robust 
single rate. In most of these Member States they 
were justified by distributional concerns (reduced 
rates on necessities such as food or on merit goods 
thought to be under consumed). (32) 
Excise duties 
2010 and 2011 saw a significant increase in a large 
number of excise duty rates in most Member 
States. In several of the new Member States, excise 
duties on transport fuels, electricity, tobacco and 
alcohol have been increased considerably, 
although in many instances from a low level close 
to the EU minimum. 
Excise duties on energy and other environmental 
taxes have been increased in a large number of 
Member States. Germany introduced a tax on  
 
                                                          
(31) In the case of Lithuania, after having increased the standard 
VAT rate from 19 % to 21 % as of 1 September 2009. 
(32) Reduced VAT rates are generally not the most efficient 
way of redistributing income. For a discussion of the 
theoretical arguments for reduced VAT rates see Chapter 4, 
section 4.2. 
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nuclear fuel. Austria and Germany introduced a 
duty on airline tickets for planes leaving from 
domestic airports. Air passenger duty was also 
increased in the United Kingdom. In Finland, 
energy taxation has been restructured to take into 
account the energy content and CO2-emissions of 
energy products. Ireland introduced a tax on CO2-
emissions, and Slovakia introduced a tax on ETS 
quotas allocated free of charge. 
Several countries have implemented changes to car 
taxation. Austria, Belgium, Finland and the 
Netherlands have increased the CO2-incentives in 
car registration tax. In the case of Belgium and the 
Netherlands, this has taken the form of a reduction 
for cars with CO2 emissions in specific brackets. 
This leads to the price of selecting a car with 
marginally larger emissions rising sharply at kink 
points. Bulgaria abolished its excise duties on cars 
in 2010. Recurrent taxes on car ownership were 
changed in Greece, where the road tax on motor 
vehicles, which is calculated on the basis of the 
engine capacity and the environmental impact, was 
increased. In Finland, the annual vehicle taxes 
were also changed to take the CO2 emissions of 
each vehicle into account. Latvia introduced an 
annual tax on car ownership in 2010. 
Excise duties on health related products such as 
tobacco and alcohol and, in some instances, sugar 
have been increased in Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain. In Denmark, a novel excise 
duty has been introduced on saturated fats in dairy 
products and meat. Finland introduced an excise 
duty on sweets and ice cream. In Austria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland and Hungary, increases in excise 
duties on cigarettes and tobacco in 2010 and 2011 
have been relatively steep, whereas increases in 
excise duties on alcohol were notable in Estonia, 
Finland and Hungary. 
Table 3.2 summarises the tax changes in excise 
duties across Member States and breaks down the 
overview from Table 3.1 into two main excise duty 
categories. 
 
Table 3.2: Excise duty changes in 2010 and 2011 
Statutory rates Base or special regimes
Increase
AT, BG, CZ, CY, 
DE, DK, EE, EL, FI, 
FR, IE, HU, LV, 
MT, RO, SL, SK, 
UK
DK, IE, IT, LV
Decrease AT, BG, SK BE, NL
Increase
AT, BG, CZ, CY, 
DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, 
HU, LV, NL, PL, 
RO, SL,  SK
Decrease
Energy & 
Environment
Tobacco, Alcohol 
and Sugar etc.
Source: Commission services. 
 
3.2.4. Taxation of real estate property 
Few Member States have taken the opportunity of 
an environment of revenue consolidation to 
increase recurrent taxes on immovable property. 
Property taxes have been increased in the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Portugal and parts of Germany. 
In the case of the Czech Republic, the property tax 
rate on land and buildings doubled in 2010, and 
Graph 3.1: Standard VAT rates in 2009 and changes 2009-2011 in EU Member States 
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Note: Standard VAT rates are recorded on 1 July 2009 and 2011. Lithuania increased VAT from 19 % to 21 % as from 1 September 2009. 
Source: Commission services. 
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only taxes for buildings and non-residential spaces 
used for other business activity remained 
unchanged. Greece reintroduced a progressive tax 
on large properties with rates ranging from 0.1 % 
to 2 %, replacing the previous flat tax rate of 1 %. 
In Portugal, real estate tax on specified properties 
was increased from 1 % to 5 % in 2011 and a 
reduced real estate transfer tax for certain 
properties was revoked. In Latvia, the real estate 
tax on non-residential land and buildings was 
increased from 1 % to 1.5 % of the property value 
in 2010 and taxation of residential buildings was 
introduced by progressive rates of 0.1 %, 0.2 % or 
0.3 %. There was also a slight increase in housing 
taxation in the Netherlands, where a progressive 
element in the imputed income from owner-
occupied housing was introduced. In Germany, 
some states (‘Länder’) increased the real estate 
transaction tax in 2010 and 2011. Moreover, many 
municipalities have increased recurrent real estate 
taxes. In France, too, local governments increased 
recurrent real estate taxes (taxe d’habitation and 
taxe foncière). Hungary introduced a property tax 
in January 2010 which applied to real estate, water 
and airborne vehicles, and high powered passenger 
cars. The tax on real estate as adopted by 
Parliament was subsequently annulled by the 
constitutional court, and as a result the property tax 
was subsequently repealed in full in July 2010. 
3.2.5. Financial sector taxation 
In recent years, the introduction of new taxes on 
the financial sector has been under discussion in 
many Member States. The reason for this debate is 
the role that banks and other financial services 
companies played in the causes of the crisis, as 
well as the substantial government support the 
sector received after the crisis. Furthermore, 
financial services to final consumers are under-
taxed compared to other segments of the economy, 
as financial activities are generally exempt from 
VAT. (33) Three main types of taxes are being 
considered: bank levies based on the balance sheet, 
a financial activities tax (FAT) on the financial 
sector or a (global) tax on financial transactions 
(FTT). The European Commission is currently 
                                                          
(33) Financial services provided as inputs to businesses are 
consequently over-taxed, as the financial institution is not 
granted credit for VAT on its own inputs. This effect is 
however of a smaller magnitude. 
carrying out an impact assessment of different 
taxes on the financial sector.  
Some Member States have introduced or are 
planning to introduce new taxes targeted at the 
financial system. In Austria, Hungary and 
Portugal, this is implemented in the form of a bank 
levy based on the balance sheet total (excluding 
own capital and secured deposits). In the Austrian 
case, as an additional component of the tax base of 
the bank levy, 0.013 % of the banks’ trading 
volume in derivatives is included. Also, in Cyprus, 
a levy on the total deposits in banks was 
introduced and France introduced a levy based on 
consolidated risk weighted assets. Slovenia plans 
to introduce a bank levy in 2011 on the assets of 
the bank. Hungary also implemented a tax on 
insurance premiums. Denmark increased its 
financial activity tax (FAT) in 2011, which is a 
duty on wage and salary costs for businesses 
engaged in financial services. The rate was raised 
from effectively 9.13 % to 10.5 %. In the United 
Kingdom, specific attention has been paid to 
financial sector taxation, with the introduction of 
both a bank levy and a one-off bank payroll tax 
(i.e. bonus tax) of 50 % on bonuses over £ 25 000 
paid by banks and building societies between 9 
December 2009 and 5 April 2010. In October 
2010, the government also announced that it would 
examine the pros and cons of introducing a FAT. 
France also introduced a levy based on 
consolidated risk weighted assets and a one-off 
bonus tax. Portugal is the only Member State that 
has increased VAT and has also introduced or 
increased the taxation of financial services. (34) 
3.2.6. Tax administration and tax compliance 
A number of Member States introduced measures 
to improve tax collection and combat tax evasion. 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Italy, and 
Slovenia, in particular, decided on a series of 
measures to increase tax compliance. 
In the case of Italy, measures to increase tax 
compliance have been the main changes made to 
the tax system over the last two years. Italy has 
adopted the so-called ‘taxometer’, a procedure by  
 
                                                          
(34) The VAT Directive allows EU Member States the option of 
taxing financial services and other VAT exempted 
activities to the extent that this is technically possible. 
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which a computed level of income based on 
expenses made by the taxpayer is compared with 
declared income to detect tax evaders. In addition, 
the government has introduced a limit on cash 
payments and an obligation to furnish a tax 
identification number on purchases above € 3 600. 
Last but not least, the government has stepped up 
the number of inspections and adopted a number of 
measures targeting VAT fraud and companies 
operating in tax havens. 
For some of the countries under the economic and 
financial adjustment programme, improving tax 
compliance is an important part of a plan to restore 
financial stability. In Greece, initiatives include the 
creation of an Attorney-General for economic 
crime and more rigorous criminal prosecution, as 
well as increased penalties and a major 
reorganisation of the Directorate General for tax 
audits. In order to reduce tax evasion in the area of 
VAT, payments above € 1 500 have to be made 
through a bank. See sub-section 2.3 in Chapter 5, 
where tax governance issues announced by 
Member States in the NRPs and SCPs are 
discussed. 
Among other measures, Latvia increased the 
administrative capacities of enforcing agencies, 
improved the visibility of tax audits, enforced 
combating of illicit trade, limited the use of cash 
transfers and set a minimum wage floor for 
companies participating in public tenders. 
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Table 3.3: Overview of tax reforms in Member States 
Austria 
Personal income tax decrease. In 2010, a tax allowance on income of self-employed was introduced. 
Personal income tax increases. From 2011, capital income tax rates were harmonised at 25 % (also for private trusts) and the holding 
period after which realised speculative capital gains were tax exempt was abolished. Capital gains on shares, bonds, deposits are now 
subject to a final 25 % withholding tax. Single earner’s allowance is only granted if child support has been received. 
Corporate income tax decreases. For unincorporated businesses, tax allowances for business profits were increased from 10 % to 13 % 
from 2010 onwards; however, this was partially offset by the cancellation of the tax-favourable treatment for retained earnings. 
Excise duties increase. Environmental tax measures cover the introduction of a flight tax, a stronger adjustment of the car registration tax 
according to the CO2 emission of the vehicles, and an increase in the mineral oil tax on diesel (+ 5 cents/litre) and petrol (+ 4 cents/litre), 
whereas commuter allowances were increased by 10 %. The motor vehicle tax for heavy trucks was lowered to the level of international 
standards. Furthermore, excises on tobacco were increased significantly. 
Other tax increases. A solidarity bank levy based on the total balance sheet (excluding own capital and secured deposits) was introduced, 
with rates ranging from 0 % for banks’ balance sheets of up to € 1 billion, 0.055 % for balance sheets up to € 20 billion and 0.085 % above 
that figure. Trading with derivatives will be taxed at 0.013 % of their volume. 
  
Belgium 
Personal income tax increases. The number of overtime hours which qualify for reduced wage withholding tax was increased from 65 
hours to 100 hours in 2009 and to 130 hours in 2010. 
Corporate income tax decreases. The cap on the rate of the notional interest deduction was temporarily lowered from 6.5 % to 3.8 % in 
2010 and 2011. This means that the actual ACE rate drops from 4.473 % in 2009 to 3.8 % (4.3 % for SMEs) in 2010 and 2011. As of 
January 2011, several incentives were introduced for entrepreneurs and companies. Lastly, several anti-abuse measures were introduced. 
A measure to carry over surpluses of dividends from subsidiaries under the participation exemption regime (PE) has recently been taken as 
a result of a decision of the European Court of Justice (Cobelfret judgment). 
VAT decrease. The VAT rate for food served in restaurants and catering services was reduced from 21 % to 12 % from 2010 onwards. The 
reduced VAT rate of 6 % on renovation works in residential houses and some labour-intensive services has become permanent. 
Excise duties decrease. Several additional measures aimed at providing incentives for individuals and companies to favour cars with low 
emission levels. For individuals, a credit (directly on the invoice) of 15 % of the purchase price (up to a maximum of € 4 270) is granted for 
cars emitting less than 105g CO2/km and 3 % (with a maximum of € 800) for cars emitting between 105 and 115g CO2/km. For 
companies, zero-emission cars used for business purposes became deductible at 120 %, while the deduction of fuel costs for cars used for 
business and private purposes was reduced from 100 % to 75 %. 
  
Bulgaria 
Personal income tax decrease. The mortgage interest deduction for dwellings of young families, which was introduced temporarily in 
2009, was prolonged and remained effective in 2010. 
Social security contribution decreases. Social security contributions for the Pension Fund were reduced by 2 percentage points in 2010, 
but it increased by 1.8 percentage points as of 2011. As of 1 January 2010, the minimum monthly amount of self-employed insurance 
income on which contributions have to be paid was increased from BGN 260 (around € 133) to BGN 420 (€ 215) in order to limit the grey 
economy. 
VAT increase. The reduced VAT rate on organised tourism services was raised as of 2011. 
Excise duties decrease. Excise duties on cars were abolished in 2010.  
Excise duties increase. In 2010, excise duties on electricity (for industrial needs), coal and cigarettes were increased. The excise duties on 
cigarettes were set at a rate that was almost 20 % above the EU required minima. The tax rate on the gross proceeds from gambling was 
raised from 10 % to 15 %. As of 2011, a tax on insurance premiums was introduced. There were further increases in excise duties in 2011. 
  
Czech Republic 
Personal income tax increase. The lump-sum deductions that entrepreneurs can claim instead of actual expenses are reduced for certain 
categories of tax-payers from 60 % to 40 % of income. 
Corporate income tax decrease. In accordance with the approved legislation there was a further gradual reduction in corporate income tax 
to 19 % in 2010. 
Social security contribution increases. In 2010, the social security contribution for high income earners was increased by raising the 
ceiling on the annual security contributions base to six times the average annual salary (the previous figure was 4 times). 
VAT increase. The VAT rates were increased by 1 percentage point from 1 January 2010 to 20 % for the standard rate and 10 % for the 
reduced rate. 
Excise duties increase. Several excise duties were increased slightly in 2010 (alcohol, tobacco products, mineral oils and fuels). 
Other tax increases: The property tax rate was doubled, including the tax on land and buildings; only taxes for buildings and non-
residential spaces used for other business activity were unchanged. 
  
Cyprus 
VAT increase. A 5 % reduced VAT-rate is applied on food and medicines from 10 January 2011. Previously these commodities were VAT 
exempt. (0.4 % GDP) 
Excise duties increase. The tax on fuel products was raised to EU minimum levels in 2010. The tax on tobacco was increased by 20 % for 
cigarettes and 30 % for loose tobacco in 2011 (0.2 % GDP). 
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Table (continued) 
 
Other tax increases. The 2010 budget included measures to improve the public finances, targeting tax evasion in particular. VAT 
collection periods were shortened. From 2011, a bank levy was introduced. The levy is computed as 0.095 % of deposits held at banks on 
31 December each year with a maximum of 20 % of the total taxable profits of the financial institution. 
 
Denmark 
Personal income tax decreases. A major tax reform was introduced in 2010 (the Spring Package 2.0). Reduction of the rate of the bottom 
tax bracket from 5.26 % to 3.76 %, abolition of the medium tax bracket with the 6 % rate altogether, and increase in the top tax bracket 
threshold by DKK 28 800 (€ 3 860). The top tax threshold was to be further increased by DKK in 2011. The reform reduced the lowest 
marginal tax rate from 42.4 % to 41.0 % and the highest marginal tax rate from 63.0 % to 56.1 % (Overall by DKK 29 billion in 2010). To 
compensate for the increases in excise duties, a ‘green check’ of DKK 1 300 (€ 175) was introduced for everyone above 18 years and DKK 
300 per child for up to two children. The nominally fixed ‘green check’ is being rapidly phased out for incomes above DKK 360 000 
(€ 48 300). Broadening of the tax base is a main source of finance for the reform. The measures include a gradual reduction of the tax 
value during the period 2012 to 2019 from 33.5 % to 25.5 % of assessment oriented deductions and limitations of the tax deductibility of 
net interest payments over a nominal threshold of DKK 50 000 (DKK 100 000 for married couples). Also the deductibility of payments 
above DKK 100 000 a year to individual pension insurance schemes with less than lifelong coverage is limited, and the tax treatment of 
company cars and other fringe benefits have been tightened. As of 1 June 2011, Denmark has introduced a temporary deduction for wage 
expenses for household services and refurbishment. 
Personal income tax increases. A Fiscal Consolidation Agreement was reached in May 2010, including a number of tax measures from 
2011: Suspension from 2011 to 2013 of automatic adjustments in various tax thresholds (including personal allowances). Postponement of 
the planned increase from the Spring Package 2.0 of the threshold for the top income tax rate from 2011 to 2014. The tax deductibility of 
labour union membership fees is limited to DKK 3 000 (€ 403) from 2011. The annual amount of total child allowance is limited to DKK 
35 000 (€ 4 696) and child allowances will be gradually reduced by 5 % until 2013. 
Furthermore, a 6 % tax is imposed from 2011 on pension payments exceeding DKK 362 800 (part of the Spring Package). 
VAT increase. VAT exemptions removed for travel agencies, property management and the supply of buildings and building land (DKK 
1.2 billion in 2011). 
Excise duties increase. The 2010-reform is partly financed by higher taxes on energy (15 % increase except for petrol and diesel) and 
transport and environmental taxes and also by increases of excise rates on health-related goods (fat, candy, sugary drinks, tobacco). 
(Overall DKK 8.7 billion (€ 1.2 billion) in 2011). 
Other tax increases. As of 2011, increase in FAT, a duty on wage and salary costs for businesses engaged in financial services, from 
effectively 9.13 % to 10.5 %. 
  
Estonia 
Personal income tax increases. Additional basic allowance for the first child and right to deduct trade union membership fees and interest 
on study loans in income taxation was abolished in 2010. The long-term plan to cut the income tax rate by 1 percentage point annually has 
been frozen. Also, the basic allowance will remain at EEK 27 000 (€ 1 726). 
Excise duties increases. Increase in the excise duty on fuel, tobacco and alcohol by 5 – 64 % and the excise duty on electricity by 40 % 
(overall 0.8 % of GDP in 2010). In 2011, excise duty on tobacco was further increased by 10 %. 
  
France 
Personal income tax increases. As from January 2010, the overall amount of tax incentives (niches fiscales) that a taxpayer may obtain 
during a fiscal year for individual income tax purposes has been capped at the level of the household (foyer fiscal) at € 20 000 plus 8 % of 
the taxable income. From 1 January 2010, capital gains realised by individuals on the disposal of shares are fully subject to social security 
contributions at an overall rate of 12.1 %. On 20 January 2010, the government tabled an amending Finance Law 2010 before the French 
Parliament providing for a tax of 50 % on bonuses exceeding € 27 500 paid in 2009 by financial institutions to their traders. As from 2011, 
the highest marginal income tax rate was increased from 40 to 41 %; taxes on capital income and gains were also raised by one point. 
Corporate income tax changes. Since 1 January 2010, the local business tax (taxe professionnelle) levied on firms to finance local 
governments has been replaced by a new ‘economic territorial contribution’ (contribution économique territoriale). The tax is no longer 
based on the annual value of commercial and industrial equipment, but on the annual rental value of immovable property (cotisation 
locale d’activité). The tax also consists of a new tax of 1.5 % on the added value of the business applicable to taxpayers with a turnover 
exceeding € 152 500 and allowances depending on the amount of the turnover (cotisation complémentaire). In addition, a special tax on the 
capital stock of network industries was introduced. Overall reduction in tax burden by 0.5 % of GDP in 2010 and by 0.2 % thereafter. 
Since 2009, under certain conditions, capital invested in SMEs gives rise to a tax credit of 25 % for individual income tax purposes. This 
favourable regime is extended by the Finance Law 2010. 
VAT increase. 
As from 1 January 2011 the standard rate is applied on the so-called ‘triple play’ services (€ 1.1 billion). The reduced VAT on air 
conditioning equipment was abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. 
Excise duties increases. As of 2011, regions have been offered the possibility to raise the diesel fuel tax (TIPP) up to 1.35 euro per 
hectolitre (instead of 1.15 previously), with the new resources being dedicated to financing sustainable transport infrastructures. 17 out of 
22 regions have increased the diesel fuel tax up to the new ceiling. 
Other tax increases. A bank levy of 0.25 % of the minimum capital required under French regulatory rules, as computed on the basis of 
risk-weighted assets, was introduced as of 2011 (€ 500 million in 2011). On average, local governments have increased housing taxes (taxe 
d’habitation and taxe foncière). 
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Finland 
Personal income tax decreases. The income tax rate was reduced by 0.5 p.p. across the four income brackets in 2010. The employment 
income deduction as well as the basic allowance for the municipal taxation was increased in order to lower the tax burden for low-income 
earners. The taxation of pension income was reduced in parallel. Generally, the aim of these measures is to compensate for increased 
employee social security contributions, the impact of a higher income level due to progressivity and likely increases in the municipal tax 
rates. 
VAT changes. Adjustments were made in the VAT system from 1 July 2010. The 12 % reduced rate of VAT for food was broadened to 
include restaurants. To finance this change, a general increase of the reduced VAT rates from 12 % to 13 % and from 8 % to 9 % for 
newspapers, books, medicines and labour-intensive services was introduced. The standard VAT rate was increased from 22 % to 23 % as 
of 2011. 
Excise duties increase. Excise duties on tobacco products were raised by 5-15 % in 2010. In 2011, the energy taxation has been 
restructured and increased. A tax on sweets and ice cream was introduced from 1 January 2011 at a rate of 0.75ct per kg. The existing tax 
on soft drinks was raised at the same time to 0.75ct (from 0.45ct) per litre. A minor shift in the green tax has been applied, as taxes on fuel 
used for heat and power production as well as the energy tax on electricity were raised to offset the loss of revenue due to the abolition of 
the national pension contribution in 2010. Car registration tax and annual vehicle taxes have been changed from 2011 to take the CO2 
emissions of each vehicle into account. 
  
Germany 
Personal income tax decreases. Following the reduction in the lowest personal income tax rate from 15 % to 14 % in 2009, the personal 
income tax allowance and thresholds were increased for a second time as of 1 January 2010 (following the 2009 increase). The tax 
allowance for children was also increased for a second consecutive time (to € 7 008 as of 2010, from € 6 024 in 2009, previously € 5 808). 
Since 2010, the deductibility of payments for health and nursing care insurance has been improved. These costs are now fully deductible 
(0.4 % of GDP). 
Corporate income tax decreases. The application of the so-called interest barrier rule (Zinsschranke) was relaxed (the interest barrier rule 
sets a profit-based limit on the deduction of interest expenses if net interest expenses exceed a certain ceiling; the ceiling was raised from 
€ 1 million to € 3 million). The depreciation allowance for low-value assets was improved in 2010. 
VAT decrease. The reduced 7 % VAT rate is now also applied to short-term accommodation. 
Excise duties increase. A tax on nuclear fuel (Kernbrennstoffsteuergesetz) is introduced as of 2011 (annual tax revenues of € 2.3 billion 
over the period 2011-2016). Introduction of a duty on all airline tickets booked after 1 September 2010 levied for flights departing from 
Germany. Rates depend on the flight distance (€ 8 for short distance flights, € 25 for medium distance flights and € 45 for long distance 
flights). 
  
Greece 
The economic adjustment programme (European Commission, 2010i) agreed between Greece, the European Commission, the ECB and 
the IMF has led to a series of tax changes. The majority of the reforms were aimed at increasing overall tax revenues. Overall, tax 
measures amount to 4 % of GDP. 
Personal income tax increases. Introduction of a new unified progressive taxation scheme with nine brackets (instead of four) in 2010, 
with a 45 % top rate (above € 100 000, replacing previous 40 % top rate. The differential treatment of sources other than employment 
income and pensions was eliminated. The tax increases gradually from € 1 000 to € 25 000 for income above € 900 000. Bonuses to 
business executives in the financial sector were subject to a special progressive levy in 2010 (between 20 % and 90 %). In 2010, a 1 % 
extraordinary one-time contribution was applied on the income of individuals above € 100 000 for 2009. The tax treatment of company 
cars was changed so that the use and maintenance of company cars with an ex-factory value of above € 17 000 is taxed as salary income. 
Greece also introduced ‘presumptive taxation’. This means that, depending on the ownership of certain ‘luxury’ goods (major houses, 
cars, leisure boats, private planes etc.), a minimum taxable amount is determined by the tax authorities according to certain objective 
criteria. The taxable person can challenge this ‘presumption’ in certain cases (e.g. unemployment). 
Corporate income tax decreases. The statutory corporate income tax rate was reduced from 25 % applicable to income earned in 2009, to 
24 % applicable to income earned in 2010. In March 2011, a new tax law reduced the CIT rate to 20 % for income earned in 2011 and later 
years. Profits distributed by corporations, limited liability companies and cooperatives will be subject to a withholding tax rate of 25 % as 
of the financial year 2012 (for profits distributed in 2011 and later years). A 21 % withholding tax was applied to profits distributed in 
2010 in the financial year 2011. If the beneficiary of the respective income is a natural person subject to a lower tax rate for his/her taxable 
income, the dividends shall be taxed according to the general provisions and the credited balance shall be reimbursed. Otherwise, the tax 
liability shall be exhausted with the withholding tax. The split system of retained and distributed profits introduced in April 2010 was 
abandoned in March 2011.  
Corporate income tax increases. A special, one-time contribution was imposed at progressive rates on all enterprises, except sole 
proprietorships, whose net income for the fiscal year 2010 exceeds € 100 000. The application was recently extended up to 2014. The rate 
for partnerships was increased from 20 % to 25 %. 
VAT increase: VAT rates were subject to several increases. The standard VAT rate was raised from 19 % to 21 % and subsequently to 
23 %. The reduced rate and the former super-reduced rate went up in three steps from 9 % to 13 % and from 4.5 to 6.5 % respectively. 
Changes in the application of the rates to different commodities were implemented with a view to broadening the tax base. Moreover, 
VAT exemptions of several categories of professionals were repealed. A special tax on luxury goods was introduced in 2010. 
Excise duties increase. The road tax on motor vehicles was increased (to up to € 300), calculated on the basis of the engine capacity and 
the environmental impact. An additional road tax (ranging from € 350 to € 650) is collected on high capacity private vehicles and 
motorcycles. Taxes on mobile telephones as well as excise duties on fuel were increased, and excise duties on electricity were introduced. 
Excise duties on cigarettes and alcohol were also raised.
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Other tax increases. Greece reintroduced a progressive tax on large property to replace the previous flat-rate tax of 1 %. Rates range from 
0.1 % to 1 % for individuals, whereas for legal entities a 0.6 % flat rate applies. The 1 % top rate applicable above € 800 000 was increased 
to 2 % for property values above € 5 million for a period of three years. As a base broadening measure, church property not used for 
religious, education and charitable purposes is now included in the base. A special levy on high-value real estate was raised. The 
progressivity of the taxation of inheritances, gifts and parental provisions was increased. The new system has four brackets, ranging from 
0 % to 10 % (above € 600 000) for close relatives and from 0 % to 20 % (above € 300 000) for other relatives. Greece has recently 
implemented a series of measures to increase tax compliance. Among others, criminal penalties were increased, the bank secrecy was 
lifted for high overdue debts to the state, a high-level tax evasion committee was established, a public prosecutor of economic crime 
introduced, a new tax arbitrage regime was provided for big tax cases and tax audits were restructured. In order to reduce tax evasion, 
particularly in the area of VAT, new rules for the issuing of invoices in electronic form were adopted. Payments above € 1 500 have to be 
made via the banks. 
  
Hungary 
Personal income tax decreases. As part of the 2009/10 tax reform, income tax rates were reduced and thresholds increased across the 
board. The additional solidarity tax of 4 % on the highest income bracket was abolished. The tax base was broadened by the abolition of 
allowances. A flat personal income tax of 16 % was introduced in January 2011, applicable to income from wages, rental and capital. The 
inclusion of the employer’s social security contribution in the tax base will remain in 2011, but it will be reduced by half in 2012 and 
phased out completely by 2013. The income thresholds for the employment tax credit will be reduced in 2011. Substantial tax credits for 
families with children have also been introduced; these are particularly favourable for families with 3 or more children (HUF 
1 000/child/month for 1-2 children, families with 3 or more HUF 33 000/child/month). (Overall -1.8 % of GDP in 2011). 
Corporate income tax decreases. In 2010, an increase in the rate from 16 % to 19 % was accompanied by a broadening of the tax base. A 
lower rate of 10 % was introduced as being generally applicable up to HUF 250 million of the tax base, and thereafter it is 19 %. The 
solidarity tax of 4 % was simultaneously abolished, which actually reduced the overall rate by 1 percentage point. From 2011-13, a flat 
rate also applies to corporate income. In 2011, the threshold for the 10 % lower rate is doubled to HUF 500 million. As of 2013, a flat rate 
of 10 % will be levied on the entire tax base. Moreover, the taxes on certain economic sectors will be deductible from the corporate 
income tax base. The overall total gross revenue impact is estimated at -0.7 % of GDP. 
Social security contribution decreases. As part of the 2009/10 tax reform the employers’ social security contributions were reduced by 5 
percentage points and the employee’s flat rate health contribution was abolished. 
VAT increase. The reduction of taxes on labour in 2009/10 was financed primarily through an increase in the statutory VAT rate from 
20 % to 25 %. Simultaneously, a new reduced VAT rate of 18 % was introduced for dairy and bakery products, which was later extended to 
district heating and accommodation services. 
Excise duties increase. Excise duties on motor fuels, alcohol and tobacco were also raised in January 2010 (by between 7.5 % and 10 %), 
following the July 2009 increase (by 5 % to 7 %). 
Other increases. Several levies on major sectors of the economy have been introduced to finance the 2011 reform. A levy on financial 
institutions was introduced in June 2010, retroactive from January. The modified balance sheet comprises the tax base of credit 
institutions, and a progressive tax rate of 0.15 % is applied up to 50 billion HUF; thereafter the rate is 0.5 % on the excessive amount. 
Insurance companies are taxed on their premiums at a rate of 6.2 %. Various rules apply to the other different types of institutions in the 
financial sector. The gross revenue of this tax is estimated to correspond to 0.7 % of GDP. In October 2010, this tax was accompanied by 
the introduction of additional levies on the retail, telecoms and energy sectors (0.6 % GDP). The tax base is the company’s net revenue 
from the listed activities. Progressive rates are applied for the retail and telecom sectors, while the tax on energy suppliers is a flat rate of 
1.05 %. The total gross fiscal impact of these measures, including the extraordinary levy on financial institutions, amounts to 1.3 % of 
GDP. According to the adopted law, most of these taxes are to be phased out from 2013. In addition, a special temporary tax on energy 
suppliers introduced in 2009 for a two-year period, i.e. the 8 % on pre-tax profits, has now also been prolonged. As an additional means of 
funding, the government has also decided to allocate the full social security contribution revenue to the state budget during the next 14 
months. Private pension fund members are also provided with strong incentives to transfer their funds back to the public pension fund. 
 
Ireland 
Personal income tax increases. The biggest contribution to the consolidation in 2011 in terms of revenue comes from income tax with 
more than € 1.2 billion, mainly through the reduction of tax credits (€ 435 million) and changes in the rate band (€ 395 million). 
Social security contribution increases. With regard to pensions, both employee’s and employer’s contributions have been increased, 
leading to higher revenue of € 40 million for each group. The pay related social insurance ceiling of € 75 036 was abolished. Both the 
income levy and the health levy (also known as the health contribution) have been replaced by the Universal Social Charge (USC) since 1 
January 2011. The USC is zero for income below € 4 004, 2 % for income up to € 10 036, 4 % from € 10 037 to € 16 016 and 7 % for income 
above the latter amount. For 2011, the change to USC is revenue neutral. The estimated additional annual revenue of the USC is € 420 
million in the future. 
VAT decrease. The VAT rate was reduced by 0.5 percentage points to 21 % in 2010, bringing it back to the pre- December 2008 level 
(annually € -167 million).  
Excise duties increase. The carbon tax introduced in December 2009 was extended in scope in May 2010 (annually € 330 million, incl. 
VAT). The Mineral Oil Tax on Petrol and Auto-Diesel was increased by 4 cent and by 2 cent respectively in 2011 (€ 106 million). 
  
Italy 
Personal income tax decreases. Changes to the municipal fiscal system were enacted in 2011 (Law n. 42/2009). Among other things this 
involves: i) Taxing rental income from buildings for residential purposes at a separate, flat rate of 19-21 %, rather than including it in the 
personal income tax base (average rates around 30 %) with around 20 % of the revenue accruing to municipalities; ii) Allowing an 
additional income tax (between 0.2 % and 0.4 %) to be levied by town councils rather than by central government. 
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Excise duties increase. Imposing of tolls on some motorways that were previously free of charge.  
Other increases. Changes to the municipal fiscal system enacted in 2011 also involve: iii) Introduction of a new tax on residential 
property to be levied by town councils on people owning second homes in the town and iv) allowing town councils to keep up to 50 % of 
revenue collected by measures against tax evasion on their territory. 
Additional revenues are expected by 2012 from enhanced measures to combat tax evasion. The new measures adopted against tax evasion 
include: i) Mandatory use of electronic invoices for amounts above € 3 000 (0.05 % of GDP by 2012); ii) Introduction of new benchmarks 
to check tax self-assessments of self-employed people (0.05 % of GDP by 2012); iii) Firms persistently reporting losses will be more 
closely inspected (0.05 % of GDP by 2012); iv) Banks must withhold 10 % of customers’ specific payments for house renovation works 
that benefit from tax incentives (0.05 % of GDP by 2010); v) Streamlining of procedures to collect unpaid tax dues (0.1 % of GDP by 
2012); vi) Tax compensation will no longer be allowed if there are tax arrears (0.1 % of GDP by 2012); vii) Introduction of an 
administrative filter for claims of VAT refunds above € 10.000 and viii) Improved selection of taxpayers for audits on the basis of risk 
analysis, improved targeting of investigations. 
  
Latvia 
Personal income tax increases. Increase of the general rate from 23 % to 26 % in 2010 (0.8 % of GDP). Taxation of fringe benefits (e.g. 
company cars) in 2010 (0.3 % of GDP). Broadening of the base to include all capital income, dividends and interests (0.2 % of GDP) in 
2010. Taxation of employer’s gifts by eliminating the exemption (0.2 % of GDP). In 2011, the general personal income tax rate was 
slightly lowered again to 25 %. Also, non-taxable-minimum and allowance for dependants was increased in 2011. 
Social security contribution increases. The social security contribution rate was increased by 2 percentage points as of January 2011 to 
compensate for the lowering of the general personal income tax rate. 
VAT increase. From January 2011, the general VAT rate was increased by 1 percentage point to 22 % and the reduced rate by 2 
percentage points to 12 %. The reduced rate on electricity has been abolished, thereby increasing the rate from 10 % to 22 %. (In 2009, the 
standard VAT rate had been increased from 18 % to 21 % and the reduced rate from 5 % to 10 %). 
Excise duties increase. Introduction of an annual fee for cars and motorcycles (0.2 % of GDP) in 2010. Further increasing taxes on luxury 
cars and motorcycles with powerful engines in 2011. Abolishing the reduced excise duty rate for oils with 5 % biofuel admixture. Excise 
duties on tobacco and alcohol were increased in both 2010 and 2011. 
Other tax increases. From January 2010 the real estate tax on non-residential land and buildings was increased from 1 % to 1.5 % of the 
property value, while the tax base was widened by adding engineering constructions and non-cultivated agricultural land (0.2 % of GDP). 
Latvia also introduced taxation of residential buildings by applying a progressive rate of 0.1 %, 0.2 % or 0.3 % based on the property value 
(0.1 % of GDP). Measures against tax evasion included an increase in the administrative capacities of enforcing agencies, improved 
visibility of tax audits, enforced combating of illicit trade, a limit on the use of cash transfers and a minimum wage floor for companies 
participating in public tenders. 
  
Lithuania 
Personal income tax decreases. The tax rate on income of self-employed persons was reduced from 15 % to 5 % and is applied on profits 
derived from individuals’ business activities, such as production (agriculture included), trade or various services. 
Corporate income tax decreases. The corporate income tax rate was cut back to 15 % in 2010 after having been increased from 15 % to 
20 % in 2009. Withholding taxes on dividends were also cut from 20 % to 15 %. The special small companies’ rate was cut from 13 % to 
5 % in 2010. From 2009 to 2013, a reduction of up to 50 % in taxable profit, subject to conditions, has been granted to firms acquiring 
assets such as plant and machinery, structures, ICT equipment, and rights on intangible assets. A 10 % reduced rate for agricultural income 
(below certain limits) was introduced in 2010, instead of more favourable special treatment for agricultural income. The rate went up to 
the general level of 15 % in 2011. 
Social security contribution decreases. On 1 August 2010, relief from social security contributions for first-time employees was 
introduced. 
VAT decreases. The 9 % reduced VAT rate was extended to include accommodation at hotels and other special accommodation services 
as of 2011. The reduced rates of 5 % (medicine) and 9 % (books and non-periodical publications and residential heating) were made 
temporary as part of the general VAT increase in 2009. They have been prolonged until 31 December 2011 with the reduced rate for 
books and non-periodical publications made permanent again. 
  
Luxembourg 
Personal income tax increases. As of January 2011, the top income tax rate is increased from 38 % to 39 %. In addition, the surcharge for 
the employment fund (solidarity tax) is increased from 2.5 % to 4 % for income up to € 150 000 and to 6 % for income above € 150 000. A 
temporary crisis tax amounting to 0.8 % levied on total income except minimum wage salaries was introduced for the years 2011 and 
2012. As a result, the aggregate top personal income tax rate has increased from 38.95 % to 42.14 %. 
Corporate income tax increases. On 1 February 2010 a self-assessment system for corporate taxation entered into force. The surcharge 
has been increased from 4 % to 5 % for contributing to unemployment social security, which results in a combined tax rate for 
Luxembourg of 28.8 %, instead of 28.59 %. The 2011 tax plan also introduced a minimum fixed corporate income tax of € 1 500 per year 
levied on entities subject to corporate income tax whose financial assets exceed 90 % of total assets and which are not subject to a business 
licence or controlled by a supervisory authority. The tax credit for investments was increased and additional measures (e.g. specific 
depreciation provisions) have been introduced to promote energy saving and to protect the environment. The tax plan 2011 imposes 
restrictions on the deductibility of departure indemnities granted to employees. 
Other increases. The annual subscription tax (taxe d’abonnement) of 0.05 % was abolished for exchange traded funds as of January 2011. 
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Malta 
Excise duties decrease. The levy on credit cards (€ 16.31) was abolished in 2010. 
Excise duties increase. As of 2010 a registration tax is levied on Euro 3 and lower-standard commercial vehicles. 
  
The Netherlands 
Personal income tax increases. As of January 2011, the tax rate in the first bracket of personal income tax and wages tax is reduced from 
2.30 % to 1.85 % (from 2012, the rate will be 2.00 %). A new top bracket was introduced in the imputed income for owner-occupied
housing, increasing the imputed income from 0.55 % to 0.8 % for the part of the value that exceeds € 1 010 000 in 2010. In 2011, the 
imputed value was further increased to 1.05 of the value that exceeds € 1 020 000. The top imputed value will increase to 2.35 % by 2016. 
The tax plan 2011 increased the exemption for business succession, introduced in 2010, from 75 % to 100 % for businesses with a 
maximum value up to € 1 006 000, and to 83 % for the excess. For the tax due, a 10 year tax deferral is granted. 
Corporate income tax increases. As of January 2010, the ‘patents box’ scheme was turned into an ‘innovation box’ for innovative 
entrepreneurs: income derived from R&D is taxed at a rate of 5 % instead of 10 %, and the ceilings were abolished. Furthermore, a 3-year 
carry-back period was introduced for losses incurred in 2009 and 2010. As of January 2011, the corporate income tax rate is reduced to 
25 % from 25.5 % for profits above € 200 000. The 2011 tax plan reduced the environment investment deduction from 15 % to 13.5 %, 
30 % to 27 % and 40 % to 36 %, depending on the type of investment. As part of an extra crisis package, the rates of the environment 
investment deduction had been increased temporarily from 15 %, 30 % and 40 % to 35 %, 50 % and 60 % from July 2009 until December 
2010). As of 1 January 2010, the profit exemption for SMEs, granted under the tax plan 2009, was raised from 10.5 % to 12 %. The 
minimum criterion for spending time on the business was dropped, making it more attractive to carry on a business alongside salaried 
employment. To foster business growth, the small-scale investment tax credit (KIA) was substantially increased. An exemption for 
investment in SMEs was introduced in Box 2 of the personal income tax. 
VAT decrease. The tax plan 2011 introduced a temporary reduction in the VAT rate from 19 % to 6 % on labour used in the renovation of 
dwellings older than 2 years until 1 July 2011. 
Excise duties increase. Excise duties on cigarettes and tobacco were increased as of 1 March 2011. The increase amounts to € 11.68 per 
1 000 cigarettes. Highly fuel-efficient cars are no longer subject to motor vehicle taxation (since 2009 based on CO2 emissions) and, as of 
January 2010, they benefit from a € 500 (€ 750 in 2010) reduction of car purchase tax. 
  
Poland 
Social security contribution increases. A reform of the pension system scheme aimed at preventing public debt from rising to excessive 
levels entered into force in April 2011. The intention is to progressively reduce transfers to privately managed pension funds from 7.3 % to 
2.3 % of workers’ salaries and redirect the 5 % into the public old-age pension system. This will not change the effective tax burden on 
either the employees or the employers. 
VAT increase. A series of measures in the VAT area came into force in 2011. The VAT rates were temporarily increased (for the years 
2011-13) by 1 percentage point, from 7 % to 8 % and from 22 % to 23 %. At the same time, a new reduced rate of 5 % was introduced for, 
amongst others, basic foodstuffs. The plan is that if this increase in VAT rates does not help to reduce the public debt, there will be two 
further such rises, each of 1 percentage point, in the years to come. 
Excise duties increase. On 1 January 2011, excise duty on tobacco was increased by 4 % (PLN 220 m (€ 55 m)). Further increases in the 
excise duty rates on tobacco products by 4 % a year in 2012 and 2013 are being considered. In line with the Energy Directive, as of 2012 
the excise tax will also apply to coal and coke, which has so far been exempted. 
  
Portugal 
Personal income tax increases. As part of the consolidation measures, the personal income taxation (IRS) rates were increased by 1 
percentage point up to the 3rd bracket and by 1.5 percentage points as of the 4th bracket from 1 July 2010. Also, as of 1 July 2010, a new 
top tax bracket of 45.88 % for income above € 150 000 was introduced, which is applicable to the whole of 2010. The withholding tax rates 
were also increased by 1.5 percentage points. A new 20 % tax rate applies to capital gains exceeding € 500 annually derived as from 1 
January 2010 and without the previous distinction of the holding period. As of 2011, expense related tax credits were somewhat reduced 
in personal income tax by imposing an overall ceiling for the two highest income tax brackets. 
Corporate income tax increases. Portugal introduced an additional state corporate income tax (IRC) of 2.5 percentage points to taxable 
profits exceeding € 2 million as of July 2010. The 2011 budget includes several changes for corporate income tax, such as an increase in 
the minimum corporate income tax assessed, as compared to the amount that would have been assessed in the absence of tax benefits and 
special regimes. 
Social security contribution increases. The contribution rates of workers to the civil servants security schemes will increase by one 
percentage point as of 1 January 2011 (thereby aligning this rate with the contribution rate for the general social security scheme). 
VAT increase. The standard, intermediate and reduced VAT rates were increased by one percentage point to 21 %, 13 % and 6 %, 
respectively as of July 2010 (0.3 % of GDP in 2010 and 0.7 % in 2011). The 2011 budget included a further increase in the standard VAT 
rate to 23 % as of January 2011. The 2011 budget also included minor changes in the goods and services that should be subject to the 
reduced rates of 6 % and 13 %. 
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Romania 
Personal income tax increases. Broadening of the personal income tax base to cover incomes from capital gains, including interests on 
bank deposits, severance payments and lunch vouchers. Any income obtained by individuals after 1 January 2011 ascertained by the tax 
authorities, for which the source has not been identified, will be taxed at a rate of 16 %. The taxable base is adjusted on the basis of the 
procedures and indirect methods for the reconstitution of revenues or expenses. 
Corporate income tax increases. The 3 % tax rate on gross income obtained by micro-companies (having 1-9 employees and a turnover of 
less than € 100 000) is reintroduced as an alternative to the general CIT rate (16 %). 
Social security contribution increases. Equalising the cap of social contributions for both employers and employees. With effect from 1 
January 2011, an obligation to pay a health contribution (5.5 %) when pension income is higher than € 173 (i.e. the contribution will apply 
to the total pension amount) was introduced. 
VAT increase. Increase in standard VAT rate from 19 % to 24 % in July 2010. Rules determining the place of supply for goods and 
services (and hence the place for VAT taxation) have been fully harmonised with EU Directive 112/2006 and EU Directive 8 / 2008 
regarding VAT. Approval of the Code of Tax Procedure, which aims to address VAT fraud, improve management of tax arrears, and 
increase inspection of the largest taxpayers. 
Excise duties increases. Excise duties on energy and cigarettes were increased. 
Other tax decreases. Incomes obtained from prizes and from gambling, in money and/or in kind, that are below RON 600 for each prize 
or from the same organiser or payer during a single day, are not taxable. Previously such gains were subject to a 25 % withholding tax. 
Other tax increases. Increase in several local taxes (e.g. vehicle tax, taxes on the issue of certificates, notices and authorisations for 
advertising). 
  
Slovakia 
Personal income tax increases. In 2011, deductions for contributions to supplementary pension insurance and amounts deposited on 
savings schemes are abolished. Also, the personal allowances can be claimed only with respect to aggregate income from employment, 
business activities and independent professional activities. 
Social security contribution increases. Non-monetary benefits provided to an employee, which are considered to be taxable employment 
income, are also subject to social security and health insurance contributions (as from 1 January 2011). 
VAT increase. From 2011, the standard VAT rate was (temporarily) increased from 19 % to 20 %. This rate will be applicable until the last 
day of the calendar year in which Eurostat declares that the deficit of the Slovak Republic is below 3 % of GDP. 
Excise duties decrease. In January 2010, the excise duty on diesel fuel was reduced. 
Excise duties increase. Introduction of a tax on CO2 emission quotas (effective as of 1 January 2011), which is imposed on the emission 
allowances allocated free of charge to the taxpayer in the period 2011-2012. The tax rate is 80 % of the tax base which is constituted by: i) 
the transferred emission quota (valued at market price for the calendar month preceding the transfer), and ii) the non-consumed emission 
quota (valued at the average market price for the respective calendar year). The calculated amount of tax on emission quota is not 
considered as a tax deductible expense. There were increases in various excise duties (e.g. tobacco) from 2011. Excise duties on spirits 
were increased as of March 2010. 
  
Slovenia 
Personal income tax decrease. Both the general allowance and the investment allowance to individual entrepreneurs were extended in 
2010.  
Corporate income tax decrease. The last stage of the reduction of the corporate income tax was implemented, resulting in a tax rate of 
20 %. 
Excise duties increase. Excise duties on energy and tobacco (cigarettes) and alcohol were increased by around 7 % in 2010. 
Other tax increases. A balance sheet tax for banks is effective since August 2011. The aim of the tax is to stimulate banks to extend loans 
to the non-financial sector rather than a fiscal purpose. The tax of 0.1 % is levied on the total assets of the bank, but 0.167 % of loans 
granted to the non-financial is deducted sector and could possibly reduce the tax due to zero. 
  
Spain 
Personal income tax increases. Measures to consolidate personal income tax were implemented in 2010. Phasing out of the € 400 
personal income tax credit for working and self-employed taxpayers over € 12 000 of the tax base (0.5 % in 2010). The personal income 
tax credit of € 2 500 for each child born or adopted in the tax year is repealed in 2011 (0.25 % in 2010). Taxation of savings income by a 
progressive system of 19 % and 21 % (above € 6 000) from 2010 instead of a flat 18 % rate (0.07 % in 2010). The 2011 Budget also 
includes a number of further changes to personal income tax aimed at raising revenue. Increase in central government component of top 
personal income tax rate by 1 percentage point (income from € 120 000 to € 175 000) and by 2 percentage points for income above 
€ 175 000. Elimination of the housing investment deduction in personal income tax for income over € 24 170.2 from 2011. Change in 
capital income taxation that cancels some deferrals from 2011. 
Corporate income tax decreases. Broadening of the application of the SMEs tax regime (e.g. higher ceiling for turnover and taxable 
amount, longer application period of three years after relaxing of conditions). 
VAT increase. Increase in general VAT rate by 2 percentage points to 18 % and a 1 percentage point reduction to 8 % from July 2010 
(0.25 % in 2010, around 0.5 % of GDP in 2011). 
Excise duties increase. A Royal Decree in late 2010 included an increase in excise duties for cigarettes and other types of tobacco (€ 780 
million annual revenue increase). 
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Table (continued) 
 
  
 
 
Sweden 
Personal income tax decreases. In 2010, the fourth stage of the earned-income tax credit was introduced. Including the fourth stage, the 
EITC has reduced the tax on earned income by a total of SEK 71 billion (€ 7.84 billion). The Budget Bill for 2011 included an increase in 
the basic allowance for individuals over 65 years old. The estimated tax reduction is around SEK 7.5 billion (€ 828 million) in 2011. 
  
United Kingdom 
Personal income tax increases. Increase in tax progression via higher tax allowances and an additional top rate. From April 2010, an 
additional rate of income tax of 50 % applies to income over GBP 150 000. Personal income tax allowance was restricted for annual 
incomes over GBP 100 000 from April 2010. From April 2011, tax relief on pension contributions is restricted for those with incomes of 
GBP 150 000 and over, and tapers down until it reaches 20 %. 
Corporate income tax decreases. In 2011, the standard and reduced corporate income tax rates have been reduced by 1 percentage point 
to 27 % and 20 % respectively. The government aims to further decrease the standard rate by 1 percentage point annually until it reaches 
24 %. 
VAT increase. In 2011, the standard VAT rate has been increased from 17.5 % to 20 % (between 1 December 2008 and 31 December 2009 
the rate had been temporarily lowered to 15 %). 
Excise duties. Several environment-related taxes have increased, such as air passenger duty or landfill taxes. 
Other tax increases. A bank levy and a one-off bank payroll tax (i.e. bonus tax) of 50 % on bonuses over GBP 25 000 paid by banks and 
building societies between 9 December 2009 and 5 April 2010. In October 2010, the government also announced that it would consider 
the pros and cons of introducing a FAT. 
 
Note: Cut-off date is 30 June 2011. 
Source: Commission services. 
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The current economic and budgetary situation both 
offers an opportunity and stresses the need for 
improving or rethinking current revenue (and 
expenditure) systems. Considerations on the 
quality of taxation have increasingly moved into 
the spotlight of both academic and political debate. 
As referred to in Chapter 1, the Europe 2020 
strategy calls for particular attention to be paid to 
the quality of the revenue/tax system. This has 
been confirmed by the Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS), opening the ‘European Semester’ and the 
‘Euro Plus Pact’. 
Tax policy serves to raise the necessary funds for 
the desired level of public expenditure, to 
redistribute income (progressive income taxation), 
to stabilise (35) the economy, to address 
externalities (environmental taxes, taxes on alcohol 
and tobacco) and to influence the allocation of 
resources. By sending a price signal it can also 
direct agents’ choices towards more sustainable 
consumption and production. Moreover, a good tax 
system should create the right incentives and lay 
the groundwork for green growth. Green growth is 
the path that ensures jobs and growth, and provides 
the answers on how to use scarce energy resources 
in a more intelligent manner. Ultimately, taxation 
pursues many policy objectives which may create 
trade-offs. 
The quality of taxation is a multi-faceted concept. 
It deals with the design of tax policy to achieve 
desired policy objectives, while minimising 
distortions and the cost of tax collection, and thus 
minimising the negative impact of taxation on 
economic growth. For any given level of taxation, 
different economic outcomes can be obtained, 
depending on the way a tax system is designed in 
terms of tax structure and individual tax design, 
and the interaction between the different tax 
instruments. The discussion on the quality of 
taxation in this chapter will focus on the effects of 
taxation on GDP and on long-term and sustainable 
economic growth. This reflects the key priority for 
Europe of achieving smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. 
                                                          
(35) Taxation plays an important role as an automatic stabiliser 
and complements other stabilisation policies such as 
automatic stabilisers on the expenditure side, discretionary 
fiscal policy and monetary policy. For a thorough analysis 
of stabilisers in the tax system, see European Commission 
(2010e). 
Economic theory links taxation to growth through 
its influence on the decisions of individual 
economic agents. Taxation changes economic 
decisions and can thereby affect economic growth. 
Considering a simple production function, it is 
obvious that taxation can affect GDP and 
economic growth through its impact on i) physical 
capital ii) human capital and iii) total factor 
productivity (TFP). (36) 
The first section (4.1) examines how the structure 
of taxation by main type of tax could be growth-
enhancing. Section (4.2) deals with the specific 
issues related to the design of particular types of 
tax with a view to making them more growth-
friendly. Section (4.3) illustrates the importance of 
the interaction between the different tax systems in 
the EU. (37) 
4.1. STRUCTURE OF TAX SYSTEMS 
This section (38) examines the effects of the 
structure of tax systems on growth. It reviews the 
main theoretical arguments and presents some 
recent empirical findings. 
4.1.1. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN THEORETICAL 
ARGUMENTS  
The following paragraphs give some indications of 
how taxation might influence growth-relevant 
decisions focusing on the tax categories of labour, 
capital, consumption, property taxes and 
environment. However, the overall impact on 
employment, GDP and growth is also determined 
by the composition and quality of public 
expenditure, the design of individual taxes and the 
interaction of taxation across jurisdictions. The 
empirical findings reviewed in sub-section 4.1.2 
put the theoretical arguments into perspective. 
Taxes on labour 
Taxes on labour (i.e. personal income taxes, 
payroll taxes and social security contributions) can 
                                                          
(36) Myles (2009a) reviews different production functions and 
effects of taxation on GDP and economic growth. 
(37) Distributive and equality considerations and properties of 
tax systems, while clearly important issues, are not 
analysed. 
(38) Sub-sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 draw on Prammer (2011). 
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affect economic decisions in three major ways, by 
altering: i) the allocation of time between labour 
and leisure, ii) human capital accumulation, and 
iii) occupational and entrepreneurial choices. (39) 
In particular, labour taxes can affect labour supply 
decisions, concerning both the decision on whether 
or not to participate in the labour market (extensive 
margin) and on the number of hours worked (40) 
(intensive margin). However, the exact effect of 
taxation on the labour market depends also on the 
labour demand elasticity, the degree of 
centralisation of wage bargaining and the 
distribution of taxable incomes. (41) 
Additionally, labour taxes, in particular 
progressive taxes, may affect the decision to 
undergo additional education and training (human 
capital formation), because they alter the expected 
returns on education and training. Progressive 
taxation reduces the return to human capital 
formation because it lowers the expected after tax 
income by a larger amount than a generally linear 
tax deduction granted during the education period. 
Hence, the net present value of the investment in 
education and training is reduced. (42) 
Furthermore, progressive labour taxes may affect 
work effort, given the number of hours worked and 
thus the quality of labour supply, by reducing the 
net return of achieving promotion and wage 
increases. (43) Progressivity may also adversely 
affect entrepreneurship and lower the expected 
after-tax return from risk-taking. (44) 
                                                          
(39) This classification is suggested based on Meghir and 
Phillips (2010), Myles (2009c) and Bocconi University 
(2010). 
(40) Economic literature distinguishes between the substitution 
effect and income effect. Considering, for example, the 
introduction of a wage tax, the income effect will make the 
worker work more, in order to maintain the level of total 
income, while the substitution effect will push in the 
opposite direction, as the free time allocated to working is 
remunerated at a lower net income. The overall effect on 
labour supply is therefore ambiguous. Moreover, marginal 
tax rates and average tax rates affect different groups of 
workers differently. For example high income groups are 
found to be sensitive to marginal rates, while second 
earner’s labour supply is found to be very sensitive to 
average tax rates. 
(41) For details on these aspects see Meghir and Phillips (2010) 
or Bocconi University (2010). 
(42) A detailed discussion can be found in Wöhlbier (2002). 
(43) See Ljunge (2010) and Clark and Tomlinson (2001). 
(44) See De Mooij and Nicodeme (2006) for a discussion. 
Moreover, the varying scope for tax 
evasion/avoidance across occupations might affect 
job-related choices. As reviewed by Bocconi 
University (2010), high marginal income taxes can 
not only bias the compensation packages towards 
less taxed items, but also skew occupational 
choices towards those where tax avoidance is 
easier. Hence, taxes on labour not only affect 
short-term decision making, they also impact on 
life-cycle decisions. 
Taxes on capital 
Taxes on capital include both taxes on business 
profits, and taxes on the return to savings of 
individuals, respectively on income in the form of 
capital gains, dividends and interests. Taxation of 
capital distorts the capital accumulation of 
business, and in effect the productivity of labour, 
as well as the savings and investment decisions 
made by individuals. By changing the return on 
capital, capital taxes alter the intertemporal 
allocation of resources. 
Considering a small open economy and assuming 
perfect capital mobility, several authors (45) state 
that the capital income taxes should be zero in the 
long run in the light of these distortions. (46) 
As reviewed by Soerensen (2007), later models, 
which introduce uncertainty in labour markets, or 
models allowing for complementarity between 
leisure and future consumption indicate however 
that a positive capital income tax could be optimal. 
In a world of increased international capital 
mobility, and in particular in an integrated market 
such as the European Union, source-based 
corporate income taxes may impact on growth at 
different levels. The corporate tax system can 
affect (i) where firms choose to locate their 
investment, (ii) how much they invest and (iii) 
where they choose to locate their profits. Research 
predicts that the average effective tax rate in 
different countries might influence the first 
decision, the marginal effective tax rate the 
second, and the statutory tax rate the third. (47) 
                                                          
(45) See, e.g., Judd (1985), Chamely (1986) and Jones et al. 
(1997). 
(46) See Samuelson (1954) and Tiebout (1956). 
(47) See Nicodeme (2008) for further details. 
4. Quality of taxation 
 
49 
Myles (2009c) shows that income taxes (both 
corporate tax and personal income tax) can 
influence the decision to engage in entrepreneurial 
activity, due to changes in the risk-return profile 
related to it. Given that the return on (risky) 
innovation is changed, this might reduce the 
investment in R&D as well as human capital 
formation, thereby impacting on long-term growth. 
The tax treatment of capital gains as well as other 
returns to capital, such as interests and dividends, 
can distort companies’ financing decisions. Most 
of the EU corporate tax systems are characterised 
by the deductibility of interest payments, whereas 
dividend payments do not reduce the tax base. Due 
to this tax discrimination, companies may favour 
debt-financing over equity-financing for their 
investments (see part 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). This favours 
companies with access to debt financing and leads 
to high leverage ratios. High leverage ratios make 
companies more vulnerable to financial market 
fluctuations. 
Taxation of the return to savings of individuals 
(dividends, interest, capital gains etc.) distorts the 
savings decision. It makes the overall level of 
savings and its allocation across assets deviate 
from an economically optimal allocation, 
particularly if tax rates on an accrual basis deviate 
between different assets. In addition, taxation of 
capital income under the personal income tax 
relative to the taxation of labour income affects the 
incentive for the self-employed to transform labour 
income into capital income or vice versa. (48) 
Lastly, capital gains taxes can also hinder the 
efficient reallocation of capital, as capital is left in 
inefficient investments in order to avoid taxes 
levied on realisation (‘locking in’ of capital). 
Consumption Taxes 
Consumption taxes — mainly value added taxes 
(VAT) and excise duties — are often regarded as 
less distortionary than income taxes, as they do not 
distort intertemporal decisions the way income 
taxes do. Consumption taxes fall partly on 
accumulated assets, which are an inelastic tax 
base. Moreover, consumption taxes do not impact 
on the returns to saving and, usually, do not have a 
                                                          
(48) See Sorensen (2007). 
progressive tax structure. (49) Taxes on goods and 
services allow different components of 
consumption to be taxed at different rates. In a 
seminal contribution made in 1927, Ramsey 
developed a system whereby taxes on commodities 
would change consumers’ buying decisions as 
little as possible. This system depends heavily on 
the price elasticity of the taxed goods and services. 
When the price elasticity is high, even small price 
rises reduce demand significantly. In this case, 
levying a consumption tax (or an excise duty) will 
alter consumers’ buying decisions significantly 
and thus create a large deadweight loss. The price 
elastic goods are not likely to be good candidates 
for high consumption tax rates in an efficient tax 
system. On the other hand, price-inelastic goods 
may be good candidates for high indirect tax rates, 
as they change consumers’ buying decisions only 
moderately. However, this result -referred to as the 
inverse elasticity rule — is simply a special case of 
the Ramsey rule, relying on strong assumptions. In 
general, the optimal structure of VAT rates also 
depends on cross price elasticities, making it very 
difficult to draw firm conclusions on how to 
differentiate optimally between consumption taxes 
across commodities. Subsequent research favours 
taxing complements to leisure at the highest rate, 
in order to make them unattractive compared to 
work. (50) 
More recent research (51) suggests that there might 
be a case for taxing consumption which uses little 
household time — or even saves time — less 
heavily than other leisure commodities. The 
argument is that high tax wedges (high marginal 
income tax and high VAT rates) make it very 
expensive to buy these services on the market and 
make it more attractive ‘to do-it-yourself’. Hence, 
highly skilled professionals, who are subject to 
particularly high marginal tax rates on account of 
the progressive nature of income taxation, have the 
greatest tax incentive to spend time on these time 
consuming activities at home. Lower taxation on 
these services, such as child care, or catering 
services, might encourage people to spend (more 
productive) time in the labour market instead of 
producing these services themselves. Furthermore, 
                                                          
(49) As explained by Stiglitz (1999) a more progressive tax 
results in a greater deadweight loss, and is hence less 
efficient than a proportional tax. 
(50) This is referred to as the Corlett-Hague Rule, (Corlett and 
Hague, 1953). 
(51) See Kleven et al. (2000), Kleven (2004). 
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goods which are conducive to health should also 
be taxed at lower rates. They might prevent people 
from falling ill, thereby reducing time off work 
and even lengthening people’s working life. 
While Crawford et al. (2010) confirm the 
theoretical argument for an optimally 
differentiated rate structure, they question its 
practicability and the overall social gains that 
could be achieved. Hence, what usually remains 
from the idea of taxing different commodities 
differently is some non-optimal form of VAT 
differentiation and excise taxes which are levied 
on specific products. The efficiency gains and 
losses of these differentiated rates are discussed in 
detail in sub-section 4.2.4. 
Kleven (2004) uses optimal tax theory to make a 
case for higher taxation of inter alia health 
damaging goods, which may come in the form of 
excise taxes. Moreover, excise taxes are a way to 
correct for externalities (costs imposed on others) 
and even costs imposed on oneself in the case of 
alcohol and tobacco, which arise during production 
or final consumption of these products. (52) Hence, 
in the case of excise taxes, the distortionary — i.e. 
the corrective — effect of taxes is welcomed, 
mostly in the area of alcoholic drinks and tobacco 
products, as well as in respect of environmentally 
harmful behaviour and products. 
Environmental taxes 
Environmental taxes (i.e. generally excise duties 
levied on environmentally harmful tax bases such 
as energy products, transport, polluting activities 
and resource use) aim to influence consumers and 
producers via price incentives towards the desired 
— i.e. less environmentally harmful — behaviour. 
An ideal Pigouvian tax — a tax that is intended to 
correct market externalities — should raise the 
marginal private costs to the level where it equals 
the higher marginal social cost. It takes into 
account the cost imposed by pollution on others 
and thus internalises external costs. (53) The 
revenue raised could then be used to decrease 
distortive taxation on labour, for example, thereby 
                                                          
(52) A standard implication of the optimal tax literature is that 
VAT does not affect production decisions. 
(53) Taxation represents one instrument to tackle externalities 
which might need to be complemented by different other 
instruments such as permits and standards, or charges. 
achieving a ‘double dividend’, i.e. protecting the 
environment and increasing employment and GDP. 
However, other strands of the literature (54) point 
out that, given pre-existing distortions in the tax 
system, an environmental tax itself creates 
(unintended) distortions. The tax increases the 
production costs, and if the cost increase is passed 
on to consumer prices, the real net wage of 
households is lowered, which might affect labour 
supply in a similar way to labour taxes. Also, the 
increase in production costs may change firms’ 
investment and production decisions, and thereby 
might impact on labour demand. (55) Hence, the 
existence of a ‘double dividend’ is controversial in 
the literature. (56) 
On the other hand, as environmental taxes set a 
price for each unit of pollution, they provide an 
ongoing incentive to reduce pollution at each unit 
and encourage the lowest cost abatement across 
polluters. Thereby, environmental taxes might 
encourage innovation and R&D activities to 
develop new, less polluting technologies, although 
the presence of market failures and consumer 
myopia might blur this effect. Usually, a wide tax 
base (in a geographical sense) generates more 
innovation activity, as the opportunities to benefit 
from the innovation, for example by selling it to 
others, are greater. (57) 
Property Taxes 
The OECD classification of taxes includes in this 
tax category recurrent taxes on immovable 
property (paid by both households and businesses), 
taxes on net wealth (paid by both households and 
businesses), taxes on gifts and inheritance and 
taxes on financial and capital transactions. As 
these taxes are obviously very heterogeneous in 
nature, they have different effects on decisions 
relevant to growth. 
                                                          
(54) As reviewed by Parry and Oates (1998). 
(55) As explained above, higher production costs might lead to 
investments aiming at efficiency improvements. 
(56) For a summary of relevant literature see Kosonen and 
Nicodeme (2009). While being controversial, recent studies 
(European Commission, 2011, OECD, 2011) have found a 
positive impact from recycling energy taxation on GDP. 
(57) There is growing evidence that targeted support to green 
innovation in complement to environmental taxation would 
allow innovation to take off in a more cost-effective way 
than environmental taxes alone (see Acemoglu et al., 2009, 
Aghion et al., 2010 or Conte et al., 2010). 
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Taxation of immovable property is usually 
considered as the least distortionary, because these 
taxes do not affect the decisions of economic 
agents to supply labour and to invest in human and 
physical capital as directly as other taxes do. (58) 
Moreover, the immobility of the tax base is 
another appealing property. However, even though 
property might be immovable in the medium term, 
property taxes might influence the initial location 
decision of businesses and also property prices, as 
future taxes might be priced in. Moreover, they 
might introduce behavioural changes, when they 
are charged on business property, affecting 
investment decisions and competitiveness with 
foreign producers. Hence, the literature suggests 
(59) that land values (value of property minus value 
of building) should be used as a tax base instead of 
property values, to avoid a disincentive — even for 
individuals — to add to the value of their 
properties. 
Depending on the bequest motive, inheritance and 
gift taxes are found to have different impacts on 
economic efficiency. (60) Taxation on planned 
bequest introduces distortions by discouraging 
capital accumulation and creating disincentives. 
However, if inheritances are the unplanned result 
of a precautionary, consumption-smoothing saving 
motive, then inheritance taxes should not change 
economic behaviour. 
Periodic taxes on wealth are considered by 
Boadway et al. (2010, p. 776) as ‘roughly 
analogous to a tax on capital income on that 
wealth’. Accordingly their effects on economic 
activity could also be considered as similar. Hence, 
as explained above, these taxes might distort 
decisions to build up capital, i.e. to save and 
invest, which in turn impacts on long-term 
productivity. 
Taxation on financial and capital transactions is 
reviewed in Boadway et al. (2010) as discouraging 
asset transactions and therefore hindering the 
efficiency of asset markets. (61) Thus these taxes 
might distort investment decision by increasing the 
firm’s cost of capital or by discouraging share 
owners from making investments that increase 
                                                          
(58) See Johansson et al. (2008) or Broadway et al. (2010). 
(59) See Boadway et al. (2010). 
(60) For a review see Kremer and Pestieau (2003). 
(61) For a theoretical and empirical analysis see Bond et al. 
(2004). 
share value. The impact of transaction taxes on 
risk taking is ambiguous, although there is broad 
evidence that transaction taxes may increase 
market volatility. (62) 
Interaction in tax and expenditure systems 
Two other factors were not taken into account 
when assessing the distortions of taxation and 
possible effects on growth, namely the interaction 
with public expenditure and the interaction 
between taxes. Barro (1990) shows that the 
provision of a public input, even when financed by 
distortive taxation, can have a beneficial effect on 
growth in a non-monotonic way. In his model, at a 
certain threshold the distortions imposed by the tax 
outweigh the benefit of the public good and hence 
curb growth. While taxes are a necessity to finance 
growth-enhancing public expenditure, there might 
be a way to finance in the least distortionary 
manner. 
Usually, tax reforms do not consist of changing a 
single tax rate, but include a combination of base 
and rate changes — often of various taxes. Hence, 
the interaction between individual taxes should 
also be taken into account. Besides economic 
criteria, the analysis of quality of taxation also 
needs to take into account compliance and 
administrative costs. According to Shaw et al. 
(2010) modern ‘optimal tax theory’ has for the 
most part ignored any costs other than those 
created by distorting people’s behaviour. However, 
one of the core problems of taxation is the 
asymmetry of information between the tax 
administration and the taxpayer about his true 
ability to pay. Assessing how much tax people owe 
and ensuring that it is paid is a costly activity for 
both taxpayers and administrations. The associated 
compliance and administrative costs will arise as 
soon as taxes are levied. While ‘natural’ 
administrative costs will arise, even in a world 
with honest taxpayers, these costs increase 
considerably when taxpayers try to reduce their tax 
liabilities by either tax avoidance or tax evasion. 
These activities also increase any ‘natural’ 
compliance cost that exists, as taxpayers have to 
find their way through tax laws. Tax avoidance 
often goes hand in hand with the complexity of tax 
systems. The more complex a system is and the 
harder the tax base is to determine, the more scope 
                                                          
(62) See Hemmelgarn et al. (2011) for a review. 
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there is usually for tax avoidance. Non-compliance 
is likely to increase tax distortions, as tax 
rates/bases have to be increased for the whole 
society as a result. 
Political feasibility of tax system reforms 
Given the above observations on the degree of 
distortion introduced by taxes, it seems that some 
taxes — at least according to theory — should be 
preferred to others. In policy terms, a shift in the 
tax structure to a less distortive tax system may 
therefore be supportive to growth. Theoretical 
reasoning suggests that environmental taxes, 
property taxes on immovable property and 
consumption taxes introduce fewer distortions than 
income taxation does. 
However, implementing tax shifts may be difficult 
from a political point of view. The literature has 
indeed identified a bias in the status quo, which 
basically states that voters are opposed to change. 
(63) Given this preference, the rationale for the 
reform has to be communicated efficiently and be 
understood by the electorate as necessary or 
welfare-improving and fair. 
The timing of a tax reform has to be chosen 
properly, not only with respect to the initial public 
finance conditions but also with respect to the 
time-span (or speed) of its implementation. A 
sudden tax reform may limit the scope for 
negotiations and hinder economic agents’ reactions 
in the short-term e.g. by preventing the bringing 
forward of consumption in the case of a VAT 
increase. A gradual reform allows the splitting of 
the reform into different chunks, such that only 
one group at a time is affected, which could lead to 
acceptance by the majority. (64) Moreover, a long-
term perspective with early announcements of tax 
reforms offers a stable and predictable economic 
environment, which allows households and 
businesses to take optimal long-term decisions, 
such as investment in human and physical capital. 
Although it presented the theoretical behavioural 
effects of taxes, the above analysis did not give 
any quantification of the effect of changes in the 
tax system. The next section will provide a 
summary of the evaluation of changes in the tax 
                                                          
(63) For a survey see Castanheira et al. (2011). 
(64) See Castanheira et al. (2011). 
system on GDP and GDP growth respectively, 
based on simulations as well as on econometric 
estimations. 
4.1.2. Overview of findings from simulations 
As shown above, according to economic theory, 
taxation — with the sole exception of lump sum 
taxes — creates distortions and in turn may have 
an adverse impact on economic growth. Thus, 
cutting taxes (and respective expenditure) might be 
considered as a reasonable option to promote 
employment and economic growth. However, at 
the current juncture of additional consolidation 
needs, considerations are more likely to focus on 
the question of how to increase a tax system’s 
capacities to raise revenues, promote growth and 
employment, while still maintaining the 
redistributive and allocative functions. 
The following overview will therefore report some 
empirical findings of the effects of (budgetary 
neutral) changes in the tax structure on GDP and 
growth. (65) 
Simulations 
The simulation models surveyed in Myles (2009a) 
display the different results of tax reforms on 
growth. While some only note minor effects from 
changes in the tax structure, others draw attention 
to the existence of non-negligible effects on GDP 
and its growth. The effects depend on the way the 
governments sector is modelled (including 
productive or just wasteful government spending), 
the degree of detail represented in modelling 
growth channels and the calibrated parameters. 
Despite these widely varying outcomes for tax-
reform simulations, Myles concludes that 
‘…almost all the results support the claim that a 
move from income taxation to consumption 
taxation will raise the rate of growth even though 
the predicted effect may vary.’ (Myles, 2009a, p. 
44). 
                                                          
(65) The following section reviews studies simulating the 
impact of a generally revenue-neutral tax shift. There are 
numerous studies analysing the impact of tax cuts (with 
corresponding expenditure cuts) on GDP, among which 
Coenen et al. (2007). It shall also be stressed that this 
section largely abstract from equity and redistribution 
impacts of the reforms, which are important policy 
objectives as well. 
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Recently, the European Commission (66) reported 
on the effects of an energy tax reform on 
employment and growth. The simulations — 
performed by Cambridge Econometrics with the 
E3ME model (67) — assume that the additional 
revenues from increased energy taxation are 
recycled to reduce the employers’ social security 
contributions. The impact of the different 
specifications of the energy tax on employment 
and GDP are reported as small, but positive. This 
positive impact on GDP and employment is driven 
by the modelling assumption that additional 
revenue from energy taxation would be used to 
reduce the employers’ social security 
contributions. Lower labour costs boost 
employment and increase private consumption. (68) 
                                                          
(66) European Commission (2011f): SEC(2011) 409. 
(67) The E3ME model of Cambridge Econometrics is a 
dynamic macro-econometric model designed to deal with 
E3 interactions (economy- energy -environment). It is a 
European model treating each Member State separately and 
keeping the rest of the world exogenous. 
(68) In addition to the E3ME model, other models developed by 
MODELS (2010) also point to the positive effects of the 
recycling of, in particular, ETS revenues on GDP. 
Moreover, there are a number of recent country 
specific simulations assessing the impact of tax 
reforms and tax shifts. Botman and Danninger 
(2007) simulate the impact of the 2007/2008 
German tax reform on growth using the IMF’s 
global fiscal model. Assuming an increase in VAT 
rates partly compensated by lower payroll taxes 
and a corporate income tax reduction in the 
following years, the initial negative effects on 
GDP growth turn slightly positive in the medium 
term. For Italy, Annicchiario et al (2011) analyse 
the effect of a shift from taxing labour to taxing 
consumption, implemented by a decrease in 
employers’ social security contributions and an 
increase in the consumption tax rate. The assumed 
reductions in disincentives and distortions in the 
labour market should lead to an increase in the 
level of employment and output. 
Quest based simulations 
These effects of taxes on GDP are confirmed by 
simulations using the European Commission’s 
Quest III model. The estimation results reported in 
European Commission (2008) indicate that a 
Graph 4.1: GDP effects of budget consolidation via taxes 
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budgetary neutral tax shift of the order of 1 % of 
GDP from labour taxes to consumption taxes will 
have a positive effect on employment and GDP. 
The long-run effects are greater when a 
coordinated euro-area wide tax shift is considered, 
than in the case of a unilateral tax shift, regardless 
of whether it is a small or large country making 
this shift. However, in the short run, the gains 
might be larger in the case of unilateral individual 
country shifts due to competitiveness effects. The 
quantitative results of a coordinated shift point to 
an increase in employment and real GDP of about 
0.25 % in the long run. (69) 
A related simulation using the Quest III model is 
reported in Roeger and Veld (2010) and European 
Commission (2010a, 2010e and 2010h). Here, the 
effects of a permanent reduction of the government 
deficit by 1 % of GDP through different tax 
increases are simulated. It is assumed that interest 
rates (risk premium) fall and at the same time the 
stock of outstanding debt gradually declines. This 
creates additional fiscal space which is used in all 
the simulations to gradually reduce labour income 
taxes, offsetting the effects of the initial 
consolidation and raising employment and GDP in 
the medium and long run. (70) The results are 
displayed in Graph 4.1, which shows the short-
term effects of tax consolidations on GDP as lines 
and the long-term effects on GDP for 10, 20 and 
30 years as bars. A consolidation by increasing 
consumption taxes is found to be the most 
favourable of all tax-based consolidations as 
regards long run GDP — while in the short run all 
tax consolidations result in GDP losses (see Graph 
4.1 below). A 1 %-of-GDP consolidation achieved 
by raising consumption taxes would lead to an 
initial decline in GDP of 0.1-0.2 per cent; in the 
long run the GDP would be higher by 0.3-0.4 per 
cent compared to the baseline scenario of no 
consolidation. A consolidation by increasing 
labour taxes would lead to stronger initial GDP 
losses and lower long-run gains. (71) By contrast, 
                                                          
(69) The Quest simulations refer to the GDP level, not to 
changes in long-term growth rates, which have not been 
investigated. 
(70) The result of the simulation is thus not only the result of 
the tax respectively tax increase but also the 
macroeconomic impact of permanently reducing the deficit 
and lowering labour taxes. 
(71) The assumptions on the use of fiscal space from a 
gradually lower interest burden means that consolidation 
through labour taxes in the long run leads to lower labour 
taxes than in the baseline with no consolidation. 
an increase in corporate profit taxes would lead to 
relatively small short-run losses in GDP. However, 
these losses build up over time as investment is 
depressed and the capital stock declines, leading to 
the highest GDP losses in the long run. 
To sum up, while the effects of a pure tax shifts 
towards less distortionary taxation seem to be 
limited, the proper design of a consolidation 
appears to have sizeable effects on GDP in the 
long-run. 
Some econometric estimations 
Empirical research is largely driven by the 
theoretical underpinnings that some taxes are more 
detrimental to growth than others. In his survey of 
empirical literature, Myles (2009b) finds some 
evidence that consumption taxes are less damaging 
to growth than income taxes. However, he 
considers the absence of structural modelling of 
the estimated equations as a serious limitation on 
the interpretation of the results, and underlines that 
causality issues could not be resolved by these 
estimations. 
Recently, Arnold (2008) has investigated the effect 
of the tax structure on long-run GDP, using a panel 
regression (an error correction model) for 21 
OECD countries for the period 1971-2004. Based 
on the results of his estimations the author suggests 
a growth-friendliness ranking for tax instruments, 
which is led by property taxes, in particular by 
recurrent taxes on immovable property, followed 
by consumption taxes. The author classifies 
personal income taxes as inferior to these two tax 
instruments, and corporate income taxes as having 
the most negative effects on GDP per capita. This 
ranking is confirmed by Johansson et al. (2008), 
replicating Arnold’s estimations. (72) 
Analysing the impact of reforms in reducing 
labour taxes, Bocconi University (2011) finds only 
weak evidence of any effects on the labour market. 
However, focusing on the reforms targeted at 
women, and those in which the social partners (i.e. 
                                                          
(72) Xing (2010) challenges these results. She replicates the 
estimations by Johansson (2008) using slightly different 
specifications and performing robustness tests. The author 
concludes that income taxes and consumption taxes are 
worse than property taxes. However, she does not find 
strong evidence for any further ranking between 
consumption taxes, personal and corporate income taxes. 
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labour and employers’ unions) were involved, 
highlights the anticipated positive impact on the 
labour market. 
4.2. DESIGN OF INDIVIDUAL TAXES 
Taxation might alter individual behaviour and 
influence growth, not only through the structure of 
tax systems, but also through the — sometimes 
sizeable — distortions that result from the design 
of individual taxes. The tax design debate has 
moved back into the spotlight of both academia 
and politics since the crisis. In particular, the debt 
equity bias in tax systems was cited as possibly 
having contributed to the crisis. (73) Moreover, 
given the consolidation needs, the efficiency of 
expenditures, including tax expenditures, together 
with a possible increase in mass taxes such as 
VAT, has attracted attention. Moreover, the design 
of environmental taxation can contribute to 
achieving the environmental objectives of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. 
Therefore, this section covers three important 
horizontal issues related to direct taxation, namely 
tax expenditures, debt equity bias in corporate 
taxation and debt bias in housing taxation. It goes 
on to tackle two more issues concerning indirect 
taxation, namely the efficiency of VAT systems 
and the need to increase the environmental 
performance of indirect taxation. 
4.2.1. Tax expenditure in direct taxation: an 
obstacle to broader tax bases 
The difficulty of identifying tax expenditures 
Tax expenditures can be defined as ‘provisions of 
tax law, regulation or practices that reduce or 
postpone revenue for a comparatively narrow 
population of taxpayers relative to a benchmark 
tax’. (74) (75) This general definition clearly 
exposes the problem related to the assessment of 
tax expenditures, since ‘some tax measures may 
not be readily classified as part of the benchmark 
                                                          
(73) Compare European Commission (2010e). 
(74) See Anderson (2010). 
(75) Note that in the economic literature there is a variety of tax 
expenditures definitions and that many European countries 
define in their tax codes tax expenditures differently i.e. the 
corresponding benchmark tax structure deviates across 
countries, see also Toder (2005). 
or an exception to it’. (76) In a wide definition, tax 
expenditures could cover all types of special tax 
provisions, including deductibility mechanisms, 
tax credits, exemptions and lower rates. 
One general criterion used to determine whether a 
tax measure can be considered as tax expenditure 
is usually that its scope is narrow; on the other 
hand, a measure which aims to benefit a large 
majority of taxpayers is more likely to be 
considered as a part of the benchmark system. In 
some cases, even the ‘age’ of a tax measure can be 
relevant, with the ‘oldest’ measures being 
considered as part of the benchmark at a certain 
point. The focus in the following will be on tax 
expenditures concerning direct taxes, i.e. personal 
and corporate income taxation. 
Drawbacks and risks for macroeconomic 
surveillance 
Although tax expenditures may rely on justified 
grounds (equity considerations) they lower the 
efficiency of the tax system. This is particularly 
the case when the creation of new tax expenditures 
is not subject to thorough ex ante assessments and 
ex post scrutiny to monitor their current relevance. 
The existence of tax expenditures increases 
compliance costs and tax collection costs. 
Reducing or streamlining tax expenditure can thus 
reduce the complexity of the tax system, 
compliance costs and the costs of tax collection. 
Tax expenditures can also create unproductive 
niches or inefficient rent-seeking behaviours. 
Moreover, they often represent costly second-best 
options compared with the more direct and 
efficient ways of achieving their initial objectives, 
such as direct benefits for those on low incomes. 
From a more dynamic viewpoint, tax expenditures 
tend to be maintained, or more correctly 
‘forgotten’, once they no longer have a ‘raison 
d’être’, which places an unnecessary cost burden 
on public finances, while creating potential 
distortions in the allocation of resources. They can 
also become inconsistent with new policies or new 
tax expenditures that are put in place. 
Tax expenditures can also pose a threat to the 
soundness of the budgetary framework and hence 
                                                          
(76) See Whitehouse (1999). 
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of public finances. Due to the problems of defining 
the benchmark system, the budgetary cost of tax 
expenditures is often underestimated and 
projections regarding their budgetary impact are 
often biased downwards. Moreover, they are 
usually not assessed against criteria that reflect 
their objectives in terms of economic policy, and 
their substitutability by public expenditure offers 
the opportunity to bypass the existing spending 
rules. Consequently, properly identified and 
controllable expenditures can be replaced by tax 
expenditures, which are much less transparent and 
whose development is more uncertain and more 
difficult to monitor. Given these risks, tax 
expenditures ought to be subject to the same 
scrutiny (and surveillance) as public expenditures. 
4.2.2. The debt-equity bias in corporate 
taxation 
Scrutiny is also needed when assessing distortions 
that result from incentives built into individual 
taxes. This sub-section deals with the 
consequences of the unequal tax treatment of debt 
and equity financing, known as the debt-equity 
bias. The tax deductibility of interest payments in 
most corporate income tax systems without any 
such beneficial treatment for equity financing 
creates at least two types of tax distortions. 
First, it may promote excessively high corporate 
leverage. Taking the favourable treatment of debt 
financing into account, the value of a leveraged 
firm becomes higher than the unleveraged firm and 
this creates an incentive for companies to finance 
over debt. This in return can lead to credit 
constraints, especially in times when banks tend to 
restrict their credit supply. A well-designed tax 
base that reduces the leverage distortion could 
make companies less vulnerable to a short-term 
reduction in credit available on the capital market. 
Second, this distortion in financing exacerbates 
opportunities to shift and decrease reported profit 
via debt-shifting or the use of hybrid instruments 
that combine characteristics of debt and equity, 
such as convertible debt obligations or asset-
backed securities. These instruments qualify as 
debt and therefore allow for the deduction of 
interest paid, but have equity-like characteristics. 
And last but not least, the beneficial tax treatment 
of debt over equity financing leads to inefficient 
allocation of capital, since some investment 
projects which would not otherwise be profitable 
turn out to be profitable because of the tax 
discrimination. 
Correcting the debt bias may therefore lead to 
beneficial effects. It is peculiar that, in the present 
context of seeking corrective taxes to curb risk, the 
current corporate tax system actually contains tax 
distortions that have the opposite effect and 
provide incentives to take up too much debt. 
The corporate tax debt bias interacts with several 
other non-tax determinants of corporate structure 
and with taxes at the personal and cross-border 
level. The next sections will therefore review these 
two aspects in turn. In addition, the extent and size 
of these distortions, as well as their impact on 
welfare, will be analysed. The current part ends 
with a review of the policy options to correct this 
bias and by stressing some of the possible 
consequences. 
The determinants of corporate structure 
The standard Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem 
states that, in the absence of agency and 
bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information, taxes, 
and assuming market efficiency, a firm is 
indifferent between various sources of financing 
(either issuing stocks or issuing debt). (77) In this 
environment, the value of an unleveraged firm is 
equal to the value of a leverage firm: VL=VU. 
However, in most corporate tax systems, debt-
financing is favoured through the tax-deductibility 
of interest payments. When this aspect is taken 
into account, the value of the leveraged firm is 
equal to the value of the unleveraged firm, 
augmented by the tax shield value of the debt. This 
tax shield equals the amount of debt times the 
corporate tax rate: VL = VU + tD. Hence, a 
company can maximise its value by being financed 
100 % by debt. 
There are, however, other theoretical reasons why 
debt and equity-financing may be distorted. First, 
highly-leveraged firms are more vulnerable and 
face bankruptcy costs (sometimes also called ‘the 
cost of financial distress’) which increase with the 
level of debt. Second, so-called agency costs may 
lead to an increased use of debt. Agency costs 
reflect conflicts of interest between shareholders 
                                                          
(77) In addition, its dividend policy shall not matter. 
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and managers on the one hand, and bondholders on 
the other hand. In the first case, asymmetry of 
information on the situation of the firm gives an 
incentive to shareholders to promote debt 
financing, as this restricts the Free Cash Flow 
available in the company. (78) This is because the 
Free Cash Flow usually derives from rent-
generating activities and provides managers with 
funds to invest in wasteful investments. Managers 
could promise to give back this Free Cash Flow to 
shareholders via higher future dividends, but the 
dividend policy can easily be reversed. Therefore, 
by substituting debt for equity, managers are 
bound to pay out the cash flows, because 
bondholders (who may be shareholders) have the 
right to take the firm to court. This can be a 
determinant of the capital structure of companies. 
(79) 
Is there a rationale for discrimination? 
Some of the aspects reviewed above may offer 
theoretical economic rationales for using the tax 
system to discriminate between debt and equity. 
However, as De Mooij pointed out (2011a and 
2011b), the shrinking gap between debt and equity 
instruments alters the relevance of these theories. 
In the majority of tax systems — the more so with 
the use of sophisticated instruments — the 
distinction between debt and equity is subject to 
the application of several criteria, such as the 
degree of variability of the claim, the control of the 
size of the payment by the management, the 
priority placed on cash-flows, the type of maturity 
(fixed or variable / infinite), etc. Devereux and 
Gerritsen (2010) show that there are no objective 
legal reasons for distinguishing between the two 
sources of financing. On the contrary, the rise in 
administrative complexity would actually require a 
similar tax treatment. The distinction could 
possibly originate from an artificial distinction 
created by the traditional view that dividends 
represent the remuneration of capital, while 
interest payments are a business cost. 
As reported by EEAG (2011), the issue of high 
leverage in the banking sector has been the subject 
                                                          
(78) Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund all projects that have positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital, Jensen (1986). 
(79) See Jensen (1986). 
of research. Some of the arguments to justify this 
high debt point to the role of debt in disciplining 
managers (the agency cost discussed above), the 
increased funding costs because equity is more 
risky, and possible credit rationing. 
Interaction with other taxes 
One possible rationale for favouring debt over 
equity through corporate taxation could lie in the 
analysis of taxation at shareholder and bondholder 
levels. Personal income taxation discriminate if the 
interest received is taxed in full at personal income 
tax rates, while capital gains and dividends are 
often taxed separately at lower final withholding 
tax rates, which is often the case. (80) There is also 
evidence that the level of debt is negatively related 
to the personal tax penalty. (81) According to 
Graham (2011), the empirical evidence indicates 
that the PIT disadvantage is between 1/3 and 1/2 of 
the CIT advantage, so that overall the tax 
advantage of debt is maintained. Normally, an 
optimal personal income taxation of different 
sources of capital income would be to tax them at 
the same rate (on an accrual basis). 
Lastly, there is evidence that the tax advantage of 
debt encourages profit shifting activities. For 
example, Huizinga et al. (2008) review economic 
literature that considers the debt financing of 
multinationals with either parent companies or 
subsidiaries in the United States (82), Germany (83), 
Canada (84) and the EU (85). This literature is 
consistent with the objectives of firms to minimise 
tax using their financial structure and interest and 
income flows across borders. Taking data from 32 
European countries between 1994 and 2003, they 
find that a 10 % increase in the tax rate increases 
leverage by 1.8 %. For multinationals with two 
equal-sized establishments in two countries, a 10 % 
increase in the tax rate in one country leads to a 
2.4 % increase in the leverage of the company 
located in that country and a 0.6 % decrease in 
                                                          
(80) Gordon (2011). 
(81) Graham (1999). 
(82) Hines and Hubbard (1990), Collins and Shackelford 
(1992), Froot and Hines (1992), Grubert (1998), Altshuler 
and Grubert (2003), Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2004) and Mills and Newberry (2004). 
(83) Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) and Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2005). 
(84) Jog and Tang (2001). 
(85) Moore and Ruane (2005). 
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leverage in the affiliated foreign company, which 
points to debt-shifting. 
In the same vein, De Mooij (2011a and 2011b) 
looks at the effect of taxes on gross bank 
profitability and finds semi-elasticities of between 
-6 and -8.5, which are very large compared to non-
financial firms, and which lead him to conclude 
that banks seem to engage in more tax avoidance 
than is the case for non-financial firms. 
Extent and Size of the Distortions 
Because of the tax deductibility, most tax systems 
in Europe actually provide a subsidy when 
financing via debt. Reacting to this benefit, the 
economic literature provides ample evidence of a 
positive correlation between the level of leverage 
and the level of corporate taxation. It is beyond the 
remit of this section to conduct an exhaustive 
review of the existing literature. Such a review is 
proposed by De Mooij (2011a and 2011b) and uses 
267 tax elasticities found in 19 studies to perform a 
meta-analysis. The mean tax elasticity across 
studies is 0.65 (the median stands at 0.51), but with 
a large standard deviation of 0.57. Interestingly, 
78 % of the regression results are significantly 
different from zero. The result of the regressions 
also indicates that the response increases over time 
and that the relationship may not be linear. Finally, 
internal debt seems more responsive to taxation 
than external debt, and short-term debt is more 
responsive than long-term debt. 
De Mooij (2011a and 2011b) also uses a sample of 
14 377 banks from 82 countries across Europe, 
Asia and the Americas between 2001 and 2009. He 
finds that, on average, the leverage ratio of banks 
is 88.1 %, compared to a ratio of between 40 % and 
60 % for non-financial firms. This is a strong 
indication that the leverage issue is more acute for 
banks. 
Impact on Welfare 
Because of the tax bias, debt financing creates a 
welfare cost. This welfare cost has been estimated 
by Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) at between 
0.08 % and 0.23 % of GDP, while Gordon (2011) 
estimates it at around 0.25 % of GDP. As rightly 
pointed out by De Mooij (2011a and 2011b), these 
estimates assume an average elasticity that applies 
to a representative firm and does not take into 
account the heterogeneity of responses and hence 
the additional welfare costs due to misallocations. 
They also fail to include the broader welfare costs 
of the negative externalities of using debt, such as 
the systemic risk, the probability of default and the 
social costs of business cycle fluctuations. Lastly, 
they do not take into account the distortions 
created by debt-shifting activities and the 
misallocation due to international tax arbitrage (86), 
as well as the administrative and compliance costs.  
4.2.3.  The debt bias in the taxation of housing 
A similar debt bias in the taxation system is often 
observed in the taxation of housing investment, in 
particular through tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments (or even capital payments). The 
decision to buy a house and live in it is both a 
consumption and an investment decision. The 
consumption decision relates to the fact that the 
buyer will occupy the house, and relates to issues 
concerning, for example, space and location. The 
investment decision refers to the possibility of an 
increase (or decrease) of the value of the house 
while living in it. The issue of the tax treatment is 
more relevant for the latter decision, which in turn 
has an impact on the housing market and house 
prices. (87) 
If the house is considered as an investment good, 
tax neutrality implies that it should be taxed in the 
same way as other assets. Ideally the rental income 
from the house, less depreciation allowances and 
interest payments (i.e. the net rental income), 
should be subject to personal income tax. In the 
case of owner-occupied housing, this translates 
into taxing an imputed rental income, while at the 
same time allowing for mortgage interest 
deductibility (and depreciation). (88) As a second-
best option, imputed rental income could be 
approximated through a recurrent annual tax on the 
property under the condition that the value of the 
tax base is regularly updated. Note that a tax on 
imputed income is a direct tax and that the tax 
burden might therefore depend on the taxpayer’s 
overall income, while a recurrent property tax is 
classified as an indirect tax and the tax burden is 
                                                          
(86) See De Mooij (2011a and 2011b). 
(87) See last year’s edition for a discussion (European 
Commission, 2010e). 
(88) Apart from the taxes discussed here, capital gains of 
housing transactions should also be taxed in order to 
achieve tax neutrality vis-à-vis other financial assets. 
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therefore normally independent of the taxpayer’s 
income situation. If interest deductibility is 
provided to house-owners, while imputed rental 
income is either (i) not taxed or taxed too low or 
(ii) approximated with a low recurrent property 
tax, a tax subsidy is provided which favours 
investments in owner-occupied housing. To 
provide neither mortgage interest deductibility nor 
tax imputed rental incomes will in general not 
ensure tax neutrality, if the return from other types 
of investment is taxed. (89) 
Providing tax subsidies (under taxation) for 
homeownership presumes that home ownership 
generates positive externalities for society. Better 
social outcomes for the children of homeowners, 
as well as more engagement in the local 
community, are among the positive externalities 
that motivate public policies favouring 
homeownership. However, it is often difficult to 
clearly separate the positive externality of home 
ownership from the private benefit, as the 
relationships might be casual or suffer from 
endogeneity bias. A drawback of home ownership 
is that it tends to reduce labour mobility, 
particularly if high transaction taxes are imposed. 
(90)  
The deductibility of mortgage interest payments 
reduces the cost for the homeowner and 
encourages the household to buy rather than to rent 
their housing. A risk is that the policy encourages 
households to invest too much in housing in 
relation to other assets. This could also lead to a 
higher private sector debt if households do not 
offset the lending for housing investment by 
savings in other assets. Moreover, as discussed in 
last year’s edition of the report, it could have 
contributed to the housing price bubble. (91) 
Moreover, to the extent that reduced interest costs 
are capitalised into higher house prices, the tax 
policy also risks being inefficient or even counter-
productive. Capozza et al. (1996), Harris (2010) 
and Agell et al. (1995) find that the removal of or a 
reduction in the interest rate deductibility would 
lower house prices significantly in the U.S. and 
Sweden respectively. Recent empirical results 
                                                          
(89) See e.g. Keen (2010) and Andrews et al. (2011). 
(90) See Andrews and Caldera Sanchez (2011) for an overview 
of benefits and costs of homeownership (box 1). 
(91) See European Commission (2010e). 
indicate that demand shocks (e.g. through financial 
deregulation) have a greater likelihood of being 
capitalised into real house prices when the country 
provides generous tax relief for mortgage cost 
payments. (92) 
No clear relationship has been found between the 
degree of tax relief and the aggregate 
homeownership rate in a cross-country comparison 
of OECD-countries. Moreover, the use of tax 
subsidies through the deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments risks being a regressive policy. 
As the tax subsidy normally takes the form of a 
deduction against earned income, and not the form 
of a tax credit, it is worth more for high-income 
earners. This is consistent with the finding that 
homeownership inequality (93), defined as the ratio 
of the homeownership ratio in the top income 
quartile to the ratio in the second quartile, appears 
to be higher in countries with generous tax 
subsidies. 
At the lower end of the income distribution, there 
is also a risk that, if the tax relief is capitalised into 
house prices, this impact crowds out the effect of 
the reduced debt costs. Andrews and Caldera 
Sanchez (2011) look at this indirectly (due to data 
limitation) and investigate whether the impact of 
financial markets regulation on homeownership 
rates differs depending on the degree of tax relief. 
It is shown that a generous tax relief reduces the 
impact of financial deregulation (through higher 
loan-to-value ratio) on the homeownership rate. 
This indicates that a tax subsidy can distort the 
impact of financial deregulation and potentially 
contribute to crowding financially constrained 
households out of the market through higher house 
prices. 
Tax subsidies for mortgage interest payments have 
also been found to be correlated with price 
volatility on the housing market. Van den Noord 
(2005) provides evidence for higher price volatility 
in countries with more generous tax relief for 
home ownership. The study covers the period from 
1970 to 2001 and includes eight euro area 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and Ireland). More 
recent empirical results in Andrews (2010) also 
indicate that more generous tax subsidies for 
                                                          
(92) See Andrews (2010). 
(93) See, e.g., Andrews et al. (2011). 
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mortgage debt could lead to greater volatility of 
house prices. 
4.2.4. VAT efficiency 
The particular importance of consumption taxation 
for a growth supportive tax system as reviewed in 
section 4.1 merits a more thorough investigation of 
its overall efficiency. As VAT accounts for the 
majority of consumption taxation, this sub-section 
will focus on VAT efficiency. 
Following the considerations set out in sub-section 
4.1.1, an economically efficient VAT system 
could, in theory, be non-uniform, imposing higher 
VAT rates on price inelastic rather than price 
elastic goods. However, given that it is the 
impossible to measure the required price 
elasticities to any serious extent, a consensus 
among economists has emerged that the best 
course would be to opt for a single uniform VAT 
rate. 
This argument relies partly on the practical 
advantages of uniform VAT rates, and partly on 
the insight that differentiating VAT rates without a 
detailed knowledge of the underlying price 
elasticities is unlikely to lead to gains in efficiency 
and may even lead to sizable losses in efficiency, 
as the ‘wrong’ goods or services are given reduced 
VAT rates. 
However, the existing VAT system within the 
European Community is far from uniform. 
Member States apply widely differing VAT rates, 
thereby creating a highly diversified and complex 
VAT system. This is generally justified by three 
types of considerations, one based on efficiency or 
labour market arguments, the other based on 
distributional considerations, and the third on the 
existence of merit goods. 
Reduced VAT rates and efficiency 
The case for moving away from a uniform VAT 
rate on efficiency grounds was discussed, for 
instance, by Copenhagen Economics (2007), in a 
study commissioned by the Directorate General for 
Taxation and Customs Union of the European 
Commission,. In line with the considerations 
expressed above, the study argues that there is a 
strong general argument for having uniform VAT 
rates in the European Union, as uniform rates are a 
better way to maintain a high degree of economic 
efficiency, to minimise otherwise substantial 
compliance costs and to smooth the functioning of 
the internal market, but it also identifies some 
possible exceptions to this general rule. 
In line with the theoretical arguments put forward 
in sub-section 4.1.1, the same study sets out 
theoretical and empirical arguments for extending 
reduced VAT rates (or other subsidies) to sectors 
whose services are easily substituted for do-it-
yourself or underground work, including by highly 
skilled workers, e.g. locally supplied services and 
some parts of the hospitality sector. 
Another — albeit contested — argument for 
reduced VAT rates on certain goods is the idea 
commonly put forward that labour-intensive goods 
and services should benefit from reduced VAT 
rates. 
The theoretical argument is that reduced VAT 
rates, by boosting demand for such services, 
stimulate demand for low-skilled workers, and 
push up their wages such that employment 
becomes a more attractive option than 
unemployment. This argument only holds in 
countries with rigid and non-flexible labour 
markets for low-skilled workers; otherwise, 
increased demand may simply stimulate wages for 
this segment of the labour market. 
However, the Copenhagen Economics’ simulations 
indicate that the overall impact on demand for low 
skilled workers is small, because differences in 
low skilled employment between industries are 
limited. Moreover, the losses from distortions in 
the composition of consumption are likely to 
outweigh the benefits. 
Reduced VAT rates and distributional concerns 
A more common rationale for differentiating VAT 
rates is linked to distribution considerations. Ever 
since the 19th century, indirect taxation has been 
criticised on the grounds that it is regressive. 
Historically, this was one of the reasons for the rise 
of direct taxation, which is much better suited to 
introducing progressivity into the tax system. 
The regressivity argument is based on the fact that 
low-income households pay VAT on a higher 
proportion of their income, because they generally 
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save less than higher-income households. As it is a 
consumption tax, VAT does not tax savings until 
the savings are spent. 
Although there is little doubt that low-income 
households pay VAT on a higher share of income, 
theory has been qualifying the significance of this 
result. First, it has been shown that looking at tax 
payments over the entire lifecycle, instead of at a 
cross-section of households, reduces the 
regressivity of the tax, as the savings are 
decumulated following retirement and spent on 
consumption goods (94); second, and more 
important, it has been shown in several studies that 
reduced VAT rates (or exemptions) are not a cost-
effective policy instrument — it generally costs 
less to redistribute the same amount of income by 
other means, on the expenditure side through 
targeted benefits or on the revenue side by 
measures such as cutting income tax for the lowest 
bracket and/or increasing the basic tax-free 
allowance. The Mirrlees Review (2010), among 
others, found that for the UK it would be possible 
to more than offset the abolition of reduced rates 
for the lowest three deciles of the income 
distribution and still gain net tax revenue of GBP 
11 billion, which could be used to reduce other 
taxes or to spend on poverty reduction 
programmes. However, the UK has a particularly 
extensive system of reduced rates. (95) 
Boeters et al. (2006) (96) nevertheless found similar 
results for Germany, where the scope of reduced 
rates is close to the EU average. The authors, using 
an applied general equilibrium model, found that 
abolishing reduced rates would have only a small 
redistributive effect towards greater inequality, and 
that if the abolition of reduced rates is offset by 
reductions in the marginal income tax rate or by 
cuts in social security contributions, there is scope 
for significant gains in overall welfare. They 
conclude that (in Germany), ‘VAT differentiation 
can hardly be considered an effective means of 
redistribution policy’ and that ‘the abolition of 
VAT differentials has only negligible redistributive 
effects’. (97) Moreover, the analysis of the standard 
                                                          
(94) See for instance, for the UK VAT, Davis and Kay (1985), 
several other studies have found a similar pattern in 
commodity taxes. 
(95) See discussion in the section ‘The scope of reduced VAT 
rates in the EU’. 
(96) Boeters et al. (2006). 
(97) Boeters et al. (2006), p. 3. 
and reduced VAT rates in Germany commissioned 
by the German Federal Ministry of Finance 
concluded that none of the reduced rates except the 
VAT rates on food could be justified from a social, 
economic, tax or budgetary point of view. (98)  
Another interesting conclusion of the paper by 
Boeters et al. (2006) is that, given that the reduced 
rate also benefits producers of the goods or 
services in question (99), ‘VAT rate differentiation 
can be viewed primarily as an industry-specific 
subsidy rather than an instrument of 
redistribution’. This conclusion is topical, because 
it highlights a major practical downside of reduced 
rates: once introduced, they are very difficult to 
revoke or curtail, and they generate political 
pressure from other producers to extend the 
favourable treatment. This pressure is inherently 
difficult to resist, given the lack of clear criteria, or 
at least clear lines of demarcation, for deciding 
which goods deserve reduced rates and for 
communicating the results to the taxpayer. In the 
context of the EU, this problem is compounded by 
the unanimity requirement in the taxation area, by 
the sensitivity in negotiating over reduced rates in 
an international context, and by the fear that any 
expansion of reduced rates in a partner country 
will generate similar demands at home. 
For the EU as a whole, Copenhagen Economics 
(2007) found that there is a limited and contingent 
argument for applying reduced VAT rates (or other 
subsidies) to sectors particularly favoured by low 
income households in order to improve the (post 
consumption) income distribution, but the 
argument only holds for countries with significant 
and stable consumption differences between high 
and low income groups. This is because if better-
off households consume a similar (if larger) basket 
of goods, they too benefit from the reduced tax 
rate, augmenting its cost without any benefit. In 
practice, literature has not found systematically 
different consumption patterns between low-
income and high-income households. The authors 
of the study therefore argue that the only relevant 
sector for which VAT rate reduction could make 
sense is food. Reducing VAT rates on food, which 
constitutes a larger share of consumption for low 
income households than for high income 
households, results in a cost saving that is 
                                                          
(98) Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2010). 
(99) Boeters et al. (2006), p. 3. 
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particularly beneficial for low income households. 
The larger the difference in consumption shares, 
the more effective the argument becomes. 
Simulations show that the argument has some 
empirical support in certain countries, in particular 
those with high initial income inequality. (100) 
Overall, Copenhagen Economics (2007) concludes 
that reduced VAT rates are not the best instrument 
for redistribution, particularly in Member States 
with broad, well-developed social security 
systems. 
VAT and merit goods 
Copenhagen Economics (2007) also claims that 
there is a limited and contingent argument for 
extending reduced VAT rates (or other subsidies) 
to sectors which, for some (good) reason, are 
under-consumed. The motivation may be to make 
cultural (merit) goods more available for low 
income households or to stimulate consumption of 
goods with positive externalities. Possible 
examples of the former include books, music and 
cultural events. However, it is often difficult to 
verify whether low income households are actually 
motivated to purchase more merit goods or 
whether the lower rates act as a subsidy to high 
income households initially consuming more merit 
goods. Furthermore, reduced rates on some merit 
goods such as books and music can create serious 
tensions in the functioning of the internal market, 
primarily due to the ease of electronic trade. 
The same study also identified a number of 
concerns that should be carefully evaluated when 
lowering VAT rates. For instance, most arguments 
in favour of lower VAT are equally valid for other 
policy instruments, such as targeted subsidy 
schemes or targeted changes in income tax. For 
this reason, in any specific case it is important to 
evaluate carefully whether lower VAT is actually 
the best instrument to achieve the desired effects. 
All the empirical evidence indicates that 
compliance costs associated with lower VAT rates 
can be considerable. Differences in VAT rates 
between similar products may in particular give 
rise to a substantial number of administrative and 
                                                          
(100) Other studies, however, seem more sceptical. The Mirrlees 
report states for the UK, where income inequality is 
relatively high, that ‘…the policy rationale for the zero-
rating of food [...] is extremely weak’, p. 300. 
legal conflicts about the correct classification of 
specific goods. 
The key to an efficient application of lower VAT 
or any other subsidy is to keep mechanical revenue 
losses low. Mechanical revenue losses arise when 
lower VAT (or any other subsidy) is ceded to 
consumption that does not contribute to reaching 
the desired goal. For example, if lower VAT is 
ceded to food in order to improve the income 
distribution there will be a mechanical revenue 
loss because high income households will also 
benefit from lower VAT. 
The choice of a financing scheme to secure budget 
neutrality should be carefully considered in the 
context of the goals to be achieved by reduced 
VAT rates. For example, if lower VAT on locally 
supplied services (in order to increase 
productivity) is financed by higher marginal 
income taxes, the desired effect may be neutralised 
or reversed. If lower VAT on food (in order to 
improve the income distribution) is financed by 
higher VAT on items primarily consumed by high 
income households, the desired effects may be 
reinforced. On the other hand, the application of a 
uniform VAT rate to a broad base diminishes the 
need for high rates of other more distortionary 
taxes. 
The application of reduced VAT rates in the EU 
As mentioned above, owing to the range of 
reduced rates and exemptions, the application of 
VAT in the EU does not comprise the entire 
consumption expenditure, which would be the base 
of the ‘ideal’ pure consumption tax. Although 
VAT is a harmonised tax, the degree of 
subsidiarity granted by the EU Directive is in 
practice considerable, as Member States can set the 
level of VAT rates within wide limits. There are 
lower limits (15 % for the standard rate and 5 % for 
the reduced rate (101)), but in either case all 
Member States except one impose higher levels. 
Where the VAT directive imposes a binding 
constraint is in the limitation of the number of 
rates (in general, one standard and two reduced 
rates, except when derogations have been granted) 
and in allowing their application only to certain 
types of goods, listed in its Annex III, essentially 
                                                          
(101) Super-reduced rates, below 5 %, exist in five countries. 
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foodstuffs (including beverages, but excluding 
alcoholic beverages), water supplies, medicines 
and medical products, passenger transport, social 
housing, cultural goods, sporting events or 
facilities, social services, waste collection, hotels, 
restaurants and catering, and some labour-intensive 
personal services such as hairdressing. Exemptions 
(whether or not in combination with the right to 
deduct the VAT incurred by suppliers in producing 
it) are also limited to specific goods or services, 
most notably financial services and services in the 
general interest or produced by public entities. 
The limitations on the rates are dictated by various 
considerations. As regards the lower limit of the 
standard rate, the limit was introduced in the run-
up to the 1992 Single Market programme, as a 
response to fears that the abolition of internal 
frontiers, by making cross-border shopping easier, 
could put excessive downward pressure on rates. 
In practice, however, these fears do not seem to 
have been confirmed: nearly 20 years after the 
launch of the single market, standard rates are 
clearly growing. As for the upper limit on the 
standard rate, this is a political and not a legal 
commitment by Member States; it was introduced 
to prevent a further widening of the gap between 
minimum and maximum rates, particularly in view 
of the long-term aim to switch to the origin-based 
system of VAT, which requires a close degree of 
approximation of rates. All in all, the fact that all 
Member States but one have exceeded the 15 % 
minimum limit suggests that the pressure on 
standard rates from cross-border shopping is 
limited. The pressure to go beyond the 25 % upper 
limit also appears relatively limited (102). 
The landscape is completely different for reduced 
rates. Experience shows that domestic political 
pressure for granting beneficial treatment to 
specific goods (and therefore to specific producers) 
is typically quite strong. Member States often fear 
that when another country is calling for the 
application of a reduced rate in a specific sector, 
this will spark similar requests domestically, which 
will be hard to resist. The extension of reduced 
rates may therefore be seen as creating policy 
‘externalities’ for other Member States, even in the 
absence of significant inter-state commerce of the 
good or service in question. In this respect, the 
                                                          
(102) Although it should be mentioned that three Member States 
have a 25 % standard rate. 
limits of the reduced rates can be seen as providing 
a superior policy framework and preventing the 
risk of a fragmentation of the VAT regime and of a 
race to reduce rates even more. The limitations on 
the number of reduced rates also seem to be a 
useful safeguard against the proliferation of special 
regimes. 
The limitations to Member State sovereignty in 
terms of the legal form of the VAT are founded on 
the importance that a reasonably uniform VAT 
system has in ensuring manageable costs for intra-
EU commerce. Even under current circumstances, 
there is good reason to believe that the differences 
between national VAT regimes lead to much 
higher compliance costs for firms that export to 
another EU Member State than for those that sell 
their products domestically. (103) A harmonised 
VAT system therefore seems to be an essential 
building block of the Single Market. 
The above discussion shows that there are sound 
arguments for the coordination of policies on VAT 
rates among Member States. The current 
framework allows for considerable flexibility at 
rate level and for some common structure at the 
level of the VAT system, although there could be 
room for improvement on either level. However, 
the framework is constrained by the unanimity rule 
which applies generally in the taxation area, and 
which typically results in very long adaptation 
periods. Indeed, the Monti report (2010) identified 
taxation as one area where a strengthening of the 
working of the Internal Market would be 
advisable. As for the structural elements of the 
VAT system other than rates such as the general 
design of the system, the rules on zero-rating of 
exports, and in particular the rules targeting the 
risk of double taxation (where the rules on place of 
supply of goods and services were not 
harmonised), the rationale for coordination 
between Member States is even stronger, justifying 
the solution adopted by the EU Treaties on 
harmonisation: namely wide latitude for Member 
States on the rates, but within a common legal 
framework. 
4.2.5. Environmental taxation  
Environmental policy objectives, though high on 
the policy agenda, introduce a necessary and 
                                                          
(103) European Commission (2010f). 
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justified constraint on the economy. Several types 
of taxes can be applied to achieve the environment 
policy objective. However, the design of the 
specific tax is essential in order to achieve the 
desired outcome. 
Environmental taxes will, as mentioned in section 
4.1.1, tax the source of the negative externality 
directly in proportion to the environmental bad. 
Thus, the tax should be levied in direct relation to 
the environmental damage, i.e. emissions or 
pollution. In comparison with alternative policy 
measures, e.g. freely allocated emissions or 
pollution allowances or regulation, taxes have the 
advantage that they generate fiscal revenue, which 
can contribute to fiscal consolidation. 
Alternatively, the revenue can be used to mitigate 
potentially negative impacts of the tax on 
vulnerable groups or to reduce other distortive 
taxes in the economy. 
Moreover, environmental incentives can also be 
integrated into the design of other taxes. A 
disincentive can be created by levying a higher tax 
on products that are negative for the environment, 
or alternatively — and more frequently — 
incentives can be created by providing a tax 
subsidy for a more environmentally friendly 
choice. Examples of such tax differentiation are 
CO2-related vehicle taxation and reduced VAT 
rates on environmental merit goods. 
When designing an environmentally friendly tax, it 
is vital to ensure that the design being considered 
will actually generate the intended outcome in 
terms of changed behaviour. This section looks 
more closely at two areas of environmentally 
related taxation which have been discussed 
recently at EU-level. First, the state of play of the 
revision of the Energy Tax Directive (ETD) is 
reviewed. Secondly, the issue of reduced VAT on 
energy-saving products is analysed more closely. 
State of play of environmental taxation at EU 
level 
According to the current stage of Community law 
in taxation, EU Member States are free to shape 
their tax legislation and apply tax measures to 
achieve their policy objectives. In the field of 
environmental taxation, Member States may levy 
taxes on excise goods, provided they respect 
existing EU harmonisation provisions in indirect 
taxation, the EU Treaties and the case-law of the 
European Court of Justice. In addition, ‘the 
levying of such taxes may not, in trade between 
Member States, give rise to formalities connected 
with the crossing of frontiers.’ (104) Against this 
background, governments have to ensure that the 
tax measures applied do not lead to discrimination 
and therefore to distortions in the Internal Market. 
In the Green Paper (105) on market-based 
instruments for environment and related policy 
purposes, the Commission encourages the 
utilisation of instruments such as indirect taxation 
and tradable emission rights for achieving 
environmental policy objectives. The economic 
reasoning for applying such instruments is based 
on their capacity to improve resource allocation by 
internalising external costs. As a result a market 
failure may be corrected in a cost-efficient way. As 
mentioned in the Green Paper, it also remains 
important to reform and remove environmentally 
harmful subsidies so as to ensure that the policy 
framework is consistent. These policy objectives, 
i.e. to use market-based instruments and phase out 
environmentally harmful subsidies, also form part 
of the Europe 2020 Strategy (106) and a 
Communication on resource-efficient Europe as 
part of this Strategy.(107) The abovementioned 
considerations concerning market-based 
instruments play an important role in reforming 
EU energy taxation. On 13 April 2011 the 
Commission adopted a proposal (108) for an 
amendment of the Energy Taxation Directive 
(ETD). The point of the revision of the ETD is to 
bring energy taxation into line with general 
strategic policy objectives as set out in Europe 
2020 by helping to make the European economy 
more resource efficient, greener and more 
competitive. (109) 
A major drawback of the current ETD 
(2003/96/EC) is that the minimum rates for the 
taxation of energy products are based on historical 
rates and levied in terms of the volume of energy 
consumption. Thus, the rates do not relate to the 
energy content of the energy products or to their 
carbon content. This causes a number of important 
                                                          
(104) OJ (2009): Council Directive 2008/118/EC. 
(105) European Commission (2007): COM(2007) 140 final. 
(106) European Commission (2010c). 
(107) European Commission (2011m): COM(2011) 21. 
(108) European Commission (2011d): COM(2011) 169/3. 
(109) European Commission (2010c): COM(2010) 2020. 
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distortions. (110) First, it does not provide 
incentives to the efficient use of energy products 
and it distorts the functioning of the Internal 
Market. Second, it does not promote the 
environmental-friendly use of energy by 
distinguishing between greenhouse gas and non-
greenhouse gas emissions. Lastly, it does not 
encourage the use of renewable energy sources, 
because it taxes renewables at the standard fuel 
rate even though they have lower energy content in 
general. 
The proposal for a revision of the ETD takes these 
aspects into account and rebalances the taxation of 
energy products according to their energy content 
and their CO2 emissions. In addition, the proposal 
for a revised directive ensures that the directive 
complements the EU Emission Trading System. 
In conjunction with the proposal for a revision of 
the ETD, the Commission also published an 
Impact Assessment (111) on the micro- and macro-
economic impacts of the amendments. Macro 
simulations demonstrate that the most positive 
impacts result from a growth-friendly 
environmental tax reform, i.e. shifting the tax 
burden from labour taxation to environmental 
taxation. In quantitative terms, the first-best 
scenario shows that Member States could collect 
substantial additional revenue of almost 40 billion 
euro and benefit from GDP growth of 0.27 % by 
2030. The option implies the introduction by 
Member States of a CO2-tax of EUR 20 per tonne 
of CO2 on the top of their current national tax 
rates, and using the revenue gains to reduce labour 
taxation. In all other respects, the impact of the 
proposed revision of the ETD is limited in scope, 
but still positive. 
Reduced VAT on energy saving products 
One particular type of merit good consists of 
environmentally-friendly products, usually 
identified as appliances that incorporate energy-
saving technology. The arguments for reduced 
VAT rates on such products are often mentioned in 
the context of the efforts to reduce energy 
consumption. 
                                                          
(110) European Commission (2011e): COM(2011) 168/3. 
(111) European Commission (2011f): SEC(2011) 409. 
The Copenhagen Economics study on reduced 
VAT for environmentally-friendly products (2008) 
shows that the best approach to reducing GHG 
emissions is to tax at source. Carbon taxes, and 
also the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), are 
examples of a tax at source. Indeed, ETS covers 
emissions of CO2 from nearly all electricity 
consumption and district heating by households. 
Due to the nature of a cap-and-trade system, the 
level of emissions is determined exclusively by the 
number of allowances allocated. Thus, any new 
measures encouraging lower electricity use by 
households will lead to a lower price of ETS 
emission allowances, but will leave the level of 
CO2 emissions unchanged. 
Consequently, the real issue is whether additional 
action, such as providing tax breaks to the most 
energy efficient variant of a specific product, is 
able to reduce the cost of CO2 abatement beyond 
what is offered by the EU ETS. Promotion of 
energy efficient product variants should be about 
lowering the costs of meeting climate and energy 
policy targets by pushing consumers in the 
direction of the ‘low hanging fruit’. 
It is essential that consumers are provided with 
accurate information about the energy 
consumption of the different variants of the same 
product, for example freezers. This enables them 
to save money and energy by choosing the most 
energy efficient product. The EU Commission 
launched a major programme in July 2008 to 
encourage more widespread and improved energy 
labelling of products, thus allowing consumers to 
choose the products with the lowest overall costs 
during the lifetime of the product. In many 
countries, consumers are also encouraged to carry 
out so-called ‘energy audits’ to identify how to 
save energy cost-effectively. 
However, even with improved labelling in place, 
consumers may be reluctant in practice to switch to 
more energy efficient products, even if such 
products save them money. The price of energy-
intensive products– for example light bulbs — 
may be so low that consumers do not really focus 
on the energy costs associated with the use of the 
product when buying it. This situation may call for 
either minimum efficiency standards to remove the 
‘worst’ performing (inefficient) products from the 
market and potentially a subsidy such as a reduced 
VAT rate to promote the ‘best’ performers 
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(efficient). Furthermore, some products may 
actually be so expensive that cash-strapped 
households choose the variant which is less 
expensive but which consumes more energy. In 
both cases, the idea is to reduce the upfront 
purchase price rather than letting price incentives 
work through lower user costs during the lifetime 
of the product. 
Copenhagen Economics (2008) sets out three main 
conclusions on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
using reduced VAT rates to encourage consumers 
to save energy. First, it is not clear whether energy 
savings will inevitably follow from such purchase 
rewards. The energy efficient appliances will gain 
market share from the inefficient ones, but at the 
same time more and larger electric appliances may 
be bought, as the price of these products falls 
significantly. This will shift overall consumption 
towards products that are energy intensive in use. 
Modelling results suggest that net effects on 
energy consumption are highly dependent on both 
how the VAT subsidy is calibrated in terms of 
product coverage, energy efficiency requirements, 
and country specific circumstances. 
Second, a lower VAT rate is a ‘blunt instrument’ 
and may also lead to compliance problems in the 
real world. These problems could most likely be 
reduced or eliminated by using alternative 
measures that provide more targeted incentives to 
shape consumers’ purchase decisions. For 
instance, rather than offering a VAT rate cut to all 
boilers/freezers that are classified as being energy 
efficient, consumers could be offered a fixed 
amount of money. 
Third, many of the products considered for 
inclusion under the lower VAT rates, such as 
freezers, have ‘cross-border trade potential’ 
because they are relatively expensive. 
4.3. INTERACTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT TAX 
SYSTEMS IN THE EU 
The effect that tax structures might have on 
sustainable growth does not stop at national 
boundaries. Given the high degree of integration of 
the EU single market, and the high mobility of 
certain factors, policy makers’ decisions might be 
influenced by tax competition and tax evasion 
considerations. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
Euro Plus Pact, adopted at the European Council 
of 24/25 March 2011, stipulates that pragmatic 
coordination of tax policies is key to supporting 
fiscal consolidation and economic growth in the 
euro area. Under the ‘Euro Plus Pact’, Member 
States commit to engage in structured discussions 
on tax policy issues, notably with a view to 
ensuring the exchange of best practices, avoiding 
harmful practices and fighting against fraud and 
tax evasion. 
The Monti report of 2010 (112) stresses ‘…that it is 
important to devise solutions that minimise 
harmful tax competition and remove the in-built 
bias towards taxation of less mobile basis’. One of 
the Commission’s priorities for the near future (113) 
is to remove cross-border tax obstacles for EU 
citizens. 
Against this background this chapter deals with the 
economic rationales for intergovernmental tax 
cooperation and tax competition from the 
theoretical and empirical points of view. In 
addition, the potential of tax cooperation for 
increasing the efficiency of the EU Internal Market 
will be depicted. 
Theoretical background 
The standard theoretical model of tax competition 
(114) was developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986), as well as Wilson (1986). In this model 
there are two production factors: capital (mobile) 
and land (immobile). The local government does 
not waste or overtax and pursues the maximisation 
of its citizens’ utility (benevolent government). It 
levies a tax to finance the provision of a public 
good. In a first-best situation without capital 
outflow (closed economy), the government sets an 
optimal tax rate at which the marginal benefit of 
supplying the good equals the marginal cost of 
raising the tax. 
However, the model shows that capital flow 
liberalisation leads to the outflow of capital. In an 
open economy, therefore, the marginal costs of tax 
setting are higher due to the additional cost of 
capital outflow (base effect). For this reason the 
                                                          
(112) Monti (2010), p. 80. 
(113) European Commission (2010g): COM(2010). 
(114) Following Nicodeme (2006) tax competition refers to non-
cooperative tax setting by independent governments to 
attract mobile tax base. 
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local government is forced to reduce its supply of 
public goods due to a fall in tax revenue. What the 
local government does not take into account is the 
fact that a loss in the tax base of one country 
results in an increase in the tax base of another 
country. Under the assumption that world capital 
supply is fixed, an increase in a country tax rate 
leads to a positive externality. However, the capital 
export country does not take this into account, as it 
is concerned only with maximising the welfare of 
its own households. As a consequence, without tax 
coordination, there is under-provision of public 
goods. (115) 
Based on this model, there are two ways of dealing 
with this dilemma. The first one is through tax 
coordination; the countries decide to increase all 
tax rates by the same amount. As a consequence, 
the welfare increases in all countries since the 
additional cost of capital outflow are zero and the 
marginal cost of taxation equals the marginal 
benefit of the provision of public goods. Another 
theoretical option is to limit capital mobility, i.e. to 
close the economy. In this situation capital outflow 
is not possible and a capital tax equals a lump-sum 
tax. Therefore, every country could set its tax rate 
at a socially desired level. 
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) modified the model 
depicted above so as to allow for country size bias 
and labour taxation. The results show that smaller 
countries face a more elastic corporate tax base 
and prefer to set their capital tax rate at a lower 
level. Bigger countries, on the other hand, have a 
less elastic tax base and choose to set their tax 
rates at higher levels to restore equilibrium. 
The introduction of labour taxation into the model 
demonstrates that smaller countries will tax labour 
only. The reason for that lies in the elasticity of 
labour; it is assumed to be inelastic (the labour-
leisure trade-off is left out of consideration). Thus 
labour taxation is similar to a lump-sum tax. 
Capital, on the contrary, from a small country 
perspective, is completely elastic since it cannot be 
affected. Sizable countries, on the other hand, will 
                                                          
(115) Race-to-the-bottom is used in similar manner to describe a 
situation in which governments have an incentive to 
engage in wasteful competition by cutting tax rates to 
attract mobile bases. Under-provision of public goods from 
this point of view is the result of a race-to-the-bottom, see 
also Dhillon et al. (2006). 
tax labour and capital according to the elasticity of 
capital supply. The less elastic the capital base, the 
higher its contribution to the provision of public 
goods. 
The predictions of the models presented above 
derive inter alia from the assumption that the 
government is benevolent, i.e. it pursues the 
maximisation of its citizens’ welfare. Challenging 
this assumption, however, changes the results of 
the standard competition model significantly. 
Edwards and Keen (1996), for example, set up a 
theoretical model in which the objective function 
of the government includes two parts: a 
household’s utility objective and a revenue raising 
objective. The model outcome shows that two 
parameters determine whether tax coordination is 
worthwhile: (1) the marginal excess burden of 
taxation approximated by the marginal deadweight 
loss per dollar of revenue and (2) the marginal 
propensity of the policy makers to waste. The first 
parameter is an approximation of the marginal 
benefit and the second of the marginal cost of tax 
coordination. Therefore, tax coordination (116) is 
desirable ‘if, and only if, the former exceeds the 
latter (the efficiency gain then being sufficient to 
outweigh the policy-maker’s tendency to waste)’. 
More recently, Devereux et al. (2008) developed a 
model to account for strategic tax rate setting 
between open economies. Their model is an 
extension of the Zodrow and Mieszkowski model 
presented above so as to allow for tax competition 
analysis through both an effective marginal tax 
rate (EMTR) and a statutory tax rate. The authors 
therefore introduced mobility of corporate profit, 
i.e. the possibility of profit-shifting via transfer 
pricing into the model. In addition, Devereux et al. 
(2008) explicitly examined the slopes of the 
reaction function so as to be able to achieve 
testable predictions. The results of the modified 
model unambiguously show that there is strategic 
interaction between countries without capital flow 
restrictions. Moreover, governments compete over 
both of the tax instruments examined — namely 
statutory tax rates and EMTRs. 
Empirical evidence 
As shown above, the theoretical literature on 
international tax competition has developed 
                                                          
(116) Edwards and Keen (1996), p. 131. 
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significantly in recent years, inter alia by extending 
the standard model in order to consider: the degree 
of mobility of production factors, heterogeneous 
regions and Leviathan behaviour, as well as 
strategic interactions via different tax instruments. 
The empirical literature has also evolved in 
assessing the magnitude and statistical significance 
of tax competition effects. 
Against the theoretical background presented 
above, the results of an empirical study performed 
by Garrett (1995) are surprising. The outcome of a 
panel analysis, including 15 OECD countries for 
the period 1976-1990, indicates that international 
trade used as a proxy for liberalisation is positively 
related to capital taxation as a share of GDP. In the 
same manner, Swank (1998) identified a positive 
relationship for 17 industrial economies between 
capital mobility and a proxy for corporate taxation. 
On the other hand, a panel analysis of 19 OECD 
countries for the period 1965-1991 carried out by 
Rodrik (1997) shows that capital taxes are 
significantly and negatively influenced by 
openness. Labour taxes, on the other hand, are 
significantly and positively affected by 
international liberalisation. However, these results 
are not robust to dummies for capital account 
restrictions. 
Bretschger and Hettich (2001) apply a panel 
analysis to 14 OECD countries for the period 
1976-1996. Their results show that corporate taxes 
are significantly and negatively related to 
globalisation and economic integration. Labour 
taxes and social expenditure, on the other hand, 
depend positively and significantly on economic 
integration. The empirical outcome clearly 
demonstrates that there is a change in the tax mix 
from an increasingly elastic corporate tax base 
towards a relatively inelastic labour tax base. 
Finally, by including an endogenous variable for 
labour taxation in the estimation equations, they 
found a significant positive impact of globalisation 
on labour taxes. 
A more recent study by Stewart and Webb (2006) 
reaches different conclusions. The authors exploit 
a different variable, namely the corporate tax 
burden measured as corporate tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP and of total taxation. Stewart 
and Webb applied both cointegration and 
descriptive analysis for OECD countries for the 
period 1950-1999 and found no indication of a 
‘race-to-the-bottom’. 
Devereux et al. (2008) used the above presented 
theoretical model of strategic interaction between 
governments as a base for an empirical 
investigation of the reasons behind the fall in 
statutory tax rates in OECD countries during the 
period between 1982 and 1999. The authors found 
clear empirical evidence of strategic tax rate 
settings between open economies. The regression 
results show that countries compete over both 
statutory tax rates and EMTRs, but especially over 
the former. In addition, Devereux et al. (2008) 
tested whether the empirical evidence of strategic 
interaction is due to other factors, such as yardstick 
competition or tax mimicking. The test results 
show that the reason behind the evident strategic 
interaction cannot be explained by yardstick 
competition and tax mimicking, but is due to 
competition over mobile profit, as the theoretical 
model predicted.  
Another type of tax interaction stems from the 
implications for price and income of tax changes 
which affect trade and competitiveness. These 
issues are especially relevant in integrated 
economic areas such as the EU, suggesting that the 
economic implications of tax changes should be 
appraised in the wider European context to give a 
more comprehensive account of their potential 
distortionary effects. Recent simulations conducted 
by the Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies of the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC-IPTS) using the CGE model 
GEM-E3 calculate the distortive effect of tax 
increases in the EU. (117) The analysis uses the 
concept of ‘marginal cost of public funds’ 
(MCPF), which measures the welfare loss to the 
economy (in monetary terms) for each additional 
euro collected by the government. Generally this 
cost is found to be positive, although it differs 
across tax categories depending on their 
distortionary effect on economic activity. (118) The 
JRC-IPTS simulations were conducted for two tax 
categories, namely VAT and labour taxes, for all 
EU countries (except Cyprus, Malta and 
Luxembourg) calibrated on 2005 data. These 
                                                          
(117) More information about the GEM-E3 model can be found 
at www.gem-e3.net .  
(118) For a comprehensive review of the literature on MCPF see 
Dahlby (2008). 
4. Quality of taxation 
 
69 
results show that the loss of efficiency due to tax 
increases (as measured by the MCPF) would be 
reduced if these tax rises were to be coordinated 
across countries in order to internalise trade-related 
spillover effects. In addition, these results indicate 
that, while the efficiency gains of cross-country tax 
coordination would be sizeable for both tax 
categories, these would be potentially higher for 
VAT vs. labour taxes. Box 4.1 at the end of the 
section provides a more detailed account of these 
simulation results and the GEM-E3 model. 
Increasing the efficiency of the Internal Market 
through tax coordination 
Tax coordination at EU level could lead to 
efficiency gains by removing the obstacles 
imposed by uncoordinated tax measures on the 
Single Market. According to the current state of 
Community law in taxation matters, Member 
States are free to design tax policy and apply tax 
measures to achieve their policy objectives. EU 
governments, however, have to ensure that the 
measures applied are compatible with the Internal 
Market and State aid rules and that they comply 
with EU legislation in tax matters, the Treaty 
provisions and the case-law of the European Court 
of Justice (e.g. on non-discrimination). 
There are cases, however, where Member States’ 
rules conflict with the Treaty freedoms as in 
taxation of gains, dividend taxation, group 
taxation, taxation of branches and anti-avoidance 
rules (119), as well as in regard to individual 
taxation. (120) The complexity of tax laws, even in 
the presence of large body of European Court of 
Justice case law, makes it difficult for tax 
administration, domestic courts and tax payers to 
apply the Treaty freedoms in a consistent manner. 
Past experience has shown that is has been difficult 
in many cases to respect the non-discrimination 
rule. (121) The unilateral response to remove certain 
tax advantages or apply the same requirements in 
domestic and cross-border situations has often 
been ineffective. As a result, the competitiveness 
of Member States’ economies has been 
undermined. 
                                                          
(119) European Commission (2006): COM(2006). 
(120) European Commission (2010g). 
(121) European Commission (2010g). 
Another important issue to be dealt with is double 
taxation, which is a major cross-border obstacle for 
the Internal Market and investment in the EU. (122) 
Double taxation causes costs that businesses and 
citizens have to bear by operating cross border in 
Europe and dealing with up to 27 different tax 
systems. This is therefore a classic example of an 
obstacle due to a lack of coordination in taxation, 
which can only be resolved by coordination 
between Member States. 
In addition, insufficient tax coordination may lead 
to inadvertent non-taxation and tax evasion 
detrimental to much needed tax revenues and the 
erosion of the social system of the Member States. 
Moreover, uncoordinated tax measures may have 
external impacts on the tax systems of other 
Member States. These externalities may be 
detrimental, especially under a common currency 
or a fixed exchange rate. 
Lastly, it is important to note that tax measures 
may fall within the scope of EU rules on State aid. 
Article 107(1) TFEU states that ‘any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the Internal Market’. 
In applying the EU rules on State aid, it is 
therefore irrelevant whether the measure is a tax 
measure, since Article 107 applies to aid measures 
‘in any form whatsoever’. 
Tax measures meeting the cumulative criteria of 
Article 107(1) are subject to a system of prior 
Commission authorisation and Member States may 
not put the proposed aid measures into effect until 
the Commission has approved them. 
When designing their tax measures, Member 
States therefore have to assess the need to notify 
the Commission of their proposed tax measure, in 
particular where it appears that such tax measures 
introduce favourable tax treatments for certain 
categories of undertakings or for the production of 
certain goods. 
 
                                                          
(122) European Commission (2006), ibid. 
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Box 4.1: The marginal cost of multilateral vs. unilateral tax increases in the European Union: 
recent estimates based on the GEM-E3 model
In the wake of the global finance crisis EU Member States are confronted with the need to consolidate their 
public finances while promoting economic growth. This implies raising taxes or reshuffling the tax systems 
towards less distortive taxes, which may entail complex distortionary effects on production costs and 
consumption prices and thus market equilibrium. Given the level of economic integration in the EU, the 
economic costs of tax increases should be appraised in the wider European context, as it may partly be 
dependent on the degree on economic coordination. The degree of distortion is likely to be influenced by 
whether the tax increase is implemented unilaterally or in coordination with other (trading-partner) 
countries, and whether the cross-border effects of a tax change are taken into account.  
One possible way to assess the size of the distortions related to tax changes is to calculate the marginal cost 
of public funds (MCPF) which measures the relative welfare loss (and benefits) incurred through tax 
increases. Such an approach is one of the most used tools for the evaluation of the distortionary effects of tax 
reforms, public expenditure programs and other public policies (see in particular Dahlby, 2008). This Box 
provides estimates of the MCPF for EU countries with a focus on distortions linked to cross-border effects 
of tax changes making use of the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) GEM-E3. The analysis is 
performed for all EU countries (except Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg) and for two tax categories, namely 
labour taxes and VAT. 
The GEM-E3 model for tax analysis: strengths and caveats  
The model GEM-E3 models the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the environment 
at country and EU level. (1) The model GEM-E3 is especially appropriate for the purpose of estimating the 
MCPF for European countries for at least three important reasons. First, the calibration of the GEM-E3 
model is based on social accounting matrices (SAM) for 2005. As a result, the tax rates are calibrated as an 
effective rate, i.e. the ratio between the tax revenues and the corresponding tax basis for each tax category as 
reported in the SAMs, which provides a fairly reliable picture of the economy and the tax system in order to 
simulate the effects of policy changes. Second, the GEM-E3 model offers a great level of detail regarding 
tax systems as it distinguishes between nine categories of government receipts, namely indirect taxes, 
environmental taxes, direct taxes, value added taxes, production subsidies, social security contributions, 
import duties, foreign transfers and government firms. Third, the GEM-E3 model comprises all sectors of 
the economy broken down into 18 sectors while private consumption is divided among 13 durable and non-
durable goods. Such level of detail allows for a consistent evaluation of the distributional effects of tax 
policy changes for the different sectors of activity and economic agents. 
Despite their analytical appeal, the use of CGEs to estimate the MCPF is subject to a number of caveats. 
First, despite the relative high degree of disaggregation a CGE model remains an abstraction of the real 
world. For instance in most countries “capital taxation” is very complex and it cannot be perfectly mimicked 
in a CGE model. Second, the EU Member States are linked through bilateral trade; however, cross-border 
shopping is not modelled. Third, the version of the model GEM-E3 used here is based on a highly stylised 
representation of labour markets as labour supply is the result of a trade-off between leisure and 
consumption and a flexible market-clearing wage balances labour supply and demand. The model therefore 
does not take into account – at this stage – the possibility of involuntary unemployment nor does it consider 
a potential wage gap (implied for instance by the existence of minimum wages). These simplifications do 
not necessarily affect the analysis of trade-related tax spillovers when tax policy changes take place 
                                                          
(1) The GEM-E3 model is hosted by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) of the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre. The JRC has also provided the results reported in this Box. For more information 
regarding this model, see www.gem-e3.net. 
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Box (continued) 
 
however, unless one assumes that labour market imperfections directly affect the strength of cross-country 
tax spillovers (2). 
The concept of marginal cost of public funds 
The estimation of the MCPF can be undertaken using a general equilibrium approach encompassing all the 
potential market effects of a given tax increase as well as the interactions between economic agents and 
resulting changes in the tax bases. The MCPF can be calculated using the following formula: 
ki
ki
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    (1) 
where ΔWi,k is the welfare loss due to the increase of tax k in country i and is calculated as the change in 
consumer utility based on the indirect utility function in order to give it a monetary value. It could be 
conceptualised as the reduction in consumption relative to a benchmark case of no-policy change, where 
prices  and incomes are fixed at their "no-policy-change" benchmark level (3). The term ΔTRi,k in equation 
(1) represents the corresponding change in tax collection in country i. 
The MCPF provides a metric for the loss in welfare (the efficiency loss) per unit of tax revenue gain. If the 
MCPF equals one, then the tax is merely a lump-sum transfer from the households to the government with 
no distortion. Typically, however, the MCPF is greater than one such that MCPF =1+α, with α>0 
representing the cost of the distortion. This means that for every euro that goes into the government's purse, 
the economy pays an efficiency cost of α euros. The higher the MCPF, the larger the distortive cost vs. the 
tax revenue gains.  
The results presented in Table 1 provide estimations of the MCPF for a very small tax increase of 0,001% of 
the effective tax rate in 2005. The small increment is intended to capture the marginal nature of the tax 
change. In practice the proceeds of a given tax increase are used to finance policy objectives such as an 
increase in public expenditure, a subsidy, or to repay public debt. As the impact of the allocation of tax 
proceeds is beyond the scope of this Box, the estimate of the MCPF of a given tax increase is isolated by 
allocating the (small amount of) additional tax revenues to the rest of the world (i.e. outside the EU). 
This Box reports the values of the MCPF for labour taxes and VAT related to a tax increase implemented 
simultaneously by all EU countries vs. a benchmark case of unilateral tax increases. As mentioned above, 
the externality modelled in GEM-E3 stems from bilateral trade relationships. A given tax policy change will 
affect bilateral trade flows and, thus, economic activity (i.e. production and consumption). It will also impact 
on tax revenues via two channels: tax changes will affect both i) relative prices of domestically produced vs. 
foreign goods and services and ii) disposable income through changes in price levels and purchasing power. 
Tax changes will also spill through the production chain: for instance countries importing intermediates 
from a country implementing a tax increase will face higher production costs if substitution possibilities (i.e. 
import from alternative suppliers) are limited. Tax changes also affect demand for intermediates produced 
abroad. A country implementing a tax increase will thus face a competitiveness loss as well as lower 
purchasing power. Furthermore, partner countries may benefit on the one hand from a price-competitiveness 
gain if their exports are close substitutes of the goods and services produced by the tax-increasing country. 
On the other hand, partner countries may eventually lose if their exports are complementary to those of the 
tax-increasing country or if the lower economic activity in the tax-increasing country reduces its imports 
from the partner country. Therefore the net effect of tax change on trading partners can be either positive or 
negative. 
                                                          
(2) For comparability across scenarios, budget-neutrality is assumed for the tax changing country as well as for the other 
EU Member States. 
(3) This technically corresponds to the "equivalent" variation. Alternatively, using the "compensating" variation would 
imply using the prices and income corresponding to "policy change" scenario. See Dahlby (2008) for a discussion.  
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The MCPF as in equation (1) is calculated for a unilateral tax increase for each EU country separately and an 
average single value is obtained using the respective GDPs as weight. In Table 1, this value is then 
compared to the results of two alternative MCPF measures (as explained below in equations 2 and 3) which 
enable the evaluation of the tax spillovers. 
An alternative MCPF measure, denoted EU
kMCPF , is computed for all EU countries when they jointly 
implement the same tax increase as in equation (2) below: 
 ∑∑ ΔΔ=
i
i
i
i
EU
k RWMCPF
   (2) 
where Wi and Ri are the equivalent variation in welfare and tax revenues changes, respectively, linked to a 
marginal increase in the tax rate k of country i. The value of EUkMCPF  is obtained from a single simulation 
where all countries increase a given tax simultaneously once and results for W and R are added across 
countries. Thus, while equation (1) adopts the perspective of a single country which does not take into 
account any spillover effects of its own tax increase, by contrast equation (2) adopts the perspective of a 
simultaneous multi-country tax change where all externalities between participating countries are 
internalized. (4) 
Alternatively one can also derive a measure of the MCPF where tax-related spillovers are taken into account 
by considering unilateral tax increases as indicated in equation (3) below: 
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where i is the country implementing a given tax change while j are the other countries (not implementing 
any tax change). The second term of equation (3) represents the spillover effect which can be compared to 
the first term of equation (3) which represents the impact of a tax change for the country implementing it 
only. The average MCPF for unilateral tax increases calculated as in (1) can then compared to the average 
value of the MCPF for unilateral tax increases including the impact of unilateral tax increases on other 
countries welfare and tax revenues as calculated in (3).  
Findings: tax coordination reduces the cost of tax hikes 
The results of calculating (2) and (3) are reported in Table 1. The first row of Table 1 provides results of the 
difference (in percentage change) in the cost of tax rises (as measured by the MCPF) for labour tax and VAT 
in the case where all countries implement simultaneously the same tax increase vs. the case where a single 
country unilaterally makes such a change. (5) These results show that the MCPF is lower for both the VAT 
and labour taxes in the multilateral compared to the unilateral tax increase cases. The MCPF in (2) is lower 
as it internalizes the positive effects to the partner regions.  In the case of the VAT this effect is even higher, 
suggesting that the spillover effects related to price-competition effects and income effects are stronger for 
VAT compared to labour taxes. Turning to the calculation of (3) and comparing it with (1) one finds similar 
evidence suggesting that the positive trade-related tax spillovers reduces the MCPF by 7% and 9.8% for
labour taxes and VAT respectively as indicated in the second row of Table 1. Therefore, the two methods 
provide very similar results.  
                                                          
(4) One must note that a minor part of the differences between the weighted form of equation (1) and equation (3) are due 
to the weight measures (and not the result of spillover effects). The unilateral increase calculated as the weighted 
average of (1) across countries uses the GDP level as weight, whereas equation (3) implicitly uses W and R as 
weights. However, these three variables are by construction closely related. 
(5) For comparability across scenarios, budget-neutrality is assumed for the tax changing country as well as for the other 
EU Member States.  
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Table 1: Change in the marginal cost of public funds for a multilateral vs. 
unilateral tax increase 
 Labour VAT 
(a) Difference in MCPF between, multilateral vs. 
unilateral tax increase -difference between eq. (1) 
and eq. (2) 
-6.3% -9.8% 
(b) Change in MCPF linked to tax spillover - 
difference between eq. (1) and eq. (3) 
-7.0% -9.8% 
Source: Commission services. 
The simulations conducted with the GEM-E3 model therefore suggest that the efficiency loss related to tax 
increases (as measured by the MCPF) are reduced if these are coordinated across countries in order to 
internalise spillover effects. In the model used here this result can be entirely attributable to trade-related 
spillovers and, more specifically price-competiveness and income effects. These results also indicate that 
efficiency gains are potentially higher for VAT vs. labour taxes thus suggesting that tax coordination is also 
likely to offer greater scope for minimising tax-increase distortions in the former case. It is worth noting that 
the existence of relatively large spillovers for VAT is found despite the fact that GEM-E3 does not model 
cross-border shopping effect in VAT (which are potentially important in the EU, especially in small Member 
States). Future work should be conducted in this area in order to extend the analysis to others tax categories 
(e.g. capital and energy taxes) and also in order to consider labour market imperfections which are likely to 
be important to analyse the joint effect of tax increases and structural reforms. 
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This chapter aims to identify the nature and scope 
of the macroeconomic challenges that individual 
euro-area Member States are facing in difficult 
times in the field of taxation and tax policy. The 
importance of tax challenges in the overall policy 
setting is heavily stressed in the context of the 
annual cycle of policy coordination (the ‘European 
Semester’), as highlighted in Chapter 1. The 
challenges have mainly to do with two particular 
macroeconomic dimensions of taxation: the 
sustainability of public finances and the growth-
friendliness of tax structures (including fostering 
employment/making work pay). Taxation issues 
are particularly relevant in a context where 
Member States need to speed up their 
consolidation effort by also considering revenue-
raising measures, while preserving fragile 
economic growth by enhancing the quality of 
taxation. 
In addition to the two overarching challenges of 
fiscal consolidation and growth-friendly tax 
structures, there are other more specific but 
nevertheless fairly universal challenges. They 
relate to: (i) reducing tax expenditures affecting 
direct taxation, (ii) reducing the debt bias in the tax 
system, (iii) increasing VAT efficiency, (iv) issues 
related to environmental taxation, and (v) tax 
governance issues (tax evasion/avoidance and tax 
administration). 
Many tax policy challenges are, however, rather 
country-specific and depend very much on the tax 
system or the institutional set-up in place in a 
given Member State. Such challenges may often 
not be identified when applying a horizontal 
approach. These country-specific challenges, 
which tend to be related to the complexity of a 
Member State’s tax system, the relationship 
between tiers of government, and the favourable 
tax treatment of specific sectors, will not be 
addressed in this chapter. As a consequence, the 
findings presented here are a contribution to the 
overall Commission assessment rather than policy 
prescriptions. 
As a first attempt to identify macroeconomic 
country-specific challenges in the field of taxation 
and revenue-raising policy, this chapter only 
considers euro-area Member States in order to deal 
with a more tractable set of countries. The Euro 
Plus Pact, endorsed by euro-area Heads of State 
and Government (as well as other Member States 
on a voluntary basis) at the March 2011 meeting of 
the European Council, stressed the particular 
relevance of taxation issues for the euro area. 
However, the Commission services continue to 
expand the analysis to non-euro area countries, in 
particular to those participating in the Euro Plus 
Pact. 
The first step of the analysis consists in a 
preliminary horizontal quantitative screening of 
euro-area Member States to identify countries that 
may need to consider tax policy measures in the 
area of fiscal consolidation (section 5.1). Based on 
the analysis of the quality of taxation set out in 
Chapter 4, a first quantitative screening will then 
be used to determine which euro-area Member 
States could enhance the growth-friendliness of 
their tax structure (section 5.2). Countries will then 
be screened against a list of additional horizontal 
challenges, as outlined above (section 5.3). Finally, 
section 5.4 will summarise the results and present 
a synopsis of the tax policy challenges faced by 
individual euro-area Member States. 
5.1. CHALLENGES RELATING TO FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATION: A FIRST QUANTITATIVE 
SCREENING 
In this section, euro-area Member States are 
subject to a preliminary horizontal quantitative 
screening — against common criteria and 
indicators — to identify needs for tax policy 
measures in the areas of fiscal consolidation and 
the sustainability of public finances. A large need 
for fiscal consolidation paired with a rather low tax 
burden in a Member State may indicate potential 
room for tax increases to contribute to fiscal 
sustainability. 
5.1.1. Main screening principles 
While experience from successful consolidations 
suggests that fiscal adjustment should primarily 
come from the expenditure side of the budget, (123) 
the 2011 Annual Growth Survey (AGS) states that, 
                                                          
(123) See European Commission (2010a).  
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given the need for rigorous fiscal consolidation in 
the aftermath of the crisis, a contribution from 
additional tax revenues will be necessary in some 
Member States. As an important caveat, it should 
be noted that the aim of the indicator-based 
analysis is to identify ‘potential options for 
increasing tax revenues’, rather than 
recommending tax increases in any definitive way. 
One major risk inherent to tax-side consolidation is 
that it can create disincentives to engage in serious 
expenditure-based consolidation focusing on 
inefficiency in public spending, which should 
remain the priority of national strategies. (124) 
Moreover, low current tax-to-GDP ratios might 
also be indicative of a need to improve tax 
compliance and administration rather than change 
the tax code by increasing tax rates or broadening 
tax bases. With these caveats in mind and against 
the backdrop of country-specific features, raising 
tax-to-GDP ratios may be recommendable if the 
following criteria are met (see Box 5.2 for a 
schematic sketch of the screening approach). 
The first necessary condition is a need for sizeable 
fiscal consolidation, which suggests that, apart 
from reining in expenditure, increasing 
government revenues might also be required. This 
potential need for revenue-raising measures is 
gauged on the basis of the sustainability gap 
indicator S2, with a particular focus on its ‘initial 
budgetary position’ component (see Box 5.1 for a 
brief presentation of the S2 indicator). The 
required adjustment given by this initial budgetary 
position is the gap (in % of GDP) between the 
initial structural primary balance and the debt-
stabilising primary balance (primary balance 
required to ensure the long-term sustainability of 
public finances under no policy change 
assumptions, i.e. without ageing-related fiscal 
adjustment). The second component of S2 
corresponds to the required additional adjustment 
due to the long-term changes in government 
expenditure. A high value of the long- 
                                                          
(124) Annex 2 to the AGS provides general guidance on the 
composition of the required fiscal adjustment: 
‘Expenditure-based corrections, especially corrections of 
current primary expenditure, are more likely to produce a 
lasting improvement in public finances and a milder, under 
some circumstances even a positive, impact on short-run 
economic growth than revenue-based corrections. Curbing 
expenditure developments is less distortive for growth than 
raising the tax burden, which is already high in the EU 
though significant variation exists among the Member 
States’. See European Commission (2011b). 
term component of S2 indicates that the 
expenditure side of the budget will already be 
much burdened by necessary cuts in age-related 
spending (through, for instance, phasing out early 
retirement schemes, pension reform and welfare 
state reforms including health and long-term care 
systems). 
As such, a high sustainability gap arising primarily 
from an initial budgetary position insufficient to 
stabilise debt is indicative of a need for either tax 
increases or spending cuts. However, when 
combined with a high value of the age-related 
component of S2 it points to an additional need to 
substantially reduce public expenditure over the 
medium-to-longer term which may limit the pace 
of feasible expenditure-based consolidation. 
Therefore, while the focus remains on 
consolidation measures needed in the short-to-
medium term, considering both components of S2 
is useful in order to identify potential needs for 
raising taxes to supplement expenditure controls. 
While not part of the screening criteria, the use of 
other indicators of the urgency of consolidation, 
such as the fiscal risk indicator, will complement 
the analysis based on the (components of the) S2 
indicator and help ascertain its robustness (see Box 
5.3 for an overview of the fiscal risk indicator). 
Empirically, the potential need for using taxes to 
help consolidation is assessed on the basis of the 
significance of the ‘initial budgetary position’ 
component and the ageing component of S2 for 
2011. It is important to note in this context that the 
S2 projections rest on the assumption that 
consolidation measures announced for 2011 are 
successfully implemented, in particular measures 
agreed in the framework of the adjustment 
programmes for countries receiving financial 
assistance. Compared to previous calculations for 
2010, this has generally led to considerable 
improvements particularly in the ‘initial budgetary 
position’ component of S2. The assessment is, 
therefore, based on strict adherence to 
consolidation plans and remains subject to an 
implementation risk. (125)  
                                                          
(125) In the case of Greece, this implementation risk also refers 
to the ageing-related component of S2, which rests on the 
assumption that the pension reform included in the July 
2010 economic adjustment programme is successfully 
implemented.  
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Box 5.1: The concept of fiscal sustainability
The concept of the sustainability of public finances concerns the ability of a government to finance its 
current debt and expected expenditure. There is no single clear-cut definition of a sustainable fiscal position 
but rather a number of alternative theoretical and practical approaches. In general, it can be stated that, in the 
first instance, a sustainable position involves a debt level that does not entail interest payments so large that 
they cannot be paid. Thus, the sustainability of public finances considers the ability of a government to 
service the costs of its debt through future revenues. It is therefore a long-term concept and differs from 
liquidity which is concerned with the immediate (short run) ability of a country to raise debt to finance its 
expenditure.  
A first way of framing the widest definition of sustainability is to look at the solvency condition for the 
general government through its inter-temporal budget constraint. (1) The inter-temporal budget constraint is 
satisfied if the projected outflows of the government (current public debt and the discounted value of all 
future expenditure, including the projected increase in age-related expenditure) are covered by the 
discounted value of all future government revenue. This is equivalent to saying that the government must 
run sufficiently large primary surpluses (receipts minus spending excluding interest payments) going 
forward to cover the cost of servicing its debt.  
Depending on the time horizon considered — finite or infinite — two sustainability gap indicators can be 
derived, showing the size of the permanent budget adjustment required to ensure that the inter-temporal 
budget constraint is met. 
The S1 indicator shows the durable adjustment to the structural primary balance (i.e. an increase in taxes or 
cuts in expenditure) required to reach a target debt of 60 % of GDP in 2060, including paying for any 
additional expenditure from now to the target date, arising from an ageing population. The choice of the debt 
target for the S1 indicator is in line with the debt threshold in the Treaty.  
The S2 indicator shows the adjustment to the structural primary balance required to fulfil the infinite horizon 
inter-temporal budget constraint, including paying for any additional expenditure arising from an ageing 
population. In contrast to S1, S2 does not take into account the additional budgetary effort to reach the debt 
target by 2060. Given its infinite horizon, S2 is more stringent than S1 and is mostly used in budgetary 
surveillance. 
Summarising the sustainability indicators 
 Required adjustment given the 
initial budgetary position (IBP) 
Required adjustment to reach debt 
to GDP ratio of 60% in 2060 (DR) 
Required adjustment due to long-term 
changes in the primary balance (LTC) 
S1= 
Gap to the debt-stabilising 
primary balance 
+ 
Additional adjustment required 
to reach a debt target of 60% of 
GDP in 2060 
+ 
Additional adjustment required to finance 
the increase in public expenditure due to 
ageing up to 2060 
S2= 
Gap to the debt-stabilising 
primary balance 
+ 0 + 
Additional adjustment required to finance 
the increase in public expenditure due to 
ageing over an infinite horizon 
Source: Commission services. 
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where Dt0 is gross debt as a share of GDP in the year before the long-term projections, PBt is the structural primary 
balance (receipts minus spending excluding interest payments), adjusted for cyclical movements and excluding one-
off transactions at time t and r is the differential between the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate. 
For further details see European Commission (2009b). 
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Regarding the initial budgetary position 
component, a value of over 2.5 is considered as 
significant given the EU and euro-area averages of 
2.2 and 1.7 (see Table 5.1). (126) Regarding the 
ageing component, a value of over 3.5 is 
considered as significant, as the EU and euro-area 
averages stand at 3.2 and 3.4 respectively. 
Together this implies a high value of at least 6 for 
the composite sustainability gap indicator S2. The 
(structural) primary deficit in 2011 (based on the 
Commission’s spring 2011 forecast) can provide 
important extra information as, where this is high, 
it is unlikely that consolidation efforts can be 
achieved without raising taxes. Similarly, a high 
value of the fiscal risk indicator points to the 
urgency of taking substantial fiscal measures. It 
should be noted that the two additional indicators 
are not part of the quantitative screening process, 
but provide complementary information. 
A simple approach is to benchmark each country 
for each of the two indicators against the euro-area 
average. This euro-area average benchmark suits 
the purpose of the analysis, being aimed at 
identifying substantial macroeconomic 
underperformance associated with tax systems. 
Countries not displaying a strong tax challenge 
may still require subtle policy adjustments, which 
would deserve a more detailed analysis with 
respect to best practices rather than euro-area 
average performance. (127) 
The second necessary condition is the availability 
of some ‘tax space’, as approximated by a 
relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio in comparison to 
                                                          
(126) Furthermore, assuming that the public deficit is at its debt-
stabilising level, an initial budgetary position component of 
S2 of 2.5 % and over would push the public deficit over the 
Treaty-based threshold of 3 %. This results from the fact 
that the debt-stabilising primary balance without ageing-
related fiscal adjustment corresponds to a deficit running at 
between 0.5 and 3 %, depending upon the country-specific 
growth prospect and public debt level.  
(127) Euro-area averages of individual indicators are used as a 
natural benchmark throughout this chapter, justified by its 
focus on tax policy challenges in countries having adopted 
the single currency. For future analysis it may be desirable 
to raise the benchmark by considering best performers in 
specific policy areas, possibly including non-euro area and 
non-EU countries. While best performers are somewhat 
more difficult to identify, the average performances of the 
top three countries may be used as a starting benchmark. 
However, this mechanical identification of good practices 
would need to be further substantiated by more qualitative 
assessments and a comprehensive and holistic analysis of 
tax systems, since strength in some areas may be associated 
with weaknesses in other areas.  
the euro-area average, although some countries, 
especially those with less advanced economies and 
less developed welfare systems, may require lower 
tax ratios. Research shows that revenue-based 
consolidation is more likely to be successful when 
the initial tax-to-GDP ratio is low. (128) 
Given that the impact of a possible tax increase on 
the economy is greatly influenced by past 
developments in the tax-to-GDP ratio and the 
current composition of the tax mix, the ‘tax space’ 
criterion is qualified by controlling for the 
following two criteria,  
• Revenue raising measures have not yet been 
utilised extensively in the recent past, i.e. the 
tax-to-GDP ratio has not risen significantly 
over the past few years due to new 
discretionary measures. 
• The analysis of the tax structure shows that 
there is scope for increasing tax categories least 
detrimental to growth (mainly consumption and 
property taxes). (129) This criterion will be 
studied in more detail in section 5.2 and can be 
applied more widely to improve the growth-
friendliness of the tax structure at a constant 
overall tax burden. Even if there is no room for 
a further rise in overall tax pressure, there may 
be scope for revenue-neutral tax reforms. 
Lastly, an analysis of the expenditure side of the 
budget can provide indicative evidence of further 
need for revenue-side consolidation efforts. Where 
low primary expenditure-to-GDP ratios, and 
particularly low public investment in growth-
enhancing areas, make further expenditure-based 
consolidation more difficult, the necessity of tax 
increases may be more acute. More generally, 
wherever controlling or cutting expenditures 
proves arduous, e.g. because they are linked to 
legal entitlements earned in the past, tax increases 
become unavoidable to meet consolidation 
requirements. 
                                                          
(128) See European Commission (2010a). 
(129) A high ratio of efficient taxes relative to other countries 
does not by itself imply that the ratio could not be 
increased even further. However, in cases where the ratio is 
low, policy measures actually tapping available overall tax 
space are likely to entail relatively limited distortions and 
implementation risk, such as leakage effects of VAT hikes 
to neighbouring countries. In that sense the criterion (in 
combination with the availability of overall tax space) is 
sufficient but not strictly necessary. 
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Box 5.2: Screening principles to identify a potential need for tax-based consolidation
A quantitative screening on the basis of selected indicators is applied to euro-area Member States with a 
view to identifying countries that could consider making use of taxation — in addition to expenditure 
control — to consolidate their public finances and bring them on a more sustainable path. It should identify 
both a strong need for consolidation and the availability of tax space. The following screening criteria are 
considered:  
Fiscal sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability is very problematic since: 
1(a) The ‘initial budgetary position component’ (in % of GDP) of the sustainability gap is very high (2½ and 
above). This value stands clearly above the euro-area average and corresponds to a risk of breaching the 
deficit threshold of 3 % of GDP stipulated in the Treaty. A high initial deficit also reduces the likelihood of 
achieving fiscal consolidation only through expenditure control.  
AND  
1(b) The long-term budgetary projections are unfavourable (age-related component (in % of GDP) of the 
sustainability indicator S2 above 3½). A high sustainability gap arising primarily from an initial budgetary 
position insufficient to stabilise debt is indicative of a need for either tax increases or spending cuts. 
However, the combination with a high value of the age-related component of S2 points to an additional need 
to substantially reduce public expenditure over the medium- to longer term that may limit the pace of 
feasible expenditure based consolidation.  
AND  
Availability of tax space 
2) There is ‘tax space’ currently available (relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio). This main criterion needs to be 
met in conjunction with one of the two qualifying criteria below: 
AND EITHER  
2(a) Revenue-raising measures have not yet been utilised extensively in the recent past (i.e. no marked tax 
increase in the past). Recent changes in tax-to-GDP ratios are assessed against (i) the size of the total 
consolidation effort over 2009-11, as measured by the change in the primary structural balance and (ii) the 
consolidation need as captured by the distance of the structural deficit to its medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO). 
OR 
2(b) There is still scope for increasing the least distortionary taxes (i.e. the share of indirect 
taxes/consumption taxes in GDP is not above average).  
A low current tax-to-GDP ratio in conjunction with a high fiscal sustainability gap does not necessarily point 
to a need to change the tax code by increasing tax rates or broadening tax bases. Higher tax revenues might 
also be achieved by improving tax compliance/administration and fighting tax evasion, with unchanged tax 
rules. Similarly, tax increases implemented in the recent past may not lead to equivalent increases in tax-to-
GDP ratios due to (higher) tax evasion and Laffer-curve effects (negative feedback of higher taxes on output 
and employment, i.e. tax bases). 
Aggravating factors (optional/not necessary but additional evidence):  
There is little room for lowering expenditures (i.e. relatively low primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio and low 
public investment in growth-enhancing areas). 
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5.1.2. Application of screening criteria to euro-
area countries 
Fiscal sustainability 
Table 5.1 and Graph 5.1 summarise the new 
estimates of the S2 indicator and its components, 
based on the Commission services’ spring 2011 
forecast until 2012. (130) The contribution of the 
                                                          
(130) Thereafter, the output gap is assumed to close by 2015, 
after which the potential growth rates converge linearly to 
the AWG baseline scenario by 2020. Beyond 2020, the 
AWG baseline scenario as agreed by the Commission and 
AWG/EPC and published in European Commission 
(2009c) is applied. Only pension reforms peer-reviewed by 
the AWG/EPC and endorsed by the EPC have been taken 
initial budgetary position to the sustainability gap 
(in % of GDP) is measured on the horizontal axis, 
while the contribution of the projected increase in 
age-related expenditure is measured on the vertical 
axis. The value of the S2 indicator can be seen 
from the dotted diagonal ‘iso-gap’ lines. 
Applying the conditions set out in the previous 
sub-section and summarised in Box 5.2 yields 
three euro-area Member States where the 
sustainability gaps are of such an extent and nature 
                                                                                   
into account. Consequently, neither the 2010 pension 
reform in Spain nor the pension reform under way in Italy 
is reflected in the data.  
 
 
Box 5.3: The fiscal risk indicator
A composite indicator summarising information on fiscal risks and vulnerabilities in EU Member States was 
presented in European Commission (2010a), together with a composite indicator on macro-financial risks. 
Fiscal risk indicators reflect risks related to actual and projected sovereign financing needs. The composite 
fiscal risk indicator includes information on the level of government debt, government debt-to-GDP falling 
due over a 24-month horizon, the implicit interest rate on sovereign debt (to capture the history of the 
country as a sovereign debt issuer) and the gap to the primary balance that would lead to debt converging to 
60 % of GDP by 2020. (1) The indicator reflects risks, which, if they were to materialise, would put pressure 
on the fiscal position and lead to a sudden increase in fiscal financing needs. The indicator is a measure of 
relative risk — it does not indicate the absolute level of risk that any country displays, but just how it relates 
to the other Member States. 
List of indicators of fiscal risk 
Fiscal risk indicators Rationale 
Public debt/GDP Default risk; market saturation; crowding out 
Implicit interest rate on government debt History as a sovereign debt issuer 
Maturing debt/GDP, in year t and t+1 Short term borrowing needs 
Primary balance gap to 60% debt by 2020 Short term borrowing needs; debt prospects 
Source: Commission services. 
Composite indicators are very useful to summarise abundant information and help making a first screening 
of country risks. They also facilitate comparisons across countries: assessing relative positions based on two 
or at most three dimensions is easier than on an undefined number of possible indicators. The exercise is, 
however, subject to criticisms. By selecting a set of indicators and excluding others and by aggregating 
different types of risks in composite indicators, some information is lost. Simplifying assumptions have to 
be made on the relative importance of the different risk indicators. In the absence of a strong theoretical base 
regarding the weights of each indicator, each indicator is given equal weight in the composite indicator. 
A high score on fiscal risks, especially if combined with high macro-financial risks, would call for strongly 
frontloaded consolidation. However, a number of factors must be kept in mind when interpreting results and 
drawing policy conclusions. To a certain extent, the indicators reflect different risks for euro-area versus 
non-euro- area countries, or for highly developed countries versus catching-up economies. Identification of 
the policy action to address the underlying source of risk requires a careful analysis of the reason behind a 
high value of the risk indicator.  
                                                          
(1) Contingent liabilities, e.g. related to the financial sector, have not been included since they are better reflected in the 
macro-financial risk indicator.  
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that raising taxes is suggested to contribute to 
addressing the severe consolidation needs: these 
are Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Spain (131) and 
Cyprus. (132) These countries are shown in the 
rectangle in the upper right-hand corner of Graph 
5.1. Moreover, Portugal and Greece appear as very 
close borderline cases, with initial budgetary 
positions clearly worse but ageing components 
slightly better than the respective thresholds set out 
above. In the case of Greece it is important to note 
that the long-term projections underlying the S2 
indicator rest on the assumption that the 2010 
pension reform is successfully implemented. While 
this leads to a relatively benign value of 2.7 % of 
GDP for the ageing component of S2 in 2011, the 
ageing-related gap was estimated to be 11.5 % of 
GDP in 2010. The Netherlands can also be found 
on the border of the rectangle. With an initial 
budgetary position just below the set threshold, the 
country’s position is mainly characterised by high 
long-term projections for ageing-related costs. In 
all six countries mentioned above, the overall S2 
value is above, or in the case of Portugal and 
Greece, very close to 6. Slovakia also has a 
markedly unfavourable initial budgetary position 
component of S2, but the long-term projections for 
ageing-related costs are below the euro-area 
average. Therefore, given that the pace of 
expenditure-based consolidation does not seem to 
be limited by a need to substantially reduce public 
expenditure over the medium-to-longer term, 
Slovakia is not detected as a country with a 
potential need for revenue-raising measures 
according to the screening criteria outlined above. 
Yet, an exclusive focus on the size of the initial 
budgetary gap (regardless of the comparably 
benign ageing-related sustainability gap) would 
place Slovakia as a further euro-area country with 
a significant fiscal sustainability gap that might 
call for policy action on the revenue side of the 
budget.  
With overall S2 values of above 12, the 
sustainability gaps in Luxembourg and Slovenia 
are of a comparable magnitude to that of Ireland. 
                                                          
(131) The projections underlying the ageing-related component 
of S2 for Spain do not yet include the effects of the 2010 
pension reform (see previous footnote).  
(132) As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the focus of 
the analysis is exclusively on euro-area countries. 
However, as regards the UK, the government foresees tax 
consolidation to contribute around 25 % to its £110bn 
consolidation package by financial year 2014-15. 
However, with rather low initial budgetary 
components of S2, the composition of the gaps 
suggests that the focus of the policy response 
should be placed on structural reforms of social 
protection systems rather than tax increases (or 
expenditure control). 
 
Table 5.1: Tax-to-GDP ratio versus overview of ageing and the 
long-term sustainability of Member States 
Initial 
Budgetary 
position
Ageing 
component
BE 44.1 5.8 0.7 5.0 0.6 4.7 0.78
DE 39.1 4.1 0.6 3.4 0.9 0.7 0.40
EE 33.3 1.0 1.5 -0.5 -0.7 1.4 0.06
IE 29.5 15.5 7.1 8.4 -5.7 2.8 0.70
EL 31.6 5.7 3.0 2.7 -0.7 0.5 1.02
ES 32.0 8.5 3.2 5.4 -2.1 2.6 0.54
FR 43.1 4.4 2.3 2.1 -1.3 0.1 0.61
IT 42.4 1.4 -0.1 1.5 2.1 2.4 0.88
CY 36.8 8.9 2.9 6.0 -2.1 0.8 0.48
LU 35.4 13.3 -0.2 13.5 0.8 2.6 -0.05
MT 32.9 7.3 1.2 6.1 0.0 -1.5 0.65
NL 39.2 7.6 2.4 5.1 -0.4 2.1 0.44
AT 42.7 5.6 1.6 3.9 -0.4 1.5 0.42
PT 32.7 5.8 2.7 3.0 -1.2 -0.8 0.73
SI 36.9 12.5 1.9 10.6 -1.1 -0.4 0.37
SK 29.2 6.1 4.3 1.8 -3.3 -2.4 0.35
FI 42.8 3.6 -0.8 4.4 2.0 6.0 0.22
BG 27.4 -1.3 1.0 -2.3 -0.3 2.9 0.08
CZ 35.0 4.7 2.6 2.1 -1.8 -3.0 0.32
DK 46.4 -1.7 1.8 -3.5 -0.3 5.2 0.29
LV 27.7 1.1 3.4 -2.2 -2.1 -0.7 0.53
LT 26.9 8.3 4.3 4.0 -3.3 -0.6 0.53
HU 36.2 3.5 3.1 0.5 -1.4 -2.2 0.82
PL 33.0 2.4 3.9 -1.5 -2.6 -1.5 0.48
RO 27.7 8.0 2.3 5.7 -1.5 -0.4 0.54
SE 45.9 -1.6 -1.3 -0.2 2.0 3.8 0.06
UK 37.7 8.8 4.5 4.3 -3.5 0.5 0.53
EU-27 39.2 5.3 2.2 3.2 -0.6 1.3 0.51
EA-17 39.7 5.1 1.7 3.4 0.0 1.4 ---
Fiscal 
risk 
indicator 
(2011)
Tax-to-
GDP 
ratio 
(2011)
Country
S2 sustainability gap indicator 
(2011)
Primary balance 
indicators
of which: Average 
primary 
balance 
(2000-
07)
Primary 
balance (in 
structural 
terms - 
2011)
Total
Notes: The definition of the tax-to-GDP ratio applied is slightly broader 
than the one in Chapter 2, as it also includes voluntary social security 
contributions and taxes assessed but unlikely to be collected. The 
average primary balance for the years 2000–07 serves as a pre-crisis 
benchmark. The fiscal risk indicator for 2011 is based on a dynamic 
analysis — i.e. the standardisation is undertaken using the mean and 
standard deviation of the scores of the 27 EU countries in 2010. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Benchmarking individual countries’ structural 
primary balances and fiscal risk indicators (see 
Table 5.1) against the respective euro-area 
averages corroborates the findings of the screening 
exercise. For two of the three countries within the 
above-mentioned rectangle, the structural primary 
deficit and the fiscal risk indicator also show 
above-average values, particularly for Ireland but 
also for Spain. In Cyprus the fiscal risk indicator is 
somewhat below the euro-area average. As to the 
borderline cases of Graph 5.1, both the structural 
primary deficit and particularly the fiscal risk 
indicator are above the euro-area average for 
Portugal. Greece displays the highest fiscal risk 
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indicator and a structural primary deficit above the 
euro-area average in 2011. Moreover, the 
country’s position is subject to the above-
mentioned implementation risk. (133) The fiscal 
risk indicator is clearly below average for the 
Netherlands, which is a borderline case — 
standing just below the threshold — when 
considering S2-based screening. Altogether, in 
view also of the relatively small 2011 structural 
primary deficit, (134) the Netherlands is not 
considered to be among the countries with 
significant fiscal sustainability challenges that 
might call for increasing tax revenues. For 
Slovakia, where the unfavourable initial budgetary 
position might point to the need to raise revenues, 
the fiscal risk indicator is clearly below-average, 
but the structural primary deficit in 2011 is 
huge. (135) Low fiscal risk is also indicated for the 
two above-mentioned countries with extremely 
unfavourable long-term projections but a rather 
low contribution from the initial budgetary 
position to the S2 indicator (Luxembourg and 
Slovenia). 
                                                          
(133) As mentioned above, for countries receiving financial 
assistance, the projections include the measures agreed in 
the framework of the adjustment programmes. 
(134) According to the Commission’s spring 2011 forecast, the 
structural primary balance is projected to improve 
considerably in 2012, turning into a surplus of 0.9 % of 
GDP.  
(135) According to the Commission’s spring 2011 forecast, the 
structural primary deficit is projected to decrease only 
marginally in Slovakia and to remain at a significant 3.1 % 
of GDP also in 2012. 
Obviously, this indicator-based approach remains a 
tentative way of classifying the degree of tax 
raising needs (and potential), and does not take 
other country-specific factors into account. 
However, the analysis of the bottlenecks to growth 
as identified through the joint work of the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and the 
Alternates of the Economic and Financial 
Committee (AEFC) (136) is broadly consistent with 
the list of countries identified above with the S2 
indicator, although the latter list is far narrower. 
Bottlenecks in the area of fiscal policy/long-term 
sustainability (high debt/deficit and/or ageing-
related costs) were identified for the great majority 
of euro-area Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Slovakia). This wider coverage of 
countries can be explained by the fact that the 
assessment of bottlenecks was carried out earlier 
and — in contrast with the screening presented 
above — did not yet take into account budgetary 
measures still to be implemented for 2011. 
Availability of tax space 
In terms of tax space, most of the new Member 
States (still) have tax-to-GDP ratios clearly below 
the euro-area average, reflecting their less 
advanced economies. Only Slovenia and Cyprus 
display tax burdens relatively close to the euro-
                                                          
(136) European Commission (2010k). 
Graph 5.1: Decomposition of the S2 indicator 
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area average. In addition, also Ireland (137), Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, 
Luxembourg display tax ratios well below the 
euro-area average. Borderline cases are Germany 
and the Netherlands, where the tax burden is only 
marginally below average. Some ‘gross’ potential 
for raising the tax-to-GDP ratio, relative to the 
euro-area average, thus seems to be available in all 
of the new Member States and five old Member 
States (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, 
Luxembourg) that are part of the euro area. 
As a first qualification of the potential for raising 
the tax-to-GDP ratio, tax hikes implemented in the 
recent past need to be taken into account. The 
assessment of the development of tax burdens over 
time should remain cautious, given the varying 
impact of the business cycle on tax revenues. Yet, 
the estimated tax revenue elasticity with respect to 
the output gap is very close to unity in almost all 
Member States in the medium run. (138) Therefore, 
the ratio of tax revenues to output is in principle 
bound to stay broadly unchanged over the cycle 
(bar the impact of tax shortfalls generated by drops 
in asset prices). (139) Table 5.2 compares the tax-
to-GDP ratio in 2011 to that in 2008 (as a pre-
crisis benchmark), to that in 2009 (as a (post-) 
crisis benchmark) and to the ten-year average ratio 
over 2000-2009. It suggests that among the 
countries where tax space appears available, tax 
ratios have not risen significantly recently. While 
tax ratios are projected to have rebounded 
                                                          
(137) The Irish gap with respect to the euro-area average appears 
less sizeable if the expected effects of very recent reforms 
are taken into account. It is also markedly reduced if taxes 
are computed as a percentage of Gross National Product 
(GNP), instead of GDP. Nonetheless, the ratio remains 
significantly below the euro-area average. In any case GNP 
is not an ideal denominator for computing tax ratios, as it 
excludes important parts of the tax base (e.g. output 
generated by domestic non-national agents).  
(138) The overall elasticity of revenues is estimated at 1.04 for 
the euro area, being an average of the above-unity 
elasticities for personal and corporate taxes, the unit 
elasticity for indirect taxes and the below-unity elasticity 
for social security contributions; see Girouard and André 
(2005). For individual euro-area countries the estimates 
vary between 0.88 for Estonia and Slovakia and 1.17 for 
Italy. 
(139) The results presented in Table 5.2 and discussed below are 
indeed qualitatively unchanged when the tax-to-GDP ratios 
are cyclically adjusted using the official revenue elasticities 
and output gaps used in the Commission’s fiscal 
surveillance framework. The absolute difference with the 
actual figures presented in the table is on average 0.1 
percentage point and in any case no bigger than 0.4 
percentage point. 
markedly from their 2009 lows in Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, tax ratios in 2011 are still 
below their pre-crisis levels in general, and, with 
the exception of Portugal, also below their average 
values over the past decade. (140) The increase in 
the tax-to-GDP ratio over 2009-2011 also appears 
fairly modest in the case of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal compared with both the size of the total 
consolidation effort over that period, as measured 
by the change in the primary structural balance, 
and the consolidation need as captured by the 
distance of the structural deficit to its medium-
term budgetary objective (MTO). Particularly for 
Greece, but also for Spain (and Portugal), this 
suggests that the available potential for tax revenue 
increases has not yet been successfully tapped to 
contribute to the severe consolidation needs. Given 
that policy measures such as broadening tax bases 
and hiking tax rates have been put in place in 
Greece, this tax space appears to point in particular 
to remaining severe deficiencies in tax collection 
and tax administration. Moreover, the tax space 
might point to a limit for legal tax increases to 
result in higher actual revenues in times of severe 
recession, owing to cyclically reduced tax bases 
and possible adverse feedback loops of tax 
increases on tax bases.  
In Ireland, the tax-to-GDP ratio has contributed 
around half of the consolidation effort so far as 
measured by the change in the structural primary 
balance since 2009. However, given the sizeable 
distance of the structural budget balance in Ireland 
to its MTO, the contribution appears far from 
excessive in absolute terms in order to address the 
substantial remaining consolidation needs. 
In Cyprus, where tax space is comparably limited, 
tax hikes have already contributed significantly to 
consolidation efforts over 2010-2011 (Table 5.2). 
At the same time, the distance to the MTO remains 
significant. In Slovakia, the country with the 
lowest tax burden in the euro area in 2011, the tax-
                                                          
(140) Consolidation measures introduced in Ireland from 2009 to 
2011 have resulted in considerable increases in marginal 
deductions from earnings arising from a combination of 
income tax, Pay-Related Social Insurance and the new 
Universal Social Charge, leading to an increase in the ratio 
of direct taxes to GDP by about one percentage point 
compared to 2008. However, the ratio is not higher than its 
average over the ten years preceding the crisis. While the 
latest Commission forecast projects the Irish tax-to-GDP 
ratio to rise above its 2008 value in 2012, it will still 
remain below its ten-year average over 2000-2009. 
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to-GDP ratio has hardly risen since 2009. 
However, the distance to the MTO is still sizeable. 
 
Table 5.2: Developments in tax burdens and total consolidation 
efforts 
10y avg 
to 2011 2008-11 2009-11 2008-11 2009-11 2011
BE -0.4 -0.2 0.7 -1.3 0.6 3.3
DE -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 -1.5 -0.9 0.9
EE 1.8 1.2 -2.5 3.1 -0.8 0.9
IE -0.6 -0.1 1.3 0.3 2.2 9.0
EL -0.5 0.1 1.6 3.9 8.2 7.4
ES -2.2 -1.1 1.6 0.1 4.7 4.3
FR -0.1 0.2 1.5 -0.6 1.9 3.9
IT 0.6 -0.6 -0.7 0.4 1.3 2.7
CY 3.0 -1.5 1.4 -4.8 1.1 4.6
LU -2.2 0.0 -1.7 -1.8 -1.1 0.2
MT 0.5 -0.4 -1.2 2.4 0.2 3.1
NL 0.8 0.1 1.0 -2.1 1.0 2.0
AT -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.8 -0.3 3.2
PT 1.1 -0.1 1.8 -0.7 4.8 4.9
SI -1.0 -0.3 -0.7 2.4 1.1 2.9
SK -2.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.3 2.8 4.8
FI -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.9 0.1 -0.3
BG -3.7 -4.9 -1.6 -1.0 2.3 0.6
CZ -0.7 -0.5 0.6 1.6 2.4 2.5
DK -2.5 -1.7 -1.8 -4.8 -3.0 2.2
LV -1.2 -1.3 1.1 3.6 2.5 3.0
LT -2.2 -3.3 -2.5 1.4 2.9 5.8
HU -2.2 -3.8 -3.2 -1.4 -4.1 3.7
PL 0.1 -1.3 1.2 -0.2 2.1 4.3
RO -0.6 -0.4 0.7 6.0 5.7 2.6
SE -2.6 -0.9 -1.3 -1.0 -1.6 -0.3
UK 0.9 -0.8 1.7 -1.0 3.4 ---
EU-27 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 1.4 ---
EA-17 -0.3 -0.3 0.6 -0.6 1.5 ---
Country
Change in tax-to-GDP ratio
Change in 
structural 
primary balance
Distance 
to MTO
Source: Commission services (AMECO database, Commission’s 2011 
Spring Forecast). 
 
A second qualification of the potential for raising 
tax-to-GDP ratios is the structure of the current tax 
burden. Where tax categories least detrimental to 
growth still suggest room for increases from a 
cross-country perspective, raising the overall tax 
burden is likely to be associated with less 
economic distortions and meet less implementation 
risk. In cases where the tax burden is relatively low 
due to e.g. a low tax burden on labour, while more 
growth-friendly tax sources are already extensively 
used, increasing the share of labour taxation is not 
recommendable. (141) However, consumption taxes 
might still be raised further where country-specific 
circumstances so allow, depending inter alia on 
                                                          
(141) It might be argued that advising against increasing low 
labour tax ratios should logically also imply advising 
countries with high labour tax ratios to reduce them. 
However, the focus in this section is on addressing 
consolidation needs. Revenue-neutral tax shifts from labour 
to consumption will be addressed in the next section.  
current VAT rates relative to neighbouring 
countries (leakage effects) and EU maximum rates, 
the efficiency of current VAT collection, the share 
of consumption in GDP and tax elasticities. The 
horizontal screening based on macro-indicators of 
current tax structures can thus only deliver first 
indications of the relative feasibility of tapping 
available overall tax space. 
The detailed analysis of the tax structure across 
Member States in the next section (5.2) identifies 
the countries with relatively low shares of 
consumption and/or (other) indirect taxes. For five 
out of the eight identified euro-area countries the 
potential for increasing the share of 
consumption/indirect taxes goes along with a high 
overall tax burden on labour (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Finland). Not surprisingly, in 
general these countries do not have overall tax 
space available (the slight exception being 
Germany). Moreover, none of these five countries 
has been identified as having severe consolidation 
needs that would call for possible tax increases. 
Three more countries (Spain, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands) have a relatively low share of 
consumption and/or indirect taxes, without 
imposing above-average overall tax disincentives 
for labour supply or demand. In line with this, 
these three countries display some tax space 
relative to the euro-area average (though very 
limited in the case of the Netherlands). Higher tax 
revenues do not seem to be required from a fiscal 
sustainability or consolidation point of view in 
Luxembourg or the Netherlands. Thus, given its 
potential need for higher tax revenues to help 
consolidation and its low tax-to-GDP ratio, 
particularly Spain appears to have some room for 
(further) increasing consumption or other indirect 
taxes. The analysis of the implicit tax rates on 
consumption underlines the scope for raising 
consumption taxes in Spain (and Italy), and yields 
Greece, Portugal and, to some extent, Slovakia and 
Cyprus as further countries that could increase 
consumption taxation relative to other euro-area 
countries. (142) All of these additional four 
countries appear to have some overall tax space 
relative to the euro area and have been identified 
                                                          
(142) While the share of consumption taxes in total tax revenues 
is relatively high in these countries, the actual tax burden 
that falls on consumption is relatively low, reflecting 
overall low tax-to-GDP ratios.  
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as countries where higher tax revenues might be 
called for to meet consolidation needs. 
As discussed in more detail in the next section, 
there is particular scope for increasing taxation on 
immovable property in several countries. Partly 
overlapping with the countries mentioned above as 
having below-average shares of revenues from 
consumption and/or indirect taxation in general, 
Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Finland and 
Greece appear to have room for increasing 
revenues from recurrent real estate taxation in a 
cross-country perspective. In these countries, the 
revenue from recurrent real estate taxes account 
for less than 0.6 % of GDP and there is no tax on 
imputed rents. Overall indirect taxes already 
account for an above-average share of total tax 
revenues in all of the above-mentioned countries 
but Germany and Finland, where tax space is very 
limited or absent and consolidation needs as such 
would not seem to require higher revenues from 
real estate taxation. While the latter also applies to 
Austria and Slovenia, Greece and Slovakia emerge 
as the two countries that could — apart from 
raising additional tax revenue on consumption — 
consider increasing recurrent taxes on real estate in 
order to address their consolidation needs. 
Room for expenditure cuts? 
Lastly, an analysis of the expenditure side of the 
budget can provide some additional evidence for 
the need for revenue-side consolidation efforts. All 
of the euro-area countries facing a significant need 
for fiscal consolidation, driven to a large extent by 
an unfavourable initial budgetary position (Ireland, 
Spain, Cyprus and, to some extent, Greece and 
Portugal), display already relatively low primary 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios. The same is true for 
Slovakia. Given that there is a limit to compressing 
expenditure, this might serve to underline the case 
for (further) tax-based consolidation measures, to 
the extent that the other screening criteria do not 
argue against it. 
Summary of screening results 
Overall, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus emerge as 
countries where the combination of the preliminary 
screening criteria as outlined above points to both 
the need and the room for potential tax increases to 
 
support consolidation efforts (Table 5.3). 
Moreover, while borderline cases in terms of the 
combined fiscal sustainability criterion, Portugal 
and Greece (143) appear to have some room for tax 
increases, too, with a view to contributing to their 
sizeable consolidation needs. As discussed above, 
a pure focus on the initial budgetary component of 
the sustainability gap might suggest Slovakia as an 
additional country displaying both a need and 
scope for raising tax revenues. 
 
Table 5.3: Overview: fiscal consolidation challenges 
Country
Potential need 
for higher tax 
revenues to 
help 
consolidation 
(based on S2)
'Tax space' 
available 
(compared to 
EA avg)
No significant 
increase in tax-
to-GDP ratio 
in recent years
Scope for 
(further) 
increasing 
least 
distortionary 
taxes
BE X X
DE (X) X X
EE X X
IE X X X
EL (X) X X X
ES X X X X
FR X X
IT X X
CY X X X
LU X X X
MT X X
NL (X) X X
AT X
PT (X) X X X
SI X X
SK (X) X X X
FI X X  
Note: (X) depicts borderline cases, i.e. where the applied criteria are 
either not strictly met (for the S2 criterion), or the assumed values 
remain very close to the thresholds (as for the tax space in Germany and 
the Netherlands). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Finally, the outcome of the mechanical screening, 
albeit consistent across countries, is inevitably of 
an essentially macroeconomic nature. An in-depth 
assessment of the microeconomic effects of an 
increase in specific types of tax, including its 
specific impact on particular groups of taxpayers, 
would have to be carried out before firm tax policy 
conclusions can be drawn. However, such detailed 
country-specific scrutiny of the possible room for 
increasing specific categories of taxes lies clearly 
beyond the scope of this section. 
                                                          
(143) It has to be recalled that the borderline position for Greece 
is largely due to the fact that the positive effects of the 
2010 pension reform are already reflected in the long-term 
component of S2. In contrast, the position of Spain would 
look more favourable if its 2010 pension reform was 
likewise reflected in the projections.  
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5.2. CHALLENGES RELATING TO GROWTH-
ENHANCING TAX STRUCTURES: A FIRST 
QUANTITATIVE SCREENING 
In this section, Member States are subjected to 
preliminary horizontal quantitative screening — 
against common criteria and indicators — to 
identify needs for improving the structure of 
taxation to enhance economic growth. 
A high tax burden on labour, especially on 
vulnerable groups, combined with low indirect and 
consumption taxation points to sub-optimal tax 
structures. As discussed in Chapter 4, various 
studies have shown that the composition of the tax 
structure is relevant to growth and that taxes on 
property and consumption (including 
environmental taxes falling on consumption) are 
the least detrimental to growth. Direct taxes, 
namely personal income taxes and corporate 
income taxes, appear to be the most detrimental. 
This ‘tax and growth ranking’, which is in line 
with theoretical predictions and consistent with 
earlier empirical results, is also reflected in the 
AGS, the Commission document launching the 
European Semester. (144) 
This section will identify Member States that 
appear to face particular challenges regarding the 
tax burden on labour. First, it will identify 
countries that face challenges either regarding the 
overall tax burden on labour or the tax burden on 
specific labour market groups. Second, the scope 
for tax shifting towards indirect taxation will be 
investigated, with a particular focus on real estate 
taxation. 
In addition to its positive impact on growth, 
shifting the tax burden from labour to consumption 
might also be beneficial in particular for those 
countries that are still suffering from losses in 
price competitiveness built up over the past decade 
(tax devaluation). While VAT is applied in the 
                                                          
(144) Annex 2 of the AGS reads: ‘Due attention should also be 
given to the quality of taxation, by collecting revenues in 
an efficient way and minimising the negative impact on 
economic growth [...]. Broadening tax bases, for example 
by removing environmentally harmful tax exemptions or 
tax credits, is preferable to increasing tax rates. [...]. Tax on 
immovable property followed by consumption taxes, 
including environmentally related taxes, are least 
distortive, while personal income taxes and corporate 
income taxes could have a more harmful impact on 
growth.’ See European Commission (2011b). 
same way to foreign and domestic producers, a 
decrease in labour costs stemming from the tax 
shift would mainly benefit domestic producers, 
with their production costs being (temporarily) 
lowered vis-à-vis foreign competitors. The tax 
devaluation effect will not be analysed further, as 
it requires the other factors of competitiveness to 
be examined in detail, which is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. (145) 
5.2.1. Reducing the tax burden on labour 
As a first step, this section will look at the overall 
tax burden on labour and the overall labour market 
situation. As a second step, it will focus on labour 
market groups that face particular employment 
problems and are at the same time considered to be 
rather responsive to labour supply incentives 
created by a higher after-tax wage: low-skilled 
workers and second earners. 
Reducing the overall tax burden on labour 
As described in Chapter 2, on average around one 
half of all tax revenues (including social security 
contributions) can be classified as taxes on labour. 
These are considered detrimental to growth as 
discussed in Chapter 4. A high overall tax burden 
on labour, in particular in combination with weak 
labour market performance, is suggestive of a need 
to reduce disincentives to hire (labour demand) 
and to supply labour. 
The employment rate in most euro-area Member 
States is below the 75 % target (20 to 64 years) set 
in the Europe 2020 Strategy (see Table 5.4). At the 
same time, several euro-area countries face high or 
even very high unemployment rates. Personal 
income taxes and social security contributions 
directly impact on labour costs and/or the net 
wage. It is therefore important to analyse the tax 
burden imposed on labour income to identify 
countries in which a reduction of the tax burden on 
labour could contribute to improving the overall 
labour market performance as regards both the 
employment rate and the average hours worked. 
Two types of indicators are available to measure 
the tax burden on labour. The implicit tax rate on 
                                                          
(145) See e.g. Desai and Hines (2002), Keen and Syed (2006), 
European Commission (2008b) and Lipinska and von 
Thadden (2009) for a discussion. 
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labour is a macro indicator, often used to gauge the 
overall tax burden on labour in the economy. (146) 
In contrast, the different tax wedge indicators (147) 
are micro indicators, based on the legal 
requirement faced by a series of hypothetical 
households. They can also be used to analyse the 
incentive effects at specific income levels and for 
different family types. The analysis will consider 
the aggregate labour tax burden as the sum of 
personal income taxes and social security 
contributions as well as payroll taxes. It will not 
analyse the composition and potential changes in 
the composition of labour taxes. As shown, e.g., in 
Arpaia and Carone (2004), shifts in the 
composition of labour taxation only matter in the 
short term, where a move from employers’ to 
employees’ social security contributions may lead 
to lower labour costs and higher labour demand. In 
the analysis below, countries are considered to 
have a high tax burden on labour if the tax burden 
indicator under consideration is significantly 
higher than the euro-area average. (148) 
A note of caution needs to be sounded here. The 
overall tax burden is not a weakness per se, but 
only inasmuch as it is accompanied with poor 
labour market performance (even if the latter could 
also be attributable to other factors). (149) The 
impact of high labour taxation could be offset by 
an integrated flexicurity approach, which provides 
non-financial incentives to work and helps to 
reduce the moral hazard related to more generous 
social security systems, themselves financed by a 
heavy tax burden on labour. Therefore, the latter 
 
                                                          
(146) The implicit tax rate on labour is calculated as the ratio of 
taxes and social security contributions on employed labour 
income to total compensation of employees. See Chapter 2 
for a discussion. 
(147) The tax wedge for a specific wage level is defined as the 
proportional difference between the costs of a worker to 
their employer (wage and social security contributions, i.e. 
the total labour cost) and the amount of net earnings that 
the worker receives (wages minus personal income tax and 
social security contributions, plus any available family 
benefits). 
(148) Technically, significantly higher means that the indicator is 
at least 0.4 standard deviations above the weighted 
average. This captures the worst performers, i.e. the bottom 
third of total distribution under normality assumption. This 
approach is applied in the Lisbon Assessment Framework 
— LAF; see European Commission (2008c). 
(149) Stringent employment protection legislation, inefficient 
wage-setting mechanisms, an incentives-distortive tax and 
benefit system and a high skill mismatch may also explain 
labour market malfunctioning, in addition to high labour 
taxation. 
could be compatible with low unemployment and 
high labour supply, provided that it is accompanied 
by effective activation and active labour market 
policies, in particular efficient job search support 
and work incentives. The success of the Nordic 
countries, despite a fairly high rate of labour 
taxation, is to a large extent attributable to reforms 
that underlined the more active approach in labour 
market policies with a clear job search and 
employment focus. (150) 
The mere application of quantitative criteria as 
regards the tax burden on labour seems to identify 
challenges in several euro-area Member States. If 
measured by the tax wedge at the average wage for 
full-time work, a particularly high tax burden on 
labour is identified in four Member States, namely 
Belgium, Germany, France and Austria. In all 
cases but Germany, the high tax burden signalled 
by the tax wedge is confirmed by a particularly 
high implicit tax rate on labour. (151) Except for 
Germany and Austria, which had already reached 
an employment rate of close to 75 % (20-64 years) 
in 2010, the countries identified have employment 
rates well below the Europe 2020 75 % target. In 
addition to the four Member States highlighted 
above, Italy and Finland also have very high 
implicit tax rates on labour, while at the same time 
displaying tax wedges above 40 %. Whereas 
Finland’s employment rate was rather close to the 
75 % target in 2010, Italy had one of the lowest 
employment rates in the euro area. The countries 
with a high tax burden on labour and an 
unsatisfactory labour market situation should 
investigate the potential to reduce overall labour 
taxation. Note that the average tax burden on 
labour increases rather automatically in many 
euro-area countries due to ‘fiscal drag’, i.e. the 
non-adjustment of thresholds and ceilings to 
inflation. (152) 
                                                          
(150) See Andersen and Svarer (2008), Arpaïa and Mourre 
(2009) and Sapir (2006). To explain the difference in 
labour market outcomes, the latter stresses the importance 
of the interplay of various institutions (including the level 
of social protection), which could be classified into four 
different ‘social models’, namely Continental, 
Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic models. 
(151) The German implicit tax rate on labour, however, is not 
among the highest in the euro area, but still well above the 
euro-area average. 
(152) See OECD (2007) for an overview of OECD countries that 
adjust the tax system to inflation. 
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Table 5.4: Tax burden on labour and overall labour market 
situation 
Country Employment rate (2010)
Unemployment 
rate (2010)
Implicit tax 
rate on labour 
(2009)
Tax wedge 
(100% 
AW, 2010)
BE 67.6 8.0 41.6 55.4
DE 74.9 7.1 38.8 49.1
EE 66.7 16.8 35.0 40.0
IE 64.9 13.2 25.5 29.3
EL 64.0 12.5 29.7 36.6
ES 62.5 19.5 31.8 39.6
FR 69.2 8.9 41.1 49.3
IT 61.1 8.1 42.6 46.9
CY 75.4 6.2 26.1 13.9**
LU 70.7 4.2 31.7 34.0
MT 59.9 6.1 20.2 22.3*
NL 76.8 4.0 35.5 39.2
AT 74.9 4.2 40.3 47.9
PT 70.5 11.1 23.1 37.7
SI 70.3 7.3 34.9 42.4
SK 64.6 14.0 31.2 37.8
FI 73.0 7.6 40.4 42.0
BG 65.4 9.9 25.5 33.8*
CZ 70.4 7.1 36.4 42.2
DK 76.1 6.9 35.0 38.3
LV 65.0 18.5 28.7 64.1*
LT 64.4 17.8 33.1 40.7*
HU 60.4 11.1 41.0 46.4
PL 64.6 9.5 30.7 34.3
RO 63.3 7.3 24.3 44.4*
SE 78.7 7.4 39.4 42.7
UK 73.6 6.8 25.1 32.7
EU-27 68.6 9.3 32.9 ---
EA-17 68.4 9.8 33.5 ---
Notes: (1) Employment rate and unemployment rate (20 to 64 years), 
tax wedge of single earner without children at 100 % of the average 
wage for full-time work (AW), implicit tax rate on employed labour; 
data for the tax wedge refer to 2009 in the case of Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Malta and Romania, 2008 in the case of Latvia and 2007 in the case of 
Cyprus. 
Source: Commission services, joint European Commission-OECD 
project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
 
Recently decided or implemented tax reforms are 
sometimes not yet reflected in the data, in 
particular in the case of the implicit tax rate on 
labour. It is therefore vital to supplement the rough 
picture painted by the above-mentioned indicators 
with information on recent reform plans covered in 
Chapter 3. In particular, Finland recently 
introduced several measures impacting on the tax 
burden on labour. Overall, however, these cannot 
be expected to lead to a significant reduction in the 
tax burden indicators. To sum up, high overall tax 
burdens relative to the euro-area average are 
indicated for Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Austria and Finland. 
Alleviating tax pressure on vulnerable groups: 
the case of the low-skilled 
When analysing ways to improve the labour 
market situation via measures on the tax side, it is 
important to note that the overall labour supply 
elasticity is rather low, or even close to zero, for 
some labour market groups. Reducing the average 
tax burden on labour can therefore only be 
expected to have a rather limited impact on overall 
labour supply in the long run. It is therefore 
essential to have a special focus on those segments 
of the labour market that are sensitive to financial 
incentives and/or face particular financial 
disincentives. As highlighted by the 2011 AGS, 
low-income earners and second earners are facing 
worryingly low participation rates, partly related to 
the failure to make work attractive for these 
groups. (153) Moreover, the adverse impact of taxes 
on labour demand is in particular felt by low-
skilled people. In effect, given the regressive 
pattern of social security contributions, labour 
costs will be proportionally higher at the lower end 
of the wage scale, which will particularly harm the 
labour demand for and the employability of those 
experiencing low productivity, such as the low-
skilled, but also second earners. On the labour 
supply side, second earners are often also 
characterised by the high opportunity cost of time 
worked. 
The tax burden on low-wage earners has already 
been at the centre of the political discussion for 
many years, as reflected, e.g., in the Lisbon 
Strategy for ‘Growth and Jobs’ (154) and Europe 
2020 (155). This is in particular due to the low 
employment rates and high unemployment rates of 
low-skilled employees (see Table 5.5), who are 
likely to earn low wages. Most Member States 
with low employment rates of low-skilled workers 
also have high long-term unemployment levels. 
Reforms of tax and benefit systems might play a 
particular role in increasing the employment levels 
of low-skilled workers given the rather high 
elasticity of their labour supply to labour earnings. 
High non-wage labour costs are also particularly 
important in the case of low-skilled workers due to 
the rather high labour demand elasticities. 
                                                          
(153) Other vulnerable groups, such as young workers and older 
workers, deserving some attention too, face other complex 
labour market issues outside the scope of this chapter. 
(154) The Integrated guidelines for employment policies call for 
‘… a significant reduction of high marginal effective tax 
rates, notably for those with low incomes ….’ and refer to 
the removal of ‘unemployment, poverty and inactivity 
traps’ (European Commission, 2007b). 
(155) See European Commission (2010c). 
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The tax wedge on labour costs at low incomes 
(67 % of average full-time earnings, single without 
children) is among euro-area countries particularly 
high in Belgium, Germany and France, which are 
also characterised by a high tax wedge at average 
wages (see Table 5.5). Tax wedges are also clearly 
above the euro-area average in Italy and Austria. 
Given that the indicator looks at a specific wage 
level, it does not reflect potential measures aimed 
at reducing labour supply disincentives at lower 
wage levels. Such a measure is, e.g., in place in 
France, which grants a reduction in employer 
social security contributions at the minimum wage 
(‘SMIC’) to increase labour supply incentives. (156) 
A high tax wedge negatively impacts on labour 
demand and supply. As pointed out above, the role 
of tax and benefit systems is of particular 
importance in the case of low-skilled workers, as 
their design is likely to affect labour supply 
                                                          
(156) The reduction is gradually phased out to zero at 1.6 times 
the minimum wage.  
incentives. Table 5.5 therefore also provides 
measures for the disincentive to return to 
employment from inactivity and unemployment, 
respectively called inactivity and unemployment 
traps. (157) The inactivity trap is also often referred 
to as the participation tax rate. These indicators 
take into account the reduction in benefits 
payments following return to the labour market, as 
well as higher taxes and social security 
contributions paid by employees. (158) 
                                                          
(157) The inactivity trap measures the part of additional gross 
wage that is taxed away in the case where an inactive 
person takes up a job. In other words, it measures the 
financial incentives to move from inactivity and social 
assistance to employment. On the other hand, the 
unemployment trap measures the part of the additional 
gross wage that is taxed away in the form of increased 
taxes and withdrawn benefits such as unemployment 
benefits, social assistance, and housing benefits when a 
person returns to work from unemployment. 
(158) To consider the impact of labour market changes on 
people’s current net income, the average effective tax rates 
need to exclude employers’ social security contributions. 
See Carone et al. (2004), p. 13. 
 
Table 5.5: Tax burden on low-wage earners and labour market situation of the low-skilled 
Employment rate Tax wedge (67% AW)
(low-skilled) of which contribution of which contribution
2010 from labour tax  from labour tax
BE 61.3 49.5 66.4 35.3 93.1 35.3
DE 61.0 44.9 67.8 35.5 74.5 35.5
EE 51.8 38.6 42.5 16.9 62.1 12.1
IE 50.2 23.4 73.6 15.5 73.0 14.9
EL 67.1 34.4 4.9 16.0 66.6 16.0
ES 59.2 36.4 42.2 14.8 81.0 11.0
FR 69.0 45.5 62.5 25.8 77.6 18.9
IT 61.0 43.6 24.2 24.1 78.9 21.4
CY 74.1 11.9** --- --- --- ---
LU 75.0 27.5 69.7 16.3 85.5 5.5
MT 59.1 17.7* 58.8 11.4 58.3 11.4
NL 71.8 34.0 82.5 32.3 83.5 8.5
AT 67.8 43.3 62.5 26.8 67.1 26.8
PT 75.5 32.8 36.3 16.8 81.8 16.8
SI 65.2 38.5 62.9 30.0 83.4 13.4
SK 35.0 34.5 40.7 17.2 67.2 17.2
FI 65.8 36.3 68.6 24.9 72.3 13.4
BG 47.9 33.9* 40.2 18.4 79.7 18.4
CZ 55.3 38.9 62.0 17.9 79.5 17.9
DK 71.4 36.7 87.2 27.1 89.2 12.5
LV 55.1 41.5* 55.3 27.5 87.5 27.5
LT 39.4 38.9* 43.6 19.9 86.2 19.9
HU 46.4 43.6 51.6 28.8 80.6 20.6
PL 53.7 33.4 51.2 26.7 75.4 22.8
RO 60.9 43.1* 35.7 24.6 76.3 24.6
SE 68.2 40.6 70.9 28.7 76.5 9.4
UK 61.6 29.6 50.2 22.5 50.2 22.5
EU-27 63.0 39.1 54.7 26.2 74.2 22.0
EA-17 63.6 41.9 54.6 26.9 77.6 22.6
Country
2009 20092010
Labour market 
performance (1)
Inactivity trap (67% AW) Unemployment trap (67% AW)
Disincentives to work (2)
Notes: (1) Employment rate and unemployment rate of low-skilled workers (25-54 years, pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education — 
levels 0-2, ISCED 1997), long-term unemployment in % of active population. (2) Tax wedge, inactivity trap and unemployment trap for single worker 
with no children at 67 % of average earnings. Tax wedge data for the indicators measuring the disincentives to work refer to 2009 in the case of 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Romania and 2007 in the case of Cyprus. 
Source: Commission services, Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Low-wage earners in several euro-area Member 
States face particularly high financial disincentives 
to return to employment from inactivity and 
unemployment as measured by the average 
effective tax rate indicators, which take into 
account the interaction of tax and benefit systems. 
Generally, the unemployment trap is substantially 
higher than the inactivity trap, as unemployment 
benefit payments are normally higher than social 
assistance. Workers in Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Slovenia face both particularly 
high inactivity and unemployment traps. The 
particular contribution from labour taxes (income 
taxes and social security contributions) to the 
unemployment trap is, however, high only in 
Belgium and not in any of the other three 
countries. Similarly, the contribution from taxes to 
the inactivity trap is high only in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Slovenia, and not in Luxembourg. 
Germany, Ireland, France, Austria and Finland are 
in particular characterised by very high inactivity 
traps but also have unemployment traps of above 
65 %. However, the particular contribution from 
taxes (including social security contributions) is 
low in Ireland for both traps and low for the 
unemployment trap in the case of Finland. Also, 
the indicators sometimes do not take into account 
special measures targeted at parts of the workforce. 
For instance, in France the ‘prime pour l’emploi’ 
and the ‘revenu de solidarité active’, which are in-
work benefits supplementing the income of those 
earning very low wages to encourage them to take 
up a job or stay employed, are not reflected in the 
data according to the French authorities. (159) 
Whereas the employment situation of low-skilled 
workers can be considered satisfactory or even 
very satisfactory in the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, the low-skilled face serious labour 
market problems in the other countries. Italy, 
Spain and Portugal have a very high 
unemployment trap and a rather low inactivity 
trap. While the high unemployment trap in Spain 
and Portugal is due not to a high contribution from 
taxes but to high benefits paid to the unemployed, 
the contribution of labour taxes to the 
unemployment trap is above the euro-area average 
in Italy. In general, the picture is much more 
mixed for the inactivity trap than in the case of the 
 
                                                          
(159) These measures are particularly targeted at reducing 
disincentives at low wage levels. 
unemployment trap. This is due to the big 
differences in the level of transfer payments to the 
inactive population. 
Again, it is important to analyse whether countries 
that are identified as having especially high 
financial disincentives for low-skilled workers 
have recently introduced policy measures that are 
not yet reflected in the indicators. The analysis of 
recent tax reforms in Chapter 3 shows that in 
particular Finland, Germany and the Netherlands 
have lowered personal income taxation at low 
income levels via a reduction in income tax rates 
and/or an increase in the income tax allowance. 
There are different possible ways of increasing 
labour supply incentives in the countries faced by 
high labour supply disincentives at low-wage 
levels and a poor labour market situation of the 
low-skilled. As regards the tax system (including 
social security contributions), positive labour 
supply incentives at lower income levels can, for 
instance, be created by lower social security 
contributions at low wage levels or a higher tax-
free allowance, above all where transfer payments 
are not subject to personal income tax. Special tax 
schemes such as earned income tax credits 
(EITCs) that provide special incentives to 
participate in the labour market could also be taken 
into consideration. (160) Positive labour demand 
effects in the short run can in particular be 
achieved by a reduction in employers’ social 
security contributions. (161) Given the rather high 
labour demand elasticities for low-skilled workers, 
reductions targeted at this group could have a 
strong effect on labour demand. However, 
measures to create better conditions for low-wage 
earners should avoid ‘low-wage traps’, often called 
‘poverty traps’, which deter low-wage earners 
from earning more (moving from part-time to full-
time work, looking for a more qualified job, etc.) 
and employers from paying more. This occurs 
when tax and benefit conditions become less 
favourable for employees, while the non-wage 
labour costs significantly rise for employers (e.g. 
because of the loss of social security rebates). 
                                                          
(160) See Saez (2002) and Immervoll et al. (2007).  
(161) Micro-economic studies for the Nordic countries indicate, 
however, that the employment effect could be limited; see 
e.g. Korkemäki and Uusitalo (2009).  
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Alleviating tax pressure on vulnerable groups: 
the case of second earners 
The second group that is of particular importance 
is second earners in couples, who are very often 
female. In 2010, female employment rates were 
below male employment rates in all euro-area 
Member States (see Table 5.6). (162) Against the 
euro-area average, the gap amounted to more than 
13 percentage points (age group 25-54 years). 
Female workers are more responsive to financial 
incentives than male workers as regards their 
labour supply at the extensive, i.e. the question 
whether to participate in the labour market, and 
above all the intensive margin, i.e. the question 
whether to supply an additional hour of work or 
whether to move from part-time to full-time 
work. (163) The comparatively low labour force 
participation of women is at least partly due to 
often very high negative incentive effects 
embedded in the tax and benefit system for second 
earners, as measured by average and marginal 
effective tax rates. Other major reasons for the low 
employment rates of females are certainly the cost 
or unavailability of child care, the insufficient 
development of flexible work arrangements to 
reconcile personal and family life, such as part-
time work, and cultural attitudes and social norms 
regarding gender roles, especially for older 
cohorts. (164) Although not analysed here, single 
mothers with (two) children face particularly high 
disincentive effects, which also negatively impacts 
on female labour market participation. 
As analysed in detail in Carone et al. (2009), high 
marginal and average effective tax rates for second 
earners are primarily influenced by taxes and 
social security contributions rather than benefits. 
This is due to the fact that the earnings of the 
primary earner are in most cases sufficiently high 
to rule out eligibility to benefits such as social 
assistance or housing. (165) As a consequence 
                                                          
(162) The Lisbon Strategy had an employment target for women 
(15-64 years) of at least 60 % as the EU average.  
(163) See Meghir and Phillips (2010) for a literature review of 
labour supply elasticities for different labour market 
groups. See also Bertola et al. (2002). 
(164) See e.g. Bettio and Verashchagina (2009), Jaumotte (2003), 
and Buddelmeyer, Mourre and Ward (2008). 
(165) According to Carone et al. (2009) benefit withdrawals tend 
to only play a role at income levels below 67 % of the 
average wage. For a detailed breakdown of the different 
components of the inactivity, unemployment and low-wage 
traps see: 
second earners in couples with children in general 
face a lower inactivity trap than single parents with 
two children. 
Table 5.6 provides two measures for labour supply 
disincentives. Whereas the inactivity trap or 
participation tax measures labour supply incentives 
at the extensive margin, the low-wage trap — as a 
marginal effective tax rate indicator — can be used 
to assess the incentive effects at the intensive 
margin. (166) 
Second earners in Slovenia, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and — somewhat less so — 
in Italy face especially high disincentives to return 
to work from inactivity. In contrast to the 
inactivity trap faced by low-skilled workers, the 
particular contribution from taxes (including social 
security contributions) to the inactivity trap for 
second earners is rather high in all countries. This 
applies particularly in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands and, to a somewhat lesser extent, also 
in the two other Member States with a high 
inactivity trap, Slovenia and Italy. Disincentives at 
the intensive margin as measured by the low-wage 
trap are considerable in Belgium, Germany and 
Italy and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in Slovenia 
and the Netherlands. (167) Overall, disincentive 
effects to labour supply of second earners as 
measured by the two indicators are considerable in 
five euro-area Member States. 
In all those countries, to a somewhat lesser extent 
in Slovenia, the female employment rate is well 
below the male employment rate. Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands are also 
                                                                                   
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/tax_be
nefits_indicators/index_en.htm. 
(166) The low-wage trap as an effective marginal tax rate is 
defined as the rate at which taxes are increased and benefits 
withdrawn as earnings rise due to an increase in work 
productivity. This kind of trap is most likely to occur at 
relatively low wage levels due to the fact that the 
withdrawal of social transfers (mainly social assistance, in-
work benefits and housing benefits), which are usually 
available only to persons with a low income, adds to the 
marginal rate of income taxes and social security 
contributions. 
(167) No breakdown for the share of labour taxes is available. 
Data are, however, available for the breakdown of a wage 
increase of 1 % of the average wage, i.e. from 33 % to 
34 %. In this case, the contribution from labour taxes to the 
trap is 100 % in Belgium, Germany, and Slovenia, more 
than 90 % in the Netherlands and more than 80 % in Italy.  
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characterised by a high share of part-time 
employment in overall female employment. 
 
Table 5.6: Tax burden on second earners and female 
employment rates 
2009
of which 
contribution 
from labour 
tax
BE 74.4 85.5 46.3 46.3 58.0
DE 76.3 86.5 51.0 46.0 49.0
EE 73.9 75.7 22.6 22.6 23.0
IE 65.7 75.0 35.4 22.0 32.0
EL 61.1 85.3 31.9 16.0 19.0
ES 63.2 75.7 17.5 17.5 18.0
FR 76.7 87.1 38.1 25.0 23.0
IT 58.7 83.5 42.5 30.6 48.0
CY 76.6 88.4 --- --- ---
LU 72.6 92.0 32.8 22.0 29.0
MT 47.8 88.7 33.3 15.3 23.0
NL 79.3 90.0 46.8 38.3 41.0
AT 79.7 88.7 29.2 29.2 39.0
PT 74.6 83.9 21.5 19.4 28.0
SI 82.1 85.2 55.8 31.0 42.0
SK 70.1 81.4 21.1 21.1 34.0
FI 79.2 83.9 29.2 24.9 32.0
BG 73.6 77.9 20.1 20.1 22.0
CZ 73.4 90.5 33.9 24.9 28.0
DK 80.6 85.9 78.8 28.6 63.0
LV 73.8 72.9 31.9 31.9 30.0
LT 76.1 71.4 39.5 19.9 26.0
HU 67.1 77.9 32.0 28.8 42.0
PL 71.7 82.6 39.2 22.6 31.0
RO 67.2 81.5 26.3 26.3 31.0
SE 82.0 88.0 23.9 28.7 29.0
UK 74.3 85.4 43.7 22.5 31.0
EU-27 72.2 84.8 40.2 30.1 36.1
EA-17 71.5 84.8 39.7 32.1 37.1
Low-wage 
trap (33% 
to 67% 
AW, 2009) 
Labour market 
performance (1) Disincentives to work (2)
Country  (67% AW)Employment 
rate - female 
(2010)
Employment 
rate - male 
(2010)
Inactivity trap
Notes: (1) Employment rate for age group 25-54. (2) Inactivity trap for 
second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner 
with 67 % of average wage, second earner with 67 %, low-wage trap for 
second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner 
with 67 % of average wage, second earner moving from 33 % to 67 % 
of average wage. Data for the traps refer to 2009 in the case of Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Romania. No detailed breakdown of the 
contribution from labour taxes to the low-wage trap is available. 
Source: Commission services, Joint European Commission-OECD 
project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
 
One main driver for particularly high effective tax 
rates on second earners — in addition to a 
generally high tax burden on labour in a specific 
country — is the consideration of the total income 
of a couple — rather than individual incomes — in 
the calculation of taxes and benefit payments in 
some Member States. This ‘joint taxation’ (168) can 
discourage labour supply at the extensive and 
intensive margin by increasing average and 
                                                          
(168) Joint taxation in income taxation can be introduced via 
different aspects of the tax system, either via full joint 
taxation or through the transferability of parts of taxable 
income to the spouse or of tax allowances and tax credits in 
countries with otherwise separate income taxation. 
marginal effective tax rates. In Member States with 
individual taxation female employment rates seem 
to be closer to male rates. Currently, Germany, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal apply a 
mandatory or default system of joint taxation of 
couples, whereas in Spain separate taxation is the 
default system but an option for joint taxation is 
available. Personal income taxation in a few other 
euro-area Member States includes at least some 
elements of joint taxation (e.g. Greece and 
Belgium) while several other Member States apply 
pure systems of individual taxation. 
The mechanism whereby the marginal tax rate is 
pushed up by the earnings of the principal earner is 
relevant in particular in the case of low-wage 
work. (169) Bettio and Verashchagina (2009) 
calculate marginal effective tax rates for female 
secondary earners with children and show that 
countries with joint taxation on average have a 
higher tax burden on second earners than countries 
with separate taxation. Using micro data, they 
calculate that the marginal effective tax rate is on 
the arithmetic average 13 percentage points higher 
in the five euro-area countries applying joint 
taxation than in those EU countries not applying 
joint taxation. (170) They also provide data that 
indicate a link between a high marginal effective 
tax rate when moving from part-time to full-time 
work and a high share of part-time workers among 
secondary earners. 
In order to increase work incentives for second 
earners it would be important to move away from 
joint taxation and in the direction of individual 
taxation. (171) Simulations carried out for countries 
currently applying systems of joint taxation 
indicate that a move to separate taxation would 
increase female labour market participation as well 
as the hours worked. (172) No significant reforms 
have taken place in the Member States in the 
recent past that are not yet reflected in the data. 
To sum up, high overall tax burdens seem to 
prevail in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
                                                          
(169) See Carone et al. (2009). 
(170) See Bettio and Verashchagina (2009, page 82) for the 
definition of family types and detailed calculation results.  
(171) In this respect, the Commission recommendation/opinion 
on the German NRP and SCP for 2011 suggests moving 
away from joint taxation of couples towards separate 
taxation (see European Commission, 2011l). 
(172) See Bettio and Verashchagina (2009) for references to 
respective studies.  
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Austria and Finland. For all of the first five 
countries, and to a lesser extent for Finland, the 
effects of a high overall tax burden are aggravated 
by a high labour tax burden on specific vulnerable 
groups. Without imposing an overall high tax 
burden on labour, the Netherlands and Slovenia are 
characterised by a high tax burden on specific 
labour market groups. Member States with a 
particularly high tax burden on labour and a rather 
low employment level should try to reduce the tax 
burden on labour with a special focus on specific 
labour market groups, in particular low-skilled 
workers and second earners. Given the tight 
budgetary situation in most Member States this 
needs to be compensated for by increases in 
revenues from other taxes. It is therefore important 
to analyse how much scope there is in Member 
States for shifting the tax burden to other economic 
activities and tax bases. 
5.2.2. Scope for tax shifting towards indirect 
taxation 
As evidenced by the above results, the tax burden 
on labour is very high in a number of countries. 
Rebalancing the tax system towards less distortive 
tax sources (immovable property, consumption and 
environmental taxes) would allow a reduction in 
relatively highly distortive labour (and corporate) 
taxes. (173) Moreover, shifting the tax burden away 
from labour towards consumption could also 
contribute to (further) improving impaired price 
competitiveness in a number of Member States. 
However, the rise in consumption taxes might lead 
to a rise in price level, translating into higher 
inflation in the short run. This may (partly) 
counteract the cut in nominal labour costs, in real 
terms. Moreover, risks of second-round effects, 
especially in cases where wages are linked to 
inflation, would have to be monitored carefully, 
since wage earners may ask to be compensated for 
the relative loss in purchasing power. In 
redistributive terms, this purchasing power loss 
should be gauged against the employment gain 
brought about by lower labour taxes. This 
employment increase, expected mainly for the 
most vulnerable groups, will induce positive 
purchasing power effects for these groups. 
However, any shift from labour to consumption 
                                                          
(173) For a general discussion and empirical results on the 
macroeconomic effects of a tax shift from labour to 
consumption, see section 4.1. 
taxes would need to be carefully analysed in terms 
of its redistributive effects. (174) 
Overall level of indirect taxes and 
consumption taxes 
The broadest category to be opposed to direct 
(personal and corporate) taxes and social security 
contributions is indirect taxes. As to the difference 
between the latter and consumption taxes, indirect 
taxes are wider in that they include, apart from 
VAT, excise duties and other consumption taxes, 
large parts of property tax revenues and some 
additional — smaller — environmental taxes. 
However, they also include some — from a 
growth-perspective ‘undesirable’ — taxes on 
capital and labour, most importantly stamp taxes 
and payroll taxes. Given the imperfections of both 
concepts in measuring the share of ‘growth-
friendly’ tax categories — the first one being too 
narrow, the second one too broad, Table 5.7 
provides an overview of both the share of 
consumption (2009) and indirect taxes (2011) in 
total tax revenues across Member States. 
To assess which euro-area Member States could 
benefit from shifting taxes towards 
consumption/indirect taxes, countries are again 
benchmarked against the weighted euro-area 
averages for the two shares. In Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland, the 
share of indirect taxes in total tax revenues is 
below the euro-area average, while it is marginally 
above the euro-area average but below the EU 
average in France and Italy. Although still being 
below the euro-area average, the share of indirect 
taxes in total tax revenues has increased markedly 
(by around 2½ percentage points) compared to 
2008 in Spain and Finland, partly reflecting the 
VAT rate increases implemented in these 
countries. Further euro-area countries showing 
even more significant increases in the share of 
indirect taxes (3 to 3½ percentage points are 
Estonia and Greece, which hiked their VAT rates 
after the economic and financial crisis but already 
had clearly above-average shares of indirect taxes 
                                                          
(174) One common objection to replacing income tax with a 
consumption tax is that the latter tends to be regressive, 
since people with low incomes spend a higher percentage 
of their incomes than do people with higher incomes. For a 
critical discussion and ways to construct a non-regressive 
consumption tax, see e.g. Caspersen and Metcalf (1994).  
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before the crisis. (175) For four of the above-
mentioned countries with relatively low shares of 
indirect taxes (Belgium, Spain, France, Italy), the 
share of consumption taxes was also below the 
euro-area average in 2009. (176) 
 
Table 5.7: Indirect and consumption taxes 
Share of 
consumption 
taxes in total 
taxation
Consumption 
taxes as % of 
GDP
ITR on 
consumption
2011  change 2008-11
BE 30.5 0.9 24.4 10.6 20.9
DE 33.1 0.5 27.8 11.1 19.8
EE 42.3 3.6 40.6 14.6 27.6
IE 40.8 -1.8 35.4 10.0 21.6
EL 42.4 3.0 35.5 10.8 14.0
ES 33.4 2.5 23.6 7.2 12.3
FR 34.3 -0.8 25.6 10.6 18.5
IT 34.0 1.2 22.8 9.8 16.3
CY 44.0 -2.2 38.1 13.4 17.9
LU 32.5 -1.1 27.4 10.2 27.3
MT 42.4 -1.2 39.3 13.5 19.5
NL 31.5 -0.9 30.8 11.8 26.2
AT 35.0 1.2 28.2 12.0 21.7
PT 43.1 -0.5 35.2 10.9 16.2
SI 38.5 -0.1 37.3 14.0 24.2
SK 38.6 1.7 35.9 10.3 17.3
FI 32.9 2.4 31.1 13.4 25.7
BG 54.5 -0.7 50.8 14.7 21.4
CZ 33.8 1.9 32.5 11.2 21.6
DK 37.0 0.9 31.6 15.2 31.5
LV 44.1 5.9 38.4 10.2 16.9
LT 44.5 5.0 38.2 11.2 16.5
HU 47.2 7.6 38.1 15.0 28.2
PL 42.8 0.7 36.2 11.5 19.0
RO 45.0 2.3 38.4 10.3 16.9
SE 39.6 0.8 28.5 13.3 27.6
UK 37.5 4.7 29.8 10.4 16.8
EU-27 34.9 1.1 27.7 10.6 18.9
EA-17 33.8 0.5 26.6 10.4 18.5
Country
Share of 
indirect taxes 
in total 
taxation
2009
Source: Commission services. 
 
In gauging the tax composition and the potential 
for shifting the tax burden to consumption taxes, it 
is important to take the overall tax burden on 
consumption into account. The below-average 
ratio of consumption tax revenues to GDP in Italy 
and, particularly, in Spain underlines the potential 
for raising consumption taxes. 
To abstract from differences in the size of tax 
bases across countries and to measure the ‘true’ tax 
burden on consumption, it also important to look at 
the implicit tax rate (ITR) on consumption. (177)   
                                                          
(175) Section 3.2 in Chapter 3 provides an overview of recent tax 
reforms in the area of VAT. 
(176) The 2009 figures do not yet reflect VAT hikes 
implemented in 2010 and 2011.  
(177) See the discussion of implicit tax rates in Chapter 2. 
A comparison of the ITR across euro-area Member 
States provides further evidence of potential for 
shifting the tax burden towards consumption in 
Spain and Italy. The ITRs on consumption in 2009 
are low particularly also in Greece and Portugal 
and, to a lesser extent, in Slovakia and Cyprus. 
While the shares of consumption taxes in total tax 
revenues are already relatively high in the latter 
four countries, the low tax burden on consumption 
would still suggest some room for manoeuvre for 
increasing consumption tax revenues in a euro-area 
wide comparison. Against the background of the 
analysis in sub-section 5.3.3, this might in several 
cases be addressed by reducing high VAT gaps 
related to fraud and deficiencies in tax collection 
and/or increasing overall VAT efficiency through 
base-broadening.  
A closer look at consumption taxes 
Table 5.8 provides a more detailed breakdown of 
consumption taxes into VAT, excise duties on 
tobacco and alcohol and energy taxes. (178) 
Revenues from real estate taxation will be dealt 
with separately in the subsequent section. The 
above-reported low share of consumption taxes in 
total tax revenues in Belgium, Spain, France, Italy 
(and Luxembourg) is essentially driven by low 
VAT receipts, (179) which account for around two 
thirds of total consumption taxes on average. In 
three of these countries (Belgium, France, Italy) 
revenues from excise duties on alcohol and 
tobacco in 2009 were below the euro-area average 
too. The same applies to Germany, the Netherlands 
and Austria. (180) Belgium, France and Austria also 
feature among the euro-area countries with 
relatively low receipts from energy taxation, the 
largest share of which is usually accounted for by 
transport fuel taxes. Further countries with below-
average shares of energy taxation (in 2009) are 
Greece, Malta and Finland. (181) 
                                                          
(178) For a definition of energy taxes see Chapter 2. The residual 
category comprises taxes on transport excluding fuel, and 
on pollution/resources, as well as other non-environmental 
consumption taxes. It varies considerably among countries 
in size and composition.   
(179) The VAT rate hike (by 2 percentage points) in Spain in 
2010 is not yet reflected in the data.  
(180) In Austria, excise duties on tobacco were increased as from 
January 2011 and are to be increased further as from July 
2011. 
(181) Fuel taxes were increased in Austria in 2011 and, following 
the 2009 increase, in Greece again in 2010.  
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Table 5.8: Consumption taxes: share of VAT and excise duties 
in total taxation (2009) 
Country VAT Alcohol/ tobacco Energy Residual
BE 16.0 1.6 2.9 3.8
DE 18.7 1.8 4.8 2.6
EE 25.2 6.9 7.1 1.4
IE 22.7 4.8 5.2 2.6
EL 21.1 4.5 3.9 6.0
ES 13.5 2.7 4.4 3.0
FR 16.3 1.4 3.5 4.4
IT 13.2 1.8 4.8 2.9
CY 26.0 3.6 4.6 3.9
LU 16.7 3.7 6.1 0.9
MT 22.9 3.7 4.3 8.4
NL 18.4 1.2 5.3 5.9
AT 18.9 1.5 3.8 4.0
PT 23.0 2.7 6.1 3.3
SI 22.4 3.4 8.0 3.5
SK 23.3 3.8 5.9 2.9
FI 20.3 2.6 4.2 4.0
BG 31.2 9.5 9.2 0.9
CZ 20.7 4.3 6.7 0.8
DK 21.0 1.3 4.6 4.7
LV 22.5 5.9 7.6 2.4
LT 25.2 5.3 6.6 1.1
HU 21.3 3.9 5.0 7.8
PL 23.4 5.1 6.6 1.2
RO 24.8 5.6 6.0 1.9
SE 20.7 1.6 4.9 1.3
UK 16.6 3.6 5.6 4.1
EU-27 17.3 2.2 4.7 3.5
EA-17 16.8 1.9 4.4 3.5
Source: Commission services. 
 
However, the relatively low shares in total 
revenues of excise duties on alcohol and tobacco in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria and of 
energy taxes in Malta, Austria and Finland have to 
be seen in conjunction with already above-average 
overall tax burdens on consumption (see Table 
5.8). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, higher revenues from 
VAT should be achieved mainly by narrowing the 
applicability of reduced rates or by increasing their 
level. In most euro-area Member States there 
seems to be potential for such changes as discussed 
in sub-section 5.2.1 below. However, in some 
countries there seems to be some margin left also 
for (further) raising the standard VAT rate in order 
to generate additional revenues (see Table A1.4 in 
Annex 1). In fact, VAT standard rates have often 
been changed from 2009 onwards, in the vast 
majority of cases upwards. The euro-area average 
has risen strongly, by around 2½ percentage points 
in three years. 
Similarly, also excise duties (both on alcohol and 
tobacco and on energy) have already been 
increased in several Member States as a means to 
raise revenues in the aftermath of the crisis. 
However, several countries still seem to have room 
for raising excise duties in a cross-country 
perspective. This is all the more true as excise 
duties are usually levied as fixed amounts per 
quantity of a given product. Thus, while the 
average tax burden on labour tends to 
automatically increase over time as mentioned 
above, (182) revenues from excise duties tend to 
diminish in relative terms in line with inflation. 
Environmental tax revenues, which can be one 
component in a tax shift towards indirect taxation, 
on average accounted for 2.4% of GDP and for 
6.3% of total tax revenues in 2009. In some 
Member States the share of environmental tax 
revenues in total taxes has reached more than ten 
percent due to various environmental tax 
reforms. (183) There seems to be some scope to 
increase environmental taxation, in particular 
energy taxation, in some countries. However, some 
countries have increased fuel taxes recently.  
Special focus on potential for increasing 
revenues from real estate taxation 
Another (potentially) important lever for raising 
indirect taxes is increasing revenues from property 
taxation. Various studies have shown that property 
taxes, and in particular recurrent taxes on 
immovable property (184), are among the taxes 
least detrimental to growth. (185) Taxation of real 
estate takes several different forms. Following the 
classification in OECD (2010b), the following 
categories are distinguished: (i) recurrent taxes on 
land and buildings, (ii) taxes on transactions 
involving immovable property, (iii) wealth taxes, 
and (iv) taxes on gifts and inheritances. Note that 
in cases (ii) to (iv), it is often difficult to separate 
tax revenues relating to immovable property from 
other property taxes, as the published tax revenue 
data normally cover a broader set of transactions or 
assets. (186) 
                                                          
(182) Many countries address this issue by indexing or regularly 
reviewing tax brackets. 
(183) See Chapter 2, Graph 2.11 for detailed country data. 
(184) European Commission (2010e) provides an overview of the 
literature on this topic. 
(185) Taxation of capital gains coming from immovable property 
sales falls under personal income taxation and will not be 
examined in this report given the scarcity of data available.  
(186) European Commission (2011a) and OECD (2010b) do not 
provide a breakdown of transaction taxes. 
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Recurrent taxes on real estate and land are found to 
have a relatively smaller adverse impact on the 
allocation of resources in the economy than other 
taxes. The tax base is also more stable and thus 
more predictable than tax revenue obtained from 
labour or, in particular, corporate taxes. One 
explanation for this is that cyclical fluctuation of 
property values is comparatively small. The 
stability is also reinforced by the fact that many tax 
systems do not update property values (the tax 
base) regularly. This could, on the other hand, risk 
leading to erosion of the tax base over time due to 
inflation if no adjustments are made. Another 
advantage of the recurrent property tax is that its 
base is immobile and visible, and hence more 
difficult to evade. (187) 
Transaction taxes, however, discourage 
transactions that would allocate these properties 
more efficiently. (188) The market will be thinner 
and the price discovery process, which is already 
slow in the housing market, could be hampered. 
The tax would also negatively impact labour 
mobility. Moreover, revenues from transaction 
taxes are often highly volatile as the revenue 
development in the crisis has shown recently, with 
tax windfall in housing market booms and tax 
shortfall in busts. On the positive side, a tax on real 
property transactions could deter speculation and 
thus possibly help to reduce the risk of housing 
market bubbles. However, this relationship 
remains empirically ambiguous. (189) It could also 
prove politically difficult to use the transaction tax 
as a timely policy response to mitigate price 
increases in the housing market. Moreover, other 
policies are available to more effectively mitigate 
the creation of housing market bubbles. 
The current systems for taxing immovable 
property provide scope for two types of reforms. 
First, there appears to be room to shift the overall 
tax burden towards recurrent taxes on real estate. 
Second, a shift from taxes on transactions to 
recurrent taxes on real estate would reduce the 
distortions introduced by taxation and improve 
economic efficiency. The latter is warranted by the 
fact that this type of tax has a less negative impact 
on the overall allocation of resources in the 
                                                          
(187) See OECD (2010f) and Johansson et al. (2008) for a 
discussion on property taxes. 
(188) See Johansson et al. (2008). 
(189) See Crowe et al. (2011). 
economy compared to other sources of revenue 
(with the exception of taxes on negative 
externalities). 
Graph 5.2: Revenues from property taxes, 2009 (in % of GDP) 
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Note: No OECD data is available for Cyprus, Estonia and Malta. 
Source: OECD (2010b).  
The reliance on property taxation varies 
considerably between euro-area Member States, as 
available data indicate. Revenues ranged from 
close to 3.5 % of GDP in France to less than 0.5 % 
in Austria and Slovakia in 2009 (see Graph 5.2). 
Recurrent taxes on immovable property are 
responsible for a large share of these revenues in 
many Member States (ranging from nearly 2.5 % 
to less than 0.5 % of GDP). Very low shares can in 
some cases partly be explained by taxation of 
imputed rents, from which the proceeds will fall 
under personal income tax and are therefore not 
included in the data (e.g. Luxembourg, Belgium 
and the Netherlands). In particular Slovakia, 
Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Finland and Greece 
appear to have room to increase revenue from 
recurrent real estate taxation (see Graph 5.2). In 
these countries, the revenue from recurrent real 
estate taxes accounts for less than 0.6 % of GDP 
and there is no tax on imputed rents. Increasing 
revenues from recurrent real estate taxes should in 
general first be done by bringing the tax base into 
line with the rental value (i.e. the market value) of 
the property. As a second step, rates could also be 
increased. Temporary measures to address the 
situation of house-owners with low income and 
illiquid assets might need to accompany such 
reforms. In addition, as property taxes often accrue 
to the local of level of government, the division of 
revenue and/or the transfer systems between local 
and central government might need to be adjusted. 
It is important to note that a few Member States 
(e.g. Greece and Portugal) currently reassess real 
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estate values with a view to bringing them into line 
with the rental value and some others (e.g. 
Germany) consider doing so. (190) 
Transaction taxes play a smaller role in the OECD 
average, but are estimated to be close to 1 % of 
GDP in Italy, Greece and Belgium. These data also 
include, as mentioned above, revenue from other 
capital and financial transactions. In order to assess 
the distortionary effect of transaction taxes it is 
important to look not only at tax revenues from 
these taxes but also at the tax rates applied. 
Belgium, Italy and Greece apply a tax on real 
estate transactions at a rate above 10 %, even if 
various reductions and exemptions apply in some 
cases, e.g. for first-time buyers. A second set of 
countries (Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, France and Cyprus (191)) apply rates 
in the 6-8 % range, while a third group applies tax 
rates below or at 5 % on real estate transactions. 
Finland, Slovenia, Germany and Austria belong to 
this group. Ireland had a stamp duty which 
amounted to 7-9 %, depending on the price of the 
property, but the 2011 budget reduces this duty to 
1-2 %. Note that no taxes on real estate 
transactions are levied in Malta, Estonia and 
Slovakia. As a result, Belgium, Italy, Greece (192), 
but also Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, France and Cyprus could review 
whether a shift from a tax on real estate 
transactions to a recurrent tax on real estate could 
improve the functioning of the housing market. 
Summarising the findings on the potential for 
tax shifting 
Overall, the following conclusions emerge as to 
enhancing the quality of taxation through tax 
shifting. In five euro-area countries (Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, France, Italy) a high overall tax 
burden on labour is matched by relatively low 
taxation of consumption and other indirect taxes, 
which suggests some scope for tax shifting. In 
                                                          
(190) See Chapter 3 for countries that are currently carrying out 
reassessments. 
(191) The rate in Cyprus varies between 4 and 8 %, with lower 
rates and reduced valuations for transactions between the 
extended family. 
(192) Note that in reform programmes, Greece is asked to update 
the values of property and thus raise more revenue. 
Portugal is asked to shift from transaction to recurrent 
property tax while protecting vulnerable households. 
Incentives to rent and own should be equalised by 
removing mortgage interest deductibility. 
Germany and Finland, the labour tax burden might 
also be alleviated through shifting taxes towards 
recurrent taxes on real estate and in particular 
housing. Similarly, while the level of consumption 
and overall indirect taxes is already somewhat 
above the euro-area average, increasing housing 
taxation could be a way to alleviate the high tax 
burden on labour in Austria. Any reduction in the 
tax burden on labour should in particular focus on 
those groups facing strong disincentives to work, 
i.e. low-skilled workers and second earners. 
High tax burdens on vulnerable groups in the 
Netherlands and Slovenia might call for a re-
profiling of labour taxation away from low-skilled 
workers and second earners towards other 
categories of taxpayers. Given the room for 
increasing the level of indirect taxation in the 
Netherlands and of recurrent real estate taxation in 
Slovenia, shifting the tax structure away from 
labour taxes falling on vulnerable groups towards 
indirect/real estate taxes might also be an option. 
Apart from the countries mentioned so far, six 
others (Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovakia) either have low revenue shares 
from consumption/indirect taxes or display below-
average ITRs on consumption (or both). 
Optimising tax structures through revenue-neutral 
tax shifts might be advisable in these cases, even if 
the tax burden on labour is not excessive in a euro-
area perspective, particularly where room for 
higher consumption taxes is accompanied by 
unsatisfactory labour market performance. (193) Of 
the above-mentioned countries, Greece and 
Slovakia appear in particular to have some room 
for shifting taxation towards real estate. Finally, 
Belgium, Italy and Greece may in particular 
benefit from a shift within real estate taxation, 
from a tax on real estate transactions to a recurrent 
tax on real estate. The results are summarised in 
Table 5.9. 
Taxes could also be shifted towards environmental 
taxation to the extent that it is economically and 
environmentally efficient. The primary goal of 
green taxation is to address the failure of markets 
to take negative externalities into account by 
                                                          
(193) The analysis in sub-section 5.3.3 suggests that in many 
cases higher VAT revenues could be generated by 
improving overall VAT efficiency (through base 
broadening, fighting fraud and enhancing VAT collection).  
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incorporating them into market prices and thereby 
to improve resource allocation. However, the 
scope for using environmental taxation to raise 
revenues and shift taxes away from labour is 
limited by the primary goal of avoiding distortions 
and the relatively small base vis-à-vis labour 
taxation. It is also limited by the potential tax base 
erosion implied by the elasticity of the 
environmental tax base to tax rate changes. 
In all cases where a tax shift from labour to 
consumption seems feasible, the impact on 
inflation should be considered, especially the risk 
of second-round effects. In particular, in countries 
where wage increases are linked to inflation, a 
shift from direct to indirect taxes may not lead to 
the desired reduction in labour costs in real terms. 
 
Table 5.9: Overview: tax structure indicators 
Overall Specific groups
Low 
consumption/ 
indirect taxes
Low recurrent 
taxes on 
housing 
BE X X X X
DE X X X X X
EE
IE
EL X X
ES X
FR X X X X
IT X X X X
CY X
LU X
MT
NL (X) X (X)
AT X X X (X)
PT X
SI (X) X (X)
SK X X
FI X (X) X X X
Country
High tax burden on labour Potential to shift
Need and 
room for 
tax shift
Note: High tax burden on specific labour market groups in a Member 
State either refers to low-skilled workers or second earners in couples or 
both. (X) depicts borderline cases, i.e. cases were only one sub-indicator 
indicated a high tax burden on a specific group whereas other indicator 
values were rather low. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Taxes could also be shifted towards environmental 
taxation, but only to the extent that it is 
economically and environmentally efficient. The 
primary goal of green taxation is to meet the 
objectives of environmental policies, such as 
reducing CO2 emissions and pollution, which will 
also enhance growth by correcting for 
environmental externalities and thus improving 
resource allocation. It also has the advantage that it 
reduces the cost of environmental policy in 
relation to other non-market based policy 
instruments. However, the scope for using 
environmental taxation to raise revenues and shift 
taxes is limited due to its relatively small base vis-
à-vis labour taxation. It is also limited by the 
potential tax base erosion implied by the elasticity 
of the environmental tax base to tax rate changes. 
Energy taxation, which accounts for around three 
quarters of overall environmental tax receipts, 
appears to be particularly low in Belgium and 
France (Table 5.8). The share of energy taxes in 
total tax revenues in 2009 was also clearly below 
the euro-area average in Greece and Austria. 
However, both countries have increased fuel taxes 
more recently. 
As argued in European Commission (2010e), 
environmental tax revenues have not been growing 
in recent years in the EU on average, despite their 
increasing importance in the policy debate. Apart 
from the above-mentioned tax base erosion due to 
higher environmental taxes and energy prices, this 
could be explained by the fact that environmental 
taxes are usually levied per unit of physical 
consumption and fixed in nominal terms, such that 
their real value tends to fall in the absence of 
inflation adjustment. Finally, given the heightened 
importance of energy efficiency, energy demand 
has a tendency to grow more slowly than income. 
5.3. OTHER HORIZONTAL CHALLENGES 
INHERENT TO THE DESIGN OF INDIVIDUAL 
TAXES 
The section below analyses challenges concerning 
the design of specific types of taxes from a 
horizontal perspective. As discussed in detail in the 
economic literature (e.g. OECD, 2010c, for a 
review), taxes should in general be levied on a 
broad base at low rates in order to reduce the 
distortionary effects of taxation. The section first 
looks at tax expenditure in the area of direct 
taxation (personal and corporate income tax). It 
then analyses issues related to specific indirect 
taxes, namely VAT and environmental taxation. It 
will then look into the debt bias created by the tax 
system. Lastly, it covers tax governance issues. 
5.3.1. Reducing tax expenditure in direct 
taxation 
Measuring the size of tax expenditure 
While bearing in mind the methodological 
constraints related to the difficulty of clearly 
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determining what constitutes tax expenditures (see 
discussion in Chapter 4), this sub-section very 
tentatively compares the size of tax expenditures in 
direct taxation across countries, using a set of 
‘macro’ indicators. While the latter remain very 
crude and fragile measures of the size of tax 
expenditures, especially in the area of personal 
income tax, they usefully provide a first order of 
magnitude and allow a first cross-country 
comparison. More precise estimates from Member 
States, based on microeconomic studies, would be 
welcome in this respect, albeit not available for all 
countries and not consistent across countries. 
Two different approaches are followed. First, 
OECD estimates of tax expenditures (as a % of 
GDP) are presented. (194) These figures are based 
on national authorities’ information, augmented by 
OECD estimates where deemed necessary for a 
comparison across countries. Unfortunately, such 
information on tax expenditure collected by the 
OECD is available for only eight out of 17 euro-
area Member States. Furthermore, it remains 
subject to limited comparability between countries, 
given the above-mentioned difficulties in defining 
tax expenditure. 
The results of a second approach are therefore 
presented. The method provides a simple, intuitive 
and robust indication of tax expenditures and is 
available for all Member States. It consists in 
comparing countries’ major statutory rates with 
estimates of ‘actual’ (effective or implicit) tax 
rates. Alternatively, statutory rates can be 
compared to the share of personal or corporate 
income tax revenues in GDP via an approach 
whereby each country is ranked with respect to the 
two indicators of the tax burden. In principle, this 
serves to make the magnitudes of the two 
indicators comparable. However, given that due to 
its generally progressive nature it is difficult to 
derive a universal statutory rate for personal 
income tax, the comparison of statutory and 
implicit personal income tax rates will be 
performed using the more robust ranking approach 
only, rather than comparing them numerically. 
Any strong discrepancy in a country’s ranking 
with respect to the statutory rate on the one hand 
and the empirical indicators of the tax burden on 
the other will signal a large tax gap, which could 
 
                                                          
(194) See OECD (2010c). 
be explained either by the number of tax 
expenditures or the size of the shadow economy 
(or both). However, the indicated tax gap may also 
partly capture tax rules that lead to lower revenues 
but belong to the benchmark tax system and 
cannot, thus, be considered as tax expenditures. 
This is the case of the general tax exemption of 
income up to a certain threshold. At the same time, 
this overestimated approximation should not 
systematically affect the position of countries 
using the ranking approach. Where the shadow 
economy in a given country is small, as signalled 
by a set of evidence (see also section 5.3.4), the 
existence of sizeable tax expenditures (in a broad 
sense) would be suggested. For corporate income 
tax, the numerical gap between the properly 
defined top statutory rates and the 
effective/implicit rates will also be presented as 
such. (195) Again, the difficulties in distinguishing 
tax expenditures from tax rules within the 
benchmark system remain unsolved. 
The two different approaches seem to provide a 
fairly consistent picture. Looking at tax 
expenditure concerning personal income taxation 
first, the OECD figures presented in the left-hand 
columns of Table 5.10 point to high foregone tax 
revenues in Greece, Spain, Italy, Austria and, to 
some extent, also in Belgium. In addition, country-
specific studies by the OECD point to significant 
levels of tax expenditure also for France and 
Portugal. (196) 
The columns in the middle of Table 5.10 compare 
a rough (mechanical) estimation of average 
statutory tax rates on personal income with 
indicators of the ‘actual’ tax burden, i.e. implicit 
tax rates on (employed) labour and shares of 
  
                                                          
(195) In the case of corporate income taxes, the gap indicator is 
also subject to influences by the business cycle and by the 
different treatment of losses in national accounts (used for 
the calculation of implicit tax rates) and tax rules (loss 
carry forward and back).  
(196) As argued in OECD (2011a), tax expenditures play an 
important role in the French tax system, with around 500 
tax expenditures in 2010. In terms of magnitude, French 
government estimates suggest foregone revenue of 4 % of 
GDP in 2008. However, according to a report by the Court 
of Auditors (Cour des Comptes, 2010), the revenue loss 
could be twice as large. The OECD country survey for 
Portugal refers to expense-related tax credits in personal 
income taxation amounting to around 1 % of GDP or 17 % 
of personal income tax revenue in 2007 (see OECD, 
2010e). 
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personal income tax revenues in GDP across 
countries. (197) 
As explained above, to make the magnitudes of the 
figures comparable and the analysis robust to the 
assumptions underlying the computation of the 
average statutory rates, the comparison is only 
                                                          
(197) To make the analysis consistent, only the share of personal 
income tax paid on labour employed is used. The revenue 
from personal income taxes on self-employed income or 
transfer income is also not taken into account in the 
calculation of the implicit tax rate on labour (computed 
only on employed labour). The share of revenues from self-
employed and the taxation of transfer and pension 
payments in total personal income tax revenues varies a lot 
between countries. It can be very high, e.g. in the case of 
Italy, and such a high share would lead to an 
underestimation of the ranking gap.  
made on the basis of a country ranking. (198) 
Among euro-area countries, large positive ranking 
gaps emerge for Greece, Spain, France, Cyprus, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia. 
These results are robust to the assumptions 
underlying the computation of the average 
statutory rates. 
Large foregone revenue as implied by large 
positive gaps between the ranking in terms of  
  
                                                          
(198) The true weighted average statutory rate depends on the 
progressivity of the tax schedule and the income 
distribution (the amount of income in each income 
bracket). Nonetheless, sensitivity analysis shows that the 
main result in terms of ranking gaps, especially for 
countries experiencing a high ranking gap, is fairly robust 
to the way the average statutory rate is estimated. 
 
Table 5.10: Estimates of tax expenditures, personal income tax 
in % personal income 
tax revenues  in % GDP
between statutory and 
implicit rates 
 between statutory 
rate and revenues as 
% GDP 
Size in % of GDP 
(2010) 
Undeclared work 
(share of GDP or 
employment, 2002-
2006)
BE 12.4 1.7 1 0 17.9 21.5
DE 5.7 0.6 0 -1 14.7 6.0
EE -6 -8 29.9 8.0-9.0
IE -4 -3 13.2 28.6
EL 21.4 1.0 7 9 25.2
ES 34.6 2.4 5 5 19.8 20.9
FR 6.7 0.8 6 10 11.7
IT 40.4 4.7 1 -1 22.2 14.8-16.7
CY 4 -1 26.8
LU -4 -5 8.8
MT 0 -1 26.0
NL 1 6 10.3
AT 30.0 2.8 6 2 8.7 11.0
PT 4.3 0.3 11 11 19.7 22.5
SI 5 4 25.0 17.0
SK 2 2 17.3 13-15
FI -3 -2 14.3 4.2
BG 0 1 32.9 22-30
CZ -6 17.2
DK 1.7 0.5 0 0 14.4 5.5
LV -9 -8 27.3 11.7
LT -7 -6 30.0 15-19
HU -8 -3 23.8 15-20
PL 10.8 0.6 6 8 26.1
RO 2 0 30.2 30.0
SE 0 0 15.6 4.5
UK 20.1 2.2 -5 -9 11.1 1.7
EU-27 15.1 1.5 15.9 7.9
EA-17 15.9 1.6 16.0 9.1
Shadow economy
Country
Ranking gaps (2009)Tax expenditures (1)
Note: (1) Tax expenditure estimates taken from the OECD refer to 2009 (Italy and Spain), 2008 (Germany, France and the Netherlands), financial year 
2007-08 (UK), 2007 (Portugal), 2006 (Denmark, Austria and Greece) and 2005 (Belgium). The ranking gap is the difference in the descending ranking 
of countries with respect to the statutory rate and the other indicators of the actual tax burden (implicit tax rate, personal income tax revenues on 
employed labour as a share of GDP). A high ranking gap thus corresponds to cases where a high statutory rate contrasts with a lower level of an 
indicator measuring the ‘actual’ tax burden, thus pointing to large revenues being foregone through tax expenditures. The statutory rates correspond to 
a crude — albeit simple and transparent — estimation of the average statutory rates, assuming a linear distribution of marginal rates between a basic 
tax allowance (0 % rate) and the top marginal rate. 20 % of total taxable incomes is assumed to be subject to the top marginal rate, 20 % of total 
incomes is assumed to benefit from the basic tax allowance. The exception is Bulgaria, which has a flat tax with no allowance. It should be noted that 
calculations do not take into account special personal income tax rates on specific labour income such as the lower tax rate on the 13th and 14th salary 
in Austria. The true weighted average statutory rate depends on the progressivity of the tax schedule and the income distribution (the amount of 
income in each income bracket). A sensitivity analysis, randomising the country-specific weights of the two extreme statutory rates, shows that the 
main result, i.e. the list of countries experiencing a high ranking gap, is fairly robust to the way the average statutory rate is estimated. 
Source: Commission services, OECD (2010c), Schneider (2010), Employment Committee (EMCO) and Eurostat. 
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statutory rates and the ranking in terms of implicit 
rates or personal income tax revenue shares can 
point to either special tax provisions or the 
existence of large shadow economies (or both). 
The indicators presented to the right of the table 
point to relatively large shadow economies for 
Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Slovenia, thus 
partly explaining the gap between (high) statutory 
tax rates and (low) tax receipts. However, the 
OECD estimates discussed earlier confirm the 
existence of substantial tax expenditures in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. (199) 
Altogether, according to both OECD estimates and 
the proposed ranking approach, personal income 
taxation appears to be subject to high tax 
expenditure in Greece, Spain, France, Austria and 
Portugal. However, more euro-area countries 
might be concerned, given that the estimates of tax 
expenditure compiled by the OECD cover only 
less than half of the euro-area Member States. 
                                                          
(199) For Portugal according to OECD (2010e). 
Regarding corporate tax revenues, the left-hand 
columns of Table 5.11 point to high (above euro-
area) tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP for 
Belgium, Spain, France and Italy. The subsequent 
columns of the table present a comparison of (the 
ranking of) adjusted top statutory corporate income 
tax rates with implicit (200) and effective (201) tax 
rate estimates and corporate income tax revenue 
shares in GDP. (202) 
Both the direct comparison of statutory and 
implicit/effective rates and the comparison on the 
                                                          
(200) Implicit tax rates are based on national accounts data and 
are computed as an average over 2004-2008 to account for 
substantial (cyclical) year-on-year variation in these 
estimates.  
(201) The comparison on the basis of effective tax rates suffers 
from the fact that the latter are computed for 
‘representative’ firms, i.e. typically larger enterprises, such 
that tax rules targeted at SMEs are typically not reflected in 
the estimated effective rates. It is partly due to this that, in 
most cases, estimated effective tax rates are higher than the 
corresponding implicit tax rates, leading to smaller gaps 
with respect to statutory rates for effective as compared to 
implicit rates.  
(202) Unlike for personal income tax, all taxation at rates below 
the top statutory rate could be considered as tax 
expenditure.  
 
Table 5.11: Estimates of tax expenditures, corporate income tax 
 in % 
corporate 
income tax 
revenues
in % GDP
Statutory 
corporate tax 
rates (2009)
Implicit tax 
rate (2004-
2008 average)
Effective tax 
rate (2009)
Corporate 
income taxes 
as % of GDP 
(2009)
 between 
statutory and 
implicit rates 
between 
statutory and 
effective rates 
 between 
statutory and 
implicit rates 
between 
statutory and 
effective rates 
between 
statutory rate 
and revenue 
as a % GDP 
BE 22.2 0.8 34.0 21.8 24.7 2.5 12.2 9.3 5 4 8
DE 0.6 0.0 31.0 28.1 2.0 2.9 -1 15
EE 21.0 6.7 17.6 1.8 14.3 3.4 5 3 6
IE 12.5 9.5 14.5 2.5 3.0 -2.0 -5 -1 -12
EL 4.5 0.1 25.0 18.4 22.0 2.4 6.6 3.0 3 2 2
ES 22.6 0.6 35.7 45.7 33.0 2.3 -10.0 2.7 0 1 15
FR 9.5 0.5 34.4 27.9 34.9 1.3 6.5 -0.5 0 -2 24
IT 18.4 0.7 31.1 26.4 27.5 3.4 4.7 3.6 0 1 0
CY 10.0 10.6 6.5 -0.6 0 -24
LU 28.6 25.2 5.5 3.4 0 -4
MT 35.0 32.4 6.7 2.6 1 -1
NL 25.5 12.0 23.8 2.1 13.5 1.7 6 -3 7
AT 4.5 0.1 25.0 24.5 22.9 1.9 0.5 2.1 -6 0 9
PT 3.9 0.1 26.5 20.7 23.8 2.9 5.8 2.7 2 0 -2
SI 21.0 29.2 19.3 1.8 -8.2 1.7 -15 0 8
SK 19.0 21.6 16.9 2.7 -2.6 2.1 -11 0 -12
FI 26.0 18.5 23.7 2.0 7.5 2.3 4 0 9
BG 10.0 18.9 8.8 2.7 -8.9 1.2 -12 1 -16
CZ 20.0 26.0 17.7 3.6 -6.0 2.3 -13 -1 -15
DK 18.3 0.8 25.0 26.7 22.7 2.5 -1.7 2.3 -9 1 1
LV 15.0 11.9 13.9 1.6 3.1 1.1 -5 1 2
LT 20.0 9.4 16.9 1.8 10.6 3.1 2 2 5
HU 21.4 17.7 19.6 2.3 3.7 1.8 1 0 1
PL 19.6 0.5 19.0 19.9 17.6 2.3 -0.9 1.4 -8 -2 -3
RO 16.0 14.9 2.6 1.1 0 -12
SE 26.3 20.1 23.3 3.0 6.2 3.0 2 2 -4
UK 11.9 0.4 28.0 23.0 28.5 2.8 5.0 -0.5 0 -4 0
EU-27 9.4 0.3 29.6 20.2 27.7 2.3 2.8 1.9
EA-17 9.1 0.3 31.0 19.8 28.7 2.2 2.8 2.3
Ranking gapTax expenditures (1)
Country
Measures of the tax burden Gap
Note: see Table 5.10. The ranking gap is the difference in the descending ranking of countries with respect to the statutory rate and the other indicators 
of the tax burden. A high ranking gap thus corresponds to cases where a high statutory rate contrasts with a lower level of an indicator measuring the 
‘actual’ tax burden, thus pointing to large tax expenditures. 
Source: Commission services, OECD (2010c). 
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basis of countries’ rankings points to large 
foregone corporate income tax revenue in 
Belgium, (203) Estonia, (204) Greece and the 
Netherlands. Other euro-area countries with 
indications of large corporate income tax 
expenditures are France, (205) Spain, Italy, Portugal 
and Finland, with at least two of the indicators 
displaying above euro-area values. 
Overall, again subject to the limited availability of 
OECD estimates, high tax expenditure in corporate 
income taxation is suggested according to both 
approaches in Belgium, Spain, France and Italy. 
Reduced tax rates for incorporated SMEs: the 
need for a cautious economic approach 
Throughout the past decades, European 
incorporated SMEs (206) have been strongly 
associated with entrepreneurship, economic 
growth and job creation. This has led Member 
States to search for ways of encouraging growth, 
investment and innovation, as well as fostering the 
competitiveness of small businesses. As a result, 
among other measures, special tax rules favourable 
to SMEs have been introduced by several euro-
area Member States (in particular Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Portugal). (207) 
                                                          
(203) In Belgium, the results partly reflect the application of the 
‘Allowance for Corporate Equity’ approach to address the 
discrimination between debt and equity financing due to 
the tax system. 
(204) In Estonia, the results partly reflect the fact that only 
distributed profits are taxed. The indicated revenue 
foregone thus largely reflects features of the benchmark 
system rather than tax expenditure. 
(205) In France it is particularly the large ranking gap between 
the (high) statutory corporate income tax rate and the (very 
low) share of corporate income tax revenues in GDP that is 
suggestive of substantial special tax rules reducing the 
‘real’ tax burden for corporations. 
(206) On 6 May 2003 the Commission adopted Recommendation 
2003/361/EC on the definition of SMEs. In addition to the 
staff headcount ceiling (less than 250 employees), an 
enterprise qualifies as an SME if it meets either the 
turnover ceiling (less than € 50 million) or the balance sheet 
ceiling (less than € 43 million), but not necessarily both.  
(207) Under state aid rules, specific rules on the taxation of 
SMEs are comparable to the underlying progressiveness of 
a tax scale and, therefore, may be justified by the ‘logic of 
the system’ and thus do not constitute state aid. Where such 
a justification does not apply, the introduction of 
favourable tax measures for SMEs raises the question of 
their compatibility with the EU state aid rules. This may 
require prior notification of the proposed tax measures to 
the Commission, which will assess their compatibility with 
Compared to the United States, the number of 
small firms is higher in the EU and, in particular, 
micro enterprises (1-9 employees) account for a 
substantially larger share of firms and employment 
in the EU. Also, in the US the more productive 
SMEs have a stronger tendency to increase their 
market shares and grow than in the EU. Against 
this background, the European Competitiveness 
Report 2008 finds that barriers to growth pose the 
biggest problem for businesses in the EU. (208) 
Encouraging the growth potential of SMEs is one 
of the primary objectives of the Small Business 
Act (SBA), which is a key component of the EU’s 
Growth and Jobs Strategy. (209) 
Only a rather limited number of euro-area Member 
States provide tax incentives for small business in 
the form of reduced corporate income tax rates. 
Table 5.12 shows the various approaches used by 
governments to preferentially tax SMEs. In 
particular, it provides an overview of reduced rates 
targeted at small businesses in comparison with the 
standard corporate income tax rates and the 
eligibility criteria applied in the respective 
countries, which are in general not the criteria used 
to define SMEs. The most common approach is to 
make use of policy adjustments at the corporate 
level by means of a reduced income tax rate. While 
some Member States (Belgium, Luxembourg) 
apply reduced corporate tax rates to SMEs with 
taxable income or profits below a specific 
threshold, others rely on a turnover criterion to 
determine the eligibility for reduced rates (France, 
Spain). Yet other countries (the Netherlands, 
Portugal) make use of a progressive corporate 
income tax system, in which lower rates apply to 
profits below a specific tax bracket, with all 
companies benefiting from the lower rate. 
Allowing all companies to benefit from a lower 
income rate on profits below a certain threshold 
avoids ‘the barrier to grow’ problem. The latter is 
particularly important in Europe as compared to 
the US, given the difficulties faced by small 
                                                                                   
the internal market with a view to avoiding both distortions 
of competition and negative effects on trade. See European 
Commission (1998), C 384/3, paragraph 24. 
(208) See European Commission (2008a), Chapter 3. 
(209) Commission Communication ‘Think Small First — A 
Small Business Act for Europe’ — COM(2008) 394. 
5. Tax policy challenges in euro-area Member States in difficult times 
 
103 
European firms in trying to expand and grow. (210) 
On the other hand, however, this approach leads to 
substantial revenue losses as all companies, 
including large companies, benefit from it without 
the lower band rate having positive incentive 
effects for many of them. In order to overcome 
these challenges, the definitions used to target 
special tax rules for SMEs are often based on a 
variety of factors. 
For example, in Belgium, the lower corporate 
income tax rate(s) apply not only to profits below a 
special threshold (as in the case of Luxembourg or 
Portugal), but companies also need to fulfil 
requirements regarding their activities, the 
shareholding, the dividend yield, and the 
remuneration of their managers. However, 
companies with profits above € 322 500 do not 
benefit from the lower tax rates because the 
specific tax rate structure leads to the tax 
advantage being phased out in the profit range 
between € 90 000 and € 322 500.  
As regards Portugal, the recent Memorandum of 
Understanding between Portugal and the EC, the 
ECB and the IMF on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality provides for all reduced corporate 
income tax rates to be abolished in the fiscal year 
2012. (211) 
The main question is whether these particular 
reliefs targeted at small businesses actually achieve 
their objective in terms of equity and efficiency, or 
in fact mainly result in distortions and additional 
complexity of the tax system. On the one hand, 
reduced rates for SMEs encourage them to become 
incorporated and, thus, participate in the formal 
economy (212), as well as to report the amounts 
required to determine the true tax base. On the 
other hand, a complex tax system is seen as a 
major disadvantage in particular for small 
businesses, given the regressivity of compliance 
costs. (213) By reducing these costs and thereby 
lowering the overall tax burden on SMEs, 
simplification provisions can help achieve 
additional efficiency gains, while generating more 
 
                                                          
(210) Equally important are the measures to ensure more 
competition and easier exits of unsuccessful SMEs. 
(211) See European Commission (2011g). 
(212) See Schneider and Klinglmair (2004). 
(213) For more details on compliance cost analysis studies, see 
Sandford et al. (1989). 
tax revenues. Overall, this implies the existence of 
a trade-off between simplicity and revenue 
loss/distortions. 
On the negative side, tax relief measures for small 
businesses in the form of reduced corporate 
income tax rates are also associated with several 
disadvantages. (214) In particular: (i) they may 
involve revenue loss; (ii) they may alter the choice 
of business organisation, due to strategic behaviour 
in the start-up phase (215); (iii) they may give rise 
to tax avoidance, by reorganising the business 
activity in order to grasp certain tax incentives 
(e.g. by breaking up a business into small entities 
in order to benefit from the special tax treatment of 
SMEs); (iv) they may act as a barrier to growth, as 
business developments imply high marginal tax 
rates when growing above the threshold; (v) they 
may result in overall economic inefficiency due to 
misallocation of resources to less efficient firms; 
and, last but not least, (vi) they may create 
distortions of competition, as a result of an uneven 
tax playing field, and constitute state aid, the 
compatibility of which would need to be assessed 
by the Commission on the basis of Member States’ 
prior notification. 
Therefore, the different objectives of special tax 
rules for SMEs may conflict with each other (e.g. 
tax equity vs. system simplicity; improving 
revenue collection vs. providing incentives for 
SME growth). Given national circumstances (216), 
specific policy objectives and the overall 
heterogeneity of the SME sector, the possible 
outcomes of providing special tax incentives to 
SMEs can be very different from one country to 
another, precluding any ‘one size fits all’ 
approach.  
This conflict of objectives makes a strong case for 
a careful and economically-minded approach. This 
could be summed up in three operational policy 
conclusions, against which existing schemes 
should be reviewed. 
                                                          
(214) For a more detailed discussion of these challenges, see e.g. 
OECD (2008b). 
(215) Da Rin et al. (2010) find strong evidence that lower 
corporate income taxation decreases the capital size of 
entrants and their capital intensity (‘extensive margin’). At 
the same time, it induces the entry of smaller and weaker 
firms (‘intensive margin’). 
(216) In many countries, there is also a strong sub-national 
dimension, with local governments levying taxes on SMEs. 
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Table 5.12: Reduced corporate income tax rates for small 
businesses (2011) 
Standard 
rate
Reduced rates for 
small businesses or 
second lower rate
Companies that fulfil a 
number of conditions 
relating to the activities of 
the company, the 
shareholding of the 
company, the rate of return 
of distributed profits and 
the remuneration of their 
managers benefit from the 
following rates:
24.25% profits of up to €25,000
31%
profits between €25,000 
and €90,000
34.5%
profits between €90,000 
and €322,500
FR 33.33% 15%
Businesses with an annual 
turnover no greater than 
€7.63 million. Only the first 
€38,120 profit per annum 
can benefit; for higher 
profits the standard rate 
applies
21% 20%
25%
Companies with a turnover 
below €10 million, up to a 
taxable base of €300,000; 
for profits exceeding € 
300,000 the 30% rate 
applies (1)
20%
In 2009-2011: micro-
enterprises with a turnover 
less than €5 million, 
employing fewer than 25 
employees and maintaining 
or increasing employment, 
applicable to the tax base of 
€300,000
NL 25% 20% On the first €200,000 of profits per annum
25% 12.5%
Corporate income tax
Country
Eligibility criteria for 
reduced rates / thresholds 
for lower rates
BE 33%
+ 3% crisis tax on income tax rate
PT (2) Taxable income of up to €12,500a municipal surcharge of up to 1.5% on 
the taxable profit may apply
LU Taxable base up to €15,000 per annum
a solidarity tax of 5% and municipal 
business tax may apply
ES 30%
Notes: (1) As of 2011, companies in Spain that grow above the limits 
applicable for small companies can benefit from the lower rate for three 
years after losing their small-business status. (2) Prior to the application 
of two corporate income tax rates as of 1 January 2009, a simplified 
scheme for small companies with a reduced rate of 20 % was in place, 
which is being progressively abolished. The Memorandum of 
Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality provides for 
all reduced corporate income tax rates to be abolished as of 2012. 
Source: Commission services, national authorities. 
 
First, creating new tax expenditures should be 
conditional upon an ex ante assessment measuring 
costs and benefits. Likewise, maintaining existing 
tax expenditures on SMEs, after the first few years 
of implementation, would need to rest on the 
conclusion of a regular and sound ex post 
evaluation, rather than on the mechanical carry-
over of past practices. Generally, due to difficulties 
in identifying ex ante and targeting instances of 
market failure, there is a strong case for preserving 
the relative merits of a neutral tax system, and for 
making use of special tax rules for small 
businesses only when the nature of a market failure 
is undoubtedly clear and taxation is found to be the 
best way to correct the specific market failure. 
Second, the tax measures should be as direct as 
possible, precisely targeting the assumed market 
distortion. Given the high fixed cost component for 
small businesses (e.g. simplified accounting and 
return filing requirements), there is scope for 
addressing the aspects of the tax system that have a 
direct effect on SMEs’ start-up and growth. In this 
respect, consideration should be given to 
introducing more targeted measures, also applying 
to small businesses (e.g. simplified and attractive 
depreciation rules, additional incentives to promote 
investment in R&D, and tax exemptions for re-
invested profits). In particular, the incentive 
scheme would promote efforts to consolidate the 
equity base of the business and help the 
implementation of business expansion strategies. 
Targeted measures aimed at directly reducing 
actual compliance costs for SMEs — using the tax 
instrument or not — are also preferable to a 
general tax rate reduction, as they reduce revenue 
shortfall. 
Third, frequent major changes to tax laws and 
regulations create unnecessary complexity, opacity 
and instability and should be minimised as much 
as possible, making sure that small businesses 
operate in a transparent and growth-friendly 
environment. (217) 
5.3.2. Debt bias in direct taxation 
Corporate income tax systems in euro-area 
Member States lead to a debt bias in the financing 
of investment. Moreover, in several Member States  
such a bias is also inherent in the personal income 
tax system via the possibility to deduct interest 
payments for debt used to finance owner-occupied 
housing. 
Debt-equity bias in corporate income taxation 
Most corporate tax systems in the EU favour debt 
financing over equity financing. This happens 
chiefly because interest payments on corporate 
                                                          
(217) For more information, see World Bank and IFC (2011). 
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debt are deductible from taxable profit, while the 
return on equity — whether dividends paid to 
shareholders or capital gains on shares — is not. 
This leads to a tax-induced bias toward debt 
finance. The welfare costs of the bias might not be 
negligible. The marginal deadweight loss of the tax 
distortion is estimated at between 0.1 and 0.2 % of 
GDP. (218) In addition, excessive debt levels 
increase the probability of default and the recent 
financial crisis proved that the costs of adjustment 
can be substantial. 
The current sub-section reviews some evidence of 
the debt bias in euro-area Member States and 
discusses policy options. For a comprehensive 
analysis of the theoretical underpinning of the debt 
bias in corporate finance, see Chapter 4, sub-
section 2.2. 
Graph 5.3 illustrates the favourable treatment of 
debt over equity in the euro-area Member States. It 
presents the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) 
for debt- and equity-financed investment as 
calculated in ZEW (2010). Effective tax rates are 
calculated for artificial average firms operating in 
different sectors. Therefore, they may not be 
representative of the typical or average firm 
operating in a Member State.  
The key message is that fully debt-financed 
investment is subsidised at the margin in most 
euro-area countries. Indeed the subsidy on debt-
financed new corporate investment is calculated at 
11 % on the GDP-weighted euro-area average. It 
was well above this average in Belgium, Greece 
and France (at around 25-30 %), and ranged 
between 5 and 15 % in most euro-area economies, 
including Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. The 
subsidy for debt-financed marginal investment was 
negligible in Ireland, Cyprus and Estonia. Spain 
was the sole country where debt-financed 
investment was not subsidised at the margin. 
Interest deductibility is an important reason (219) 
for making the required marginal return on debt-
financed investment lower than a ‘normal’ post-tax 
return (i.e. on long-term bonds).  
                                                          
(218) Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008). 
(219) Other reasons for this marginal subsidy are accelerated 
depreciation for tax purposes and the deductibility of 
nominal, rather than real, interest rates. 
In contrast, for new equity-financed investment the 
effective marginal rate is positive in all euro-area 
Member States. Most countries display an 
effective marginal tax rate for equity financing 
relatively close to the euro-area (weighted) average 
(32 %). Greece, Spain, Malta and, to some extent, 
France are exceptions on the upside; Belgium and, 
to a lesser extent, Slovakia, Ireland and Cyprus, on 
the downside. 
Graph 5.3: Effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) on debt- and 
equity-financed new corporate investment, euro 
area, 2010 
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includes a surcharge on taxable profits, which was retroactively revoked. 
Source: ZEW (2010). 
The graph also highlights the fact that the gap 
between equity and debt financing is the result of 
both the bias towards debt and the level of EMTRs 
for equity financing. In this respect, also France, 
Malta and Luxembourg exhibit a gap larger than 
the weighted euro-area average, although not as 
wide as in the case of Greece. Cyprus and Ireland 
stand out as the countries with the smallest gap in 
both absolute and relative terms (i.e. with respect 
to the euro-area average). A gap at least 10 % 
lower than the euro-area average can be seen also 
in Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Belgium. 
The individual country trends and the average 
trend for the euro area may not fully explain the  
corporate debt-finance bias, given the existence of 
financing optimisation across countries. The bias 
towards debt increases with the statutory corporate 
income tax rate because more tax is saved at 
higher rates. It also increases with the cross-
country dispersion of statutory corporate income 
rates, because multinationals have an incentive to 
shift debt to high-tax countries. As Graph 5.4 
shows, the statutory euro-area corporate income 
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rate (un-weighted average) fell over the last 
decade. Hence, ceteris paribus, the cost of equity 
declined relative to debt. At the same time, 
however, the relative dispersion of statutory 
corporate income rates has increased in the euro 
area. This, combined with the growth of capital 
flows during the last decade, may then have 
increased the incentives towards debt financing 
through cross-country tax shifting. 
Graph 5.4: Adjusted top statutory corporate income tax, euro-
area average and dispersion (1995-2011) 
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Source: Commission services. 
There are two possible approaches to remove the 
difference in the tax treatment of debt and equity at 
corporate level: (a) remove the deductibility of 
interest payments. This is the approach of the 
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT); (b) 
allow a deduction for the return on equity similar 
to the deduction on interest payments. This is the 
approach of the allowance for corporate equity 
(ACE). Under CBIT all capital returns are taxed. 
ACE exempts from tax the normal return to 
capital. 
CBIT eliminates distortions in corporate finance 
structures, but raises the cost of investment 
financed by debt. At the same time, it broadens the 
tax base, allowing a reduction of corporate income 
tax rates, which spurs investment. However, model 
simulations by de Mooij and Devereux (2011) for 
Europe suggest that CBIT can yield a positive 
macroeconomic effect for a specific country only 
if other countries do not pursue the same policy. 
When all countries apply the same policy, the 
marginal benefit (for a specific country) also 
disappears. Overall, CBIT calls for enhanced tax 
coordination, which may be difficult to achieve 
given strong national preferences in this field. 
ACE transforms the corporate income tax rate into 
a tax on economic rents as it charges corporate 
taxes only on investment projects with a return 
above a ‘normal’ level. Another positive aspect of 
ACE is its neutrality with respect to depreciation 
practices/rules. Indeed, faster depreciation rates 
today for tax-saving purposes would reduce the 
book value of firms’ assets tomorrow, thereby also 
reducing the ACE in the future. The ACE can, 
however, lead to a significant reduction in 
corporate income tax revenues. 
Only a few euro-area countries have experimented 
systems close to an ACE. Between 2000 and 2004, 
Austria experienced a variant of ACE, whereby the 
notional return on investment projects was taxed at 
a reduced rate of 24 % instead of 34 %. In Italy, the 
Dual Income Tax (a variant of ACE), which was in 
place between 1997 and 2003, allowed the notional 
return on investment projects to be taxed at a 
reduced rate of 19 %, while other profits were 
taxed at 37 %. Bordignon et al. (1999) report that 
the Italian reform did achieve a reduction in the tax 
preference for debt finance. Bordignon et al. 
(2001) present effective tax rates, confirming the 
reduction in equity discrimination. These ACE 
reforms were subsequently terminated, mainly 
with the purpose of introducing tax reforms aimed 
at reducing statutory corporate income tax rates. 
Today, in the euro area, only Belgium has a variant 
of ACE in place. With effect from the 2007 tax 
year, it applies a system of notional 
interest/allowance for corporate equity which 
reduces the ‘effective tax rate’ by several 
percentage points. (220) While the corporate income 
tax rate is rather high in Belgium (about 8  
percentage points above the EU average in 2010), 
taxable profits are considerably lower than 
accounting profits. (221) 
                                                          
(220) The exact amount depends on the difference between the 
rate of return and the rate of the notional interest deduction 
(based on the rate on 10-year government bonds). 
(221) This is shown by relatively wide differences between the 
statutory and effective corporate tax rates in the country 
(see e.g. OECD, 2008b; IMF, 2008) and a relatively low 
implicit corporate tax base (IMF, 2008). The importance of 
tax allowances and reductions in Belgium is also evidenced 
by the Paying Taxes 2011 report (PwC et al, 2010), which 
calculates the actual tax rate on corporate income of a 
typical medium-sized company at around 5 %, thus much 
lower than the statutory rate of 34 % (for the EU an actual 
tax rate of below 12 % compares to an average statutory 
rate of above 23 %).  
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Recent empirical evidence indicates that the 
economic benefits of an ACE system are likely to 
accrue primarily to employees. (222) This happens 
because the removal (or reduction) of the tax on 
notional profits is likely to attract more capital 
(inflows), enhancing labour productivity and 
therefore real wages. 
Overall, most tax systems in the euro area offer tax 
advantages chiefly for financing investment via 
debt. The economic crisis has shown that this can 
make corporations more vulnerable to adverse 
financial developments. It also made it clear that 
government adjustment costs may be staggering. 
Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence also 
call for more tax neutrality, or at least less 
preference for debt financing. Viable policy 
options are to reduce or eliminate interest rate 
deductions from taxes (CBIT) or introduce an 
ACE. Euro-area Member States which exhibit a 
significant bias towards debt-financing investment 
should take appropriate measures to address the 
debt bias in their tax system. 
Debt bias in the taxation of housing 
The tax treatment of housing investments also 
tends to be debt-biased in several Member States. 
It is particularly the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments (or even capital payments) that 
favour debt. This type of tax relief is considered to 
have contributed to the increase in housing prices 
and debt leverage, and thereby to the housing 
market bubble. There is evidence that countries 
that favour homeownership through favourable tax 
treatment of mortgage debt financing also have 
higher ratios of mortgage debt to GDP. 
Conversely, analyses of past tax reforms show that 
reducing mortgage interest relief has resulted in 
lower mortgages in relation to the house 
value. (223) 
At present, 10 out of 17 euro-area Member States 
subsidise interest payments for owner-occupied 
housing. The rules vary considerably between 
them. Only three of these Member States (the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium) explicitly 
tax imputed rental income, but in all cases 
considerably below a level corresponding to the 
current market value of the house. Spain also taxes 
                                                          
(222) See e.g. Arulampalam et al. (2010). 
(223) See Keen et al. (2010). 
imputed rents but has an exemption for the main 
residence. An overview of the situation in the 
euro-area Member States is provided in Table 
5.13. 
 
Table 5.13: Tax treatment of owner-occupied housing 
Country Mortgage interest deductibility Tax on imputed rents
BE
Yes. All of the payment (interest, 
insurance, and capital repayment) 
can be deducted up to a ceiling of 
€2,770 for the first 10 years, and 
€2,080 thereafter.
Yes. For the main dwelling, the 
imputed rental income is subject to 
an immovable witholding tax, while 
the income tax is levied on the 
income from other properties. The 
assessed value of the property is 
based on 1975 values, which has 
been indexed to the development of 
the CPI since 1991. Thus, the 
assessed value is on average below 
half of the market value.
DE No. No.
EE Yes. No.
IE
Yes, but to be phased out by 2017. 
Relief of 20% on the interest on 
qualifying loans for 7 tax years, 
(higher rates for first homebuyers). 
Mortgage interest relief is restricted 
to €3,000 for singles and €6,000 for 
married/widowed taxpayers.
No.
EL
Yes.  For mortgage loans taken 
after 2002, a credit of 20% of the 
annual mortgage interest on the 
principal home is granted (on the 
first €200 000 of the loan).
No.
ES
Yes. 7.5% of amounts paid for the 
house (repair, mortgage etc.) up to 
a max €9 015.  As of 2011, 
removed for incomes above 
€24170.
Not on the principal dwelling, but 
on other than the habitual 
residence.
FR
No (2007-2009 Tax credit for 
interest on loan for principal 
residence for 5 years. The credit 
was equal to 20% of the interest 
payment up to €3,750 per year, 
increased by €500 per year for each 
dependent person. The limits are 
doubled for couples).
No
IT
Yes. Interest on mortgage loans for 
building or buying the principal 
residence is subject to a tax credit 
equal to 19% of interest payments 
up to a maximum of €4,000 (i.e. 
maximum annual tax credit of 
€760).
No. (Not on owner-occupied 
dwellings.)
CY No. No.
LU
Yes, with a ceiling of the tax 
deduction at €1500 per person in 
the household. Reduced to €750 
after 12 years of occupancy. No tax 
deductability on secondary homes.
Yes, at marginal tax rate but valued 
below market value.
MT No. No.
NL
Yes, fully. Yes. Imputed rent is below 1% of 
the property value (i.e. 0.55% of a 
€1million detached house, higher 
for more expensive properties). 
AT No. No.
PT
Yes, tax credit of 30% of interest 
and principal repayments on loans 
for permanent residence.
No.
SI No. No.
SK No. No.
FI
Yes. Deductible from capital 
income. Beyond that, 28% of the 
deficit due to interest on owner 
occupied dwellings up to €1,400 
can be credited against taxes paid 
on earned income.
No.
Source: Commission services, OECD, and IBFD (2010). 
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An indicator that measures the wedge introduced 
by the tax relief (reflecting tax systems in 2010) is 
presented in Andrews et al. (2011). It is based on 
calculating the gap between the market interest 
rate and the after-tax debt financing cost, following 
Van den Noord (2005). The indicator takes into 
account the deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments (including potential time limits or 
ceilings) and tax credits for loans, but does not 
include taxation of imputed rents or recurrent 
property taxes. The indicator takes the value of 
zero for those countries that do not subsidise 
mortgage interest payments via a tax deduction 
and thus debt-financed homeownership (i.e. 
Germany, Cyprus, Austria, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). The results indicate that the Dutch tax 
rules are the most generous and favour debt-
financed housing investments most, within the 16 
euro-area Member States for which information is 
available. The Greek and the Finnish systems also 
appear rather generous, rated at about 2/3 of the 
high subsidy level in the Netherlands. The tax 
systems in Luxembourg, Austria and Italy provide 
a more modest tax subsidy (around 1/8), while the 
other four Member States’ systems provide tax 
relief in between these limits in terms of 
generosity. (224) 
With a view to reducing the debt bias of the tax 
system, a number of Member States have recently 
changed their rules on mortgage interest tax 
deductibility and the issue is under discussion in 
some other countries. France replaced the tax 
deductibility of mortgage interest rates in 2010 
with more targeted subsidised loan schemes. Spain 
limited the mortgage deductibility to low-income 
households through the introduction of a ceiling in 
2011, i.e. the deductibility was removed above an 
annual income of € 24 170.20. The possibility to 
deduct part of rent payments for low-income 
households was also introduced to ensure tax 
neutrality between renting and owning a house. 
Ireland is about to phase out interest deductibility 
by 2017, while Estonia has decided to 
simultaneously reduce personal income tax (as of 
2015) and the ceiling for the tax deductibility (in 
2012). The Netherlands has increased the imputed 
rent for a normal detached house (€ 1 million) from 
                                                          
(224) Hemmelgarn et al. (2011) confirm the generosity of the 
Dutch system when calculating an effective personal 
income tax rate on housing covering eight EU Member 
States. 
0.55 % to 0.8 % in 2010 and to 1.05 % in 2011. 
However, this imputed rate remains considerably 
below the 4 % rate that applies for other assets. 
Despite these recent measures to reduce the tax 
subsidy for homeownership and house 
investments, the general picture that Member 
States’ tax systems often tend to favour mortgage 
debt financing of homeownership remains valid. 
Nine euro-area countries (Belgium, Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Finland) still face the 
challenge of a debt-biased tax system favouring 
housing investments. Taxes on imputed rents are 
seldom applied, and if so, either the rate or the tax 
base is too low. Recurrent property taxes could act 
as a second-best solution, but also in this case rates 
and/or the bases are normally too low for the tax to 
reflect rents paid for housing. Moreover, political 
considerations often make it difficult to tax 
property at the level required to make the tax 
system neutral.  
Liquidity constraints of low-income earners and 
the nature of the asset, i.e. an illiquid asset 
providing a necessity service, make it socially 
difficult to treat homeownership in the same way 
as other financial assets. Another option could 
therefore be to reduce the debt bias by reducing the 
interest rate deductibility in the tax systems with a 
view to gradually phasing it out completely. If 
countries want to retain the tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments, the rules should be 
strictly targeted at low-income households and/or 
first-time homebuyers. However, in this case 
subsidised loans — as currently applied in, for 
example, Slovakia and France — could potentially 
be more efficient to target certain categories of 
homebuyers. (225) 
5.3.3. Increasing VAT efficiency 
As discussed in detail in section 2 of Chapter 4, 
from an efficiency perspective VAT should in 
general be levied as far as possible on a broad base 
at a single rate. Member States are free neither to 
multiply the number of rates, nor to arbitrarily 
                                                          
(225) Since 2010, subsidised loan schemes targeted at first-time 
buyers, low-earners, housing shortage areas and the 
purchase of new dwellings have been in place in France. 
These schemes replaced the previous tax relief on 
mortgage interest payments. In Slovakia interest rate 
subsidies are granted to low-income households. 
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grant a reduced rate or exemption to any goods or 
services, but they enjoy wide latitude to determine 
rates. In particular, there is no obligation to adopt 
reduced rates at all; in practice, however, Member 
States do make substantial use of reduced rates and 
exemptions. Denmark is the only Member State 
that does not apply any reduced rates. (226) 
Broadness of VAT base 
To give an idea of the share of consumption 
expenditure benefiting from favourable treatment, 
it is instructive to look at Table 5.14, which 
compares actual VAT revenue with the revenue 
that would accrue if all private consumption (227) 
were taxed at the standard rate and revenue 
effectively collected. (228) This share gives a good 
first indication of the impact of exemptions and 
reduced rates, i.e. of ‘policy efficiency’. However, 
it is also affected by the share of tax evasion or tax 
compliance (‘collection efficiency’), which also 
diminishes the share (unless, due to the existence 
of the informal sector, private consumption is 
understated by national accounts in an equal 
proportion to the share of VAT evasion, which 
seems unlikely). 
Table 5.14 suggests that the impact of reduced 
rates and exemptions is indeed significant, as 
actual VAT revenue is typically some 30-40 % 
below the theoretical total. This figure may be an 
overestimation as it includes (untaxed) imputed 
rents in the indicator base. However, the country 
ranking is largely left unchanged by this 
aspect. (229) Transposing this result into the effect 
                                                          
(226) However, Denmark applies zero rates to supplies such as 
newspapers and exempts supplies such as education and 
passenger transport. 
(227) Note that, although this is a reasonable approximation, 
private consumption is in some respects narrower than the 
VAT base (as the latter includes certain construction work, 
which is classified as investment in the national accounts) 
and in some respects wider than it (some items belonging 
to personal consumption are exempt from VAT, such as 
spending on financial services or on public services). 
(228) This measure is analogous to the ‘C-efficiency’ or the 
‘VAT revenue ratio’ computed by the OECD, see OECD 
(2011b). 
(229) The consumption of housing services by owner-occupiers, 
an item on which VAT cannot be levied, on average 
accounts for slightly less than 12 % of final consumption, 
which is used as a proxy for the potential tax base. On the 
other hand, while this results in a downward bias in the 
ratio, other items tend to boost it, one example being sales 
of residential housing, which yield VAT revenues but are 
not part of final consumption. Overall, excluding 
consumption of housing services by owner-occupiers does 
on the standard VAT rate, as done by the ‘VAT 
reduced rate and base indicator’ (see European 
Commission, 2011a), suggests that on average, 
exemptions and tax evasion together might be 
equivalent to some 5 percentage points of the VAT 
rate. 
While being quite high on average, the impact of 
reduced rates and exemptions varies quite 
significantly among Member States. Although one 
might think, given the accumulating evidence that 
extensive rate differentiation is a costly way to 
achieve redistribution, that more recent members 
of the EU should show a higher share, this is only 
marginally the case — the average for the EU-12 
differed from that of the EU-15 by just a couple of 
points in 2009. Furthermore, the difference 
between the standard and the reduced VAT rate is 
actually somewhat higher, on average, in the EU-
12 than in the EU-15. 
The significant cost of reduced rates — not only in 
budgetary terms, but also in terms of 
administrative and compliance costs — raises the 
question of whether there is any trend to reduce the 
extent of rate differentiation in the EU, particularly 
as the economic and financial crisis has made the 
budgetary situation more acute. The answer to this 
question is, unfortunately, rather uncertain. 
Looking at Table 5.14, data seem to show a 
relatively long-lasting upward trend, from 2001 to 
2007. However, the actual revenue share dropped 
sharply in the following two years. The fact that 
the sharp drop coincided with the recession, 
whereas the previous long rise coincided with a 
long upswing, seems to show that this indicator is 
sensitive to the cycle, making it difficult to judge 
whether the growing trend reflected a gradual, 
structural broadening of the tax base or simply 
stronger economic growth. 
There are a number of good reasons why the 
indicator should be susceptible to cyclical 
developments, even though VAT is a proportional 
tax. First, the extreme depth of the recession is 
likely to have shifted consumption patterns 
towards primary goods, which are normally 
                                                                                   
not have a major impact on the ranking of countries in 
terms of the ratio. An alternative calculation, e.g. the one 
made in the OECD review of France, identifies the same 
countries as having the narrowest VAT base (see OECD, 
2011a, page 17). 
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subject to lower VAT rates. Second, the share 
calculated here is affected (230) by the decline in 
construction activity, which was particularly 
marked in this recession. Third, rising bankruptcies 
reduce the amount of VAT paid, as do inventories 
involuntarily accumulated by businesses during the 
recession. (231) Last but not least, many countries 
have introduced measures aimed at granting 
companies the possibility to defer tax payments, 
including VAT. 
 
Table 5.14: Actual VAT revenues as a percentage of theoretical 
revenues at standard rates 
Country 2001 2005 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009
BE 47.8 50.0 51.3 48.9 47.2 49.1
DE 57.2 54.4 54.5 54.9 54.8 54.7
EE 68.2 75.2 80.1 66.6 69.8 72.2
IE 61.6 67.1 64.2 56.5 46.7 55.8
EL 50.4 43.9 46.2 44.2 37.8 42.8
ES 52.1 56.6 54.9 46.1 35.0 45.3
FR 50.8 50.9 50.7 49.5 46.1 48.8
IT 43.5 40.6 42.8 40.7 37.6 40.4
CY 82.0 89.1 102.0 100.2 77.1 93.1
LU 74.4 89.4 93.4 95.6 92.8 93.9
MT 53.0 58.6 57.7 57.3 56.6 57.2
NL 58.4 58.0 61.8 59.9 54.8 58.8
AT 61.6 60.9 60.8 61.2 61.0 61.0
PT 58.6 52.1 52.6 53.4 44.1 50.0
SI 64.6 66.6 68.7 67.8 62.7 66.4
SK 44.2 61.0 53.2 53.5 47.5 51.4
FI 58.4 60.4 59.9 58.0 55.8 57.9
BG 52.2 66.1 68.9 75.6 64.1 69.5
CZ 43.3 59.3 56.3 58.9 57.3 57.5
DK 60.8 62.7 65.0 62.4 58.6 62.0
LV 49.0 59.8 63.9 48.9 37.9 50.2
LT 51.3 52.1 61.0 57.9 46.7 55.2
HU 48.6 48.6 59.0 56.8 50.1 55.3
PL 40.5 47.5 54.1 50.6 46.8 50.5
RO 41.5 53.9 56.8 56.3 47.5 53.5
SE 52.5 54.9 57.2 58.3 57.5 57.7
UK 47.9 47.7 47.8 45.7 46.4 46.6
EU-27 51.7 51.7 52.5 50.7 47.6 50.3
EA-17 52.9 52.1 52.7 50.7 47.0 50.1
Note: The ratio consists of actual VAT revenues divided by the product 
of the VAT standard rate and net final consumption expenditure, i.e. 
final consumption expenditure minus VAT receipts. A low value of the 
ratio suggests that exemptions, reduced rates, or tax evasion have a 
significant impact. Averages are GDP-weighted. 2007-2009 refers to the 
arithmetic average of the average of the three years. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
                                                          
(230) This is because VAT paid on construction is counted in the 
numerator of the ratio, but is excluded from the 
denominator (not being consumption expenditure). This 
statistical bias ensures that any decline in construction 
activity will tend to have an over-proportional impact on 
the share. 
(231) National accounts data indicate, however, that a destocking 
of inventories took place in 2009. 
The consequence of all this is that the upward 
trend in the share visible until 2007, like its sharp 
subsequent drop, is likely to be at least partly a 
statistical artefact. Indeed, looking at the trends in 
reduced rates, these hardly show any tendency for 
reduced rates to converge to the standard rate in 
the last few years; on the contrary, the difference 
between the average reduced rate and the average 
standard rate has increased slightly in 2010 and 
2011 as reduced rates have failed to keep up 
completely with the increase in standard rates. 
Although base broadening could occur also 
without changes in reduced rates, this can hardly 
explain the scale of the changes. 
Given the cyclical nature of VAT revenues, an 
average of the ratio for the period 2007-2009 will 
be used (232) to assess which euro-area Member 
States face an above euro-area average challenge 
of increasing the share of actual VAT revenues in 
total potential revenues: Italy, Greece, Spain, 
France, Belgium and Portugal. 
Although EU VAT systems retain, to this day, 
significant scope for reduced rates and exemptions, 
the increased need for cost-effectiveness after the 
crisis might still trigger some policy initiatives. 
VAT compliance gap 
As mentioned above, the difference between 
theoretical and actual tax revenue is also due to 
VAT fraud and evasion. It is certainly very 
difficult to quantify this variable. The 2009 study 
by Reckon is the most comprehensive recent report 
attempting to do so. (233) It quantifies and analyses 
the VAT ‘compliance’ gap in the EU-25 Member 
States over the period 2000-2006. The study 
compares accrued VAT receipts with a theoretical 
net VAT liability. This net liability is calculated by 
identifying the categories of expenditure that give 
rise to irrecoverable VAT and combining them 
with appropriate VAT rates. 
                                                          
(232) Using the average of those three years takes both the 
cyclical nature of the indicator into account and 
acknowledges the fact that only data for rather recent years 
should be taken into consideration in order to reflect tax 
reforms as far as possible. 
(233) See Reckon (2009). The report was commissioned by the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Taxation 
and Customs Union and produced by Reckon LLP.  
5. Tax policy challenges in euro-area Member States in difficult times 
 
111 
The study stresses the distinction between VAT 
gap and VAT fraud; though related, they are not 
interchangeable or equivalent measures. 
Discrepancies between these two measures can 
arise because the VAT gap might include VAT not 
paid as a result of legitimate tax avoidance 
measures. Although the VAT gap is estimated on 
the basis of national accounts data, it depends on 
the quality of such data. Finally, the VAT gap 
measure does not remove the VAT that is not 
collected due to insolvencies. The report also 
cautions about the shortcoming of the top-down 
approach used to obtain the VAT gap (i.e. 
comparing total accrued tax receipts with a 
theoretical tax liability derived from general 
economic data), in that it does not help much in 
identifying what sectors and types of business are 
more suited/prone to VAT fraud. 
 
Table 5.15: VAT ‘compliance’ gap, EU-25, in % 
Country 2000 2002 2004 2006
BE 10 13 12 11
DE 12 13 14 10
EE 12 15 21 8
IE 5 3 4 2
EL 24 20 29 30
ES 9 12 8 2
FR 5 7 7 7
IT 22 24 27 22
CY  ---  ---  ---  --- 
LU 12 5 2 1
MT 17 4 14 11
NL 7 9 6 3
AT 13 10 13 14
PT 5 7 8 4
SI 16 13 8 4
SK 27 27 24 28
FI 2 4 5 5
CZ 15 16 13 18
DK 9 8 7 4
LV 31 32 31 22
LT 15 18 28 22
HU 15 25 24 23
PL 22 20 19 7
SE 6 4 4 3
UK 16 17 15 17
EU-25 12 14 14 11
EA-17 12 13 13 10
Note: The study covers the EU-25 Member States. No data is available 
for Cyprus. The VAT gap compares VAT receipts with a theoretical net 
VAT liability. The latter is calculated by identifying the categories of 
expenditure that give rise to irrecoverable VAT and combining them 
with appropriate VAT rates. 
Source: Reckon (2009). 
 
The aggregate VAT gap for the EU-25 (excluding 
Cyprus) was estimated at the level of € 106.7 
billion in 2006, which constituted 12 per cent of 
theoretical liability. The estimates of the VAT gap 
in Table 5.15 show no common trend across the 24 
Member States studied. However, Member States 
joining the EU in 2004 show more widely a fall in 
the estimated VAT gap between 2004 and 2006, 
due perhaps to the effort to gain fiscal efficiency 
and the VAT legislation reforms that this new 
affiliation involved. (234) 
The variable found to have the strongest 
relationship with the size of the VAT gap was the 
one connected with the perceived level of 
corruption in the country. The relationship implies 
that lower perceived corruption is associated with 
a lower VAT gap. The main difference between 
the Reckon analysis and the results obtained by 
other studies is due to the relationship between the 
VAT gap and the VAT burden. If the VAT burden, 
characterised by the ratio between the theoretical 
VAT liability and GDP, is treated as a candidate 
explanatory variable, then the Reckon study finds 
that it has a significant positive relationship with 
the VAT gap. This is in line with the limited 
literature on this topic, and with the theory that a 
higher tax burden should lead to higher levels of 
evasion. However, there was a risk identified that 
this estimated relationship may be biased by 
measurement errors in the estimation of the 
theoretical liability. Once this risk has been taken 
into account by using an instrumental variable 
regression, the Reckon study found no statistically 
significant relationship between the VAT gap and 
the VAT burden. Based on the 2006 results of the 
Reckon study, in particular the following euro-area 
Member States face the challenge of addressing a 
high VAT gap: Greece, Slovakia, Italy, Austria 
and, to a lesser extent, Malta. All these countries 
are characterised by an indicator value higher than 
the weighted euro-area average. 
5.3.4. Towards more environmentally friendly 
taxation 
Environmentally related taxes, in particular energy 
taxes, were often introduced with a fiscal purpose. 
However, as the tax will induce behavioural 
changes it will automatically serve both fiscal and 
environmental purposes. The Europe 2020 
                                                          
(234) Notwithstanding the differences due to the different 
methodology applied and datasets, the authors of the study 
found that Reckon’s estimates of the VAT gap for 
Germany, Italy and the UK follow a similar trend to the 
published estimates for these countries that were computed 
by national tax agencies or statistical offices. 
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Strategy, including its Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, explicitly refers to using market-based 
instruments, including taxation, in the energy and 
climate policy and to work to phase out 
environmentally harmful subsidies. (235) To 
minimise the cost of reaching the agreed EU 
climate and energy policy targets, it is crucial to 
utilise the taxation framework as efficiently as 
possible. This is particularly acute in the context of 
austerity measures and budget consolidation, 
which reduces the possibility to undertake 
environmental policy measures on the expenditure 
side of the budget. It is equally important to ensure 
that the overall policy framework is consistent. 
A first step should therefore be to improve the 
current tax frameworks by ensuring that 
environmentally harmful tax subsidies are phased 
out. Secondly, energy taxes and environmental 
taxes should be designed so that they provide the 
appropriate incentives to reduce emissions, and 
thus provide consistent tax rates between various 
products (e.g. across fuels). There are several 
measures that could be taken at national level to 
improve on existing tax systems. This concerns in 
particular the energy consumption subsidies 
embedded in the VAT regime and the company car 
taxation schemes, as well as the inconsistent 
structure of excise duty rates on fossil fuels. (236) 
Moreover, the environmental objectives as 
outlined in Europe 2020 Strategy call for further 
use of market-based instruments. Environmental 
taxation has an important role to play in this 
context due to its cost-efficiency. However, the 
mix of various environmental policy instruments in 
the context of the policy on resource efficiency is 
beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Reduced VAT on energy 
A broadening of the VAT base, i.e. removing 
reduced rates, zero rates and exemptions, would 
improve efficiency through reducing distortions 
generated by differential treatment while at the 
same time generating more revenue. It is also 
essential to ensure overall consistency across EU 
policy, and to remove environmentally harmful 
subsidies. At present, the Member States have the 
                                                          
(235) European Commission (2010c). 
(236) This list is not conclusive, but highlights common 
structural issues to be improved in the environmental tax 
area. The use of environmental taxes for consolidation and 
tax shifts is covered in section 5.2.2.  
possibility to levy lower VAT rates on electricity 
and natural gas, as well as district heating. This is 
in conflict with the overall ambitions in the energy 
and climate policy as it reduces the consumer price 
of these energy sources and as such reduces 
incentives to undertake energy-saving efforts and 
to reduce energy consumption. Reduced VAT 
could potentially also counteract incentives put in 
place by the excise duties on energy. Moreover, 
excise duties are generally a more economically 
efficient policy instrument when steering towards 
the use of certain fuel or energy sources. 
According to European Commission (2011f), 
Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta (237) and Portugal were reported to tax 
natural gas and electricity at a reduced VAT rate at 
the beginning of this year. Moreover, Belgium, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal apply reduced 
VAT rates on fuel oil and/or solid fuels (European 
Commission, 2011i). Thus, these euro-area 
countries face the challenge to phase out these 
subsidies. Support to vulnerable households could 
potentially be provided more efficiently through 
general welfare payments, rather than broadly 
supporting energy consumption. Energy efficiency 
measures could be a flanking policy to support 
investments in more energy-efficient housing 
and/or appliances. This can be particularly relevant 
if market failures related to energy efficiency 
investments are concentrated on low-income 
households. (238) 
Taxation of company cars 
Company cars are defined as passenger light-duty 
vehicles leased or owned by companies, but used 
by their employees for business or personal travel. 
Copenhagen Economics (2009) conclude that the 
current favourable taxation of company cars in 
many EU Member States is distorting and imposes 
welfare costs on society. These rules tend to 
encourage car ownership and affect the choice of 
car model, as well as driving habits. Roughly 50 
per cent of all new cars sold in the EU in 2008 
were company cars, which implies that these 
schemes have a large and long-term impact on the 
overall composition of the car fleet. According to 
Copenhagen Economics (2009) the private use of 
                                                          
(237) Electricity only, as natural gas supplied by public 
authorities in Malta is defined as outside the scope of VAT. 
(238) Fullerton et al. (2010).  
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company cars has been heavily subsidised in 
several euro-area countries. The subsidy (measured 
as the percentage gap in imputed tax base) has 
been more than 20 % in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain and Portugal. Against this 
background these countries should consider 
reviewing the tax treatment of company cars. 
The company car schemes in particular mitigate 
and counteract the incentives to reduce fuel 
consumption provided through energy taxation. 
The value of the fuel provided by the company is 
difficult to assess correctly for tax authorities. 
Consequently, many countries do not explicitly 
take into account the benefit of the fuel provided 
when assessing the imputed value of the company 
car. This creates incentives to drive the car for 
private purposes, and reduces the marginal cost of 
private trips. According to Copenhagen Economics 
(2009), Austria, Estonia, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain 
and the Netherlands are the euro-area countries 
that do not explicitly include fuel costs when 
calculating the tax base for company cars. (239) 
Thus, these countries face the challenge to review 
their tax systems in this respect and investigate the 
possibility to better mirror the fuel costs in the tax 
base used to calculate the imputed benefit of a 
company car. 
It is also relevant to consider the incentives to buy 
large cars embedded in the company car tax 
regimes, as these vehicles have a detrimental 
environmental impact through increased overall 
fuel consumption. Due to their large share of new 
cars sold, company cars also have an impact on the 
overall composition of the car fleet. Systems where 
the tax base is not proportionally dependent on car 
value can be regarded as providing higher 
subsidies to large cars. The euro-area countries that 
are found to face a challenge to review their 
systems of company car taxation in this respect are 
Austria and Greece. (240) 
Structure of excise duty rates on fossil fuels 
The main historical objective behind excise duties 
on energy is fiscal, even if a number of Member 
States have introduced environmental taxes, 
                                                          
(239) No information is available for Cyprus, Greece or Malta. 
(240) Data is missing for France, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta and 
Ireland. 
including carbon taxes, as part of their 
frameworks. The current Energy Tax Directive 
(2003/96/EC) and its predecessor the Mineral Oil 
Directive (92/81/EEC) mainly aim to avoid 
distortions of competition on the internal market. 
In the current context of budget consolidation 
needs and austerity measures, while facing the 
serious challenge of climate change, it becomes 
crucial to use these taxes to their full extent in the 
climate and energy policy in order to minimise the 
overall cost of the policy. As excise duties are 
levied as a fixed amount on the quantity of energy 
products used, they are suitable for introducing the 
‘polluter pays’ principle and to internalise the 
external cost of carbon emissions. (241)(242) 
The current structures of excise duty rates do not, 
however, normally reflect the environmental and 
energy properties of the various fuels. In fact, the 
current energy tax structures implicitly promote 
fuels that are relatively more detrimental to the 
environment and/or less energy-efficient. (243) It is 
particularly important that the relative tax rates 
rank close substitutes correctly according to their 
environmental and energy properties. A carbon tax 
would be based on the carbon content of the fuel 
and thereby rank the various fuels according to 
their carbon content. A neutral energy tax, in terms 
of promoting energy efficiency equally across 
energy products, would tax the fuels according to 
their energy content. 
The low tax rates on diesel vis-à-vis petrol are a 
preferential treatment favouring the transport 
service sector. It reflects the different tax treatment 
of fuels mainly used for commercial versus private 
use, also partly motivated by tax competition. 
Hence, the low rate on diesel is often combined 
with a higher circulation tax on diesel cars in order 
to try to mitigate the impact of the lower fuel cost. 
The market share of diesel cars has, however, 
increased substantially in the EU since 1995. At 
present their market share is about 60 % and 
expected to increase to 65 % with current policies. 
                                                          
(241) This is due to the fact that CO2 emissions are proportional 
to the carbon content of the fuel and the damage to the 
environment is broadly the same regardless of where 
emissions take place (see e.g. Stern, 2007). 
(242) The situation in terms of energy use differs widely among 
the Member States. Thus, national circumstances will have 
an impact on the formulation of the national energy tax 
policy.  
(243) The Commission proposal to revise the Energy Tax 
Directive (COM(2011) 169) addresses these issues. 
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Model simulations indicate that rebalancing the 
national tax rates on diesel and petrol would help 
to mitigate the expected further growth of the 
market share of diesel cars by maintaining the 
market share at the current level. (244) The rising 
share of diesel cars also has energy security 
implications, as the EU currently imports diesel 
while exporting a surplus of petrol. (245) More 
consistent and neutral taxation of all transport 
fuels, while providing proper incentives for carbon 
emission improvements, would give a neutral 
technology advantage to carbon- and energy-
efficient fuels without favouring certain fossil 
fuels. (246) 
A potential carbon tax on motor fuels would mean 
that the tax rate on diesel would need to be around 
20 % higher than the tax on petrol in terms of 
litres. A tax based only on energy content would 
require a rate around 13 % higher for diesel. A 
combination of these two types of taxes would 
result in a rate which is within this range. (247) In 
contrast, euro-area countries currently tend to 
strongly promote diesel through their relative tax 
rates (see Graph 5.5). Some countries, however, 
provide a larger subsidy to diesel drivers than other 
countries. In particular Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Finland are the euro-area 
countries that face the challenge of reviewing how 
to phase out the preferential tax treatment of 
                                                          
(244) European Commission (2011j). 
(245) European Commission (2010j).  
(246) Diesel cars have currently an advantage due to lower fuel 
use and thereby lower CO2 emissions vis-à-vis a 
comparable petrol car. However, the fact that diesel buyers 
have to a greater extent than petrol buyers shifted to large 
and more powerful cars have significantly counteracted the 
advantage of the lower fuel use. As a consequence, new 
diesel cars, bought in 2009, had only 1.6 % lower emissions 
than petrol cars. Moreover, past emission reductions can 
mainly (95 %) be attributed to efficiency improvements of 
new vehicles (both petrol and diesel), while only a small 
share of the reductions (5 %) is estimated to be due to the 
increased share of diesel cars (see SEC(2011) 409 for a 
discussion and detailed references). 
(247) To achieve a cost-efficient climate policy, a common price 
signal on CO2 emissions is required across sectors and 
countries. Additional taxation on motor and heating fuels in 
order to internalise other externalities, to provide incentives 
for energy efficiency or to generate revenue could be levied 
through a tax based on the energy content of the fuel. The 
Commission proposal (COM(2011) 169) to revise the ETD 
applies this structure and includes a carbon tax component 
of EUR 20 per tCO2. 
diesel, while at the same time providing proper 
incentives for emission reductions. (248)(249) 
Graph 5.5: Diesel/petrol excise duty ratio, January 2011 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
EE CY SI AT IE MT ES IT DE FR LU SK BE PT EL NL FI EU-
27
EA-
17
Source: Commission services. 
Similar inconsistencies also exist in the taxation of 
fossil-based heating fuels. Normally, heating oil is 
taxed heavily, while natural gas and coal have 
relatively low rates. This rate structure is based on 
the tradition of taxing oil heavily, while coal and 
natural gas have been brought into the energy tax 
framework more recently at lower rates. (250) Thus, 
normally coal, but also natural gas, are given a tax 
advantage as a heating fuel. The situation is 
complex as conditions vary considerably between 
Member States according to industrial structure 
and fuel mix. The issue mainly concerns 
businesses falling outside the scope of the 
Emissions Trading System and households. 
Several countries also exempt household 
consumption of heating fuels. There is scope to 
ensure that energy tax rates are more consistent 
across fuels and uses, and that the tax system does 
not unduly favour fossil-based solutions. 
Consistent tax rates are also important in order to 
provide correct framework incentives for 
technology development. 
                                                          
(248) Based on a threshold equal to the euro-area average of 
0.72. 
(249) Some countries apply a higher circulation tax on diesel cars 
in view of the low fuel tax on diesel, e.g. Finland and 
Germany. The share of diesel cars has, however, increased 
also in these countries; see EEA (2011). 
(250) At the level of EU legislation, heating oil was covered by 
the Mineral Oil Directive (92/81/EEC), while natural gas 
and coal have been covered since the adoption of the 
Energy Tax Directive (2003/96/EC). 
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5.3.5. Tax governance issues 
The recent economic crisis has led several Member 
States to step up efforts to fight tax evasion and the 
shadow economy, which are considered to be 
important factors limiting revenue collection. 
Many empirical studies suggest that in particular 
high taxes on labour income (including social 
security contributions), high tax rates on profits, 
and high consumption taxes encourage households 
and other economic actors to move away from the 
formal economy towards more informal 
arrangements. Yet, most of the studies seem to 
confirm the existence of a vicious cycle: tax 
evasion by actors in the informal economy reduces 
the economies of scale and productivity in formal 
companies, distorts the playing field and creates 
unfair competition between formal and informal 
actors, ultimately leading to more informality. (251) 
As a consequence, tax administrations are forced 
to collect more taxes from a shrinking tax base and 
place high tax rates on the income and profits of 
formal businesses in terms of number of taxes, 
number of tax payments and tax burden. (252) Tax 
revenue mobilisation can also be negatively 
affected by policy measures, in particular the 
introduction of tax expenditures, which 
deliberately reduce the tax burden on certain 
economic activities or groups of taxpayers. 
Trends and challenges in tax compliance 
Many researchers have worked on measuring the 
size of the shadow economy, and on analysing its 
consequences for the formal economy. (253) 
According to Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003), the 
shadow economy includes those economic 
activities and the income derived from them that 
circumvent or avoid government regulation or 
taxation. A large share of the shadow economy in 
official GDP can, therefore, be due to the 
avoidance of tax and social security contribution 
                                                          
(251) On the other hand, according to Schneider and Enste 
(2002), at least two thirds of the income earned in the 
shadow economy is immediately spent in the official 
economy, resulting in a considerable positive stimulus 
effect on the official economy. 
(252) See Spiro (2005) and PwC et al. (2010). 
(253) The phenomenon is addressed in the literature under many 
other different names: informal, unofficial, irregular, 
unrecorded, parallel, underground, hidden, invisible, 
shadow, black economy, etc. Work on measuring the 
shadow economy can be found, among others, in Dixon 
(1999), Tanzi (1999), Schneider and Enste (2000) and 
Schneider (2004, 2010). 
payments, but also due to the avoidance of labour 
protection legislation and consumer rights 
protection laws. 
Schneider (2010) argues that the economic crisis 
has had a widespread effect on the shadow 
economy, as the income loss in the formal  
economy was partly compensated by additional 
activities in the informal economy. Economic 
crises are also considered to have a negative effect 
on tax and benefit morale as, e.g., investigated in 
Heinemann (2009) for a set of 20 OECD countries. 
Sancak et al. (2010) show that VAT proceeds are 
significantly affected by changes in tax evasion 
during the business cycle. VAT proceeds are 
reduced during economic contractions, since firms 
and households are more likely to evade taxes 
when they are credit constrained and financially 
distressed. 
Reflecting the difficulties in quantifying the size of 
the shadow economy, different studies come to 
rather different results for some Member States. 
Therefore, available results provide an indication 
of the magnitude of the problem rather than precise 
estimates. 
According to Schneider (2010), the size of the 
shadow economy increased steadily between 2008 
and 2010. In 2010, Estonia had the largest shadow 
economy in the euro area, equivalent to 29.9 per 
cent of its gross domestic product, followed by 
Cyprus, with 26.8 per cent, Malta, with 26.0 per 
cent, and Greece, with 25.2 per cent (see Table  
5.16). While the estimates collected by the 
Employment Committee and Eurostat for the share 
of undeclared work over the period 2002-2006 
provide rather similar estimates for many Member 
States, the results are very different for several of 
them. It is noticeable that Estonia is estimated to 
have a share of undeclared work below the 
European average. 
Given today’s fiscal environment, the incidence of 
tax and social security contribution evasion varies 
considerably across and within the EU Member 
States. It tends to be concentrated in a small 
number of non-tradable sectors. Tax 
administrations have taken action to achieve a 
higher degree of tax compliance, by adopting 
efficient and effective operating practices that 
should not only reduce costs, but also create a 
more favourable environment for voluntary tax 
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compliance. With a view to closing existing 
loopholes and preventing tax evasion more 
effectively, governments face the challenge to 
undertake incentive-oriented policy measures to 
reduce tax gaps, which should pay attention to the 
following three dimensions. (254) 
 
Table 5.16: Size of the shadow economy and undeclared work in 
the EU 
2008 2009 2010
BE 17.5 17.8 17.9 21.5
DE 14.2 14.6 14.7 6.0
EE 29.0 29.6 29.9 8.0-9.0
IE 12.2 13.1 13.2 28.6
EL 24.3 25.0 25.2
ES 18.7 19.5 19.8 20.9
FR 11.1 11.6 11.7
IT 21.4 22.0 22.2 14.8-16.7
CY 26.0 26.5 26.8
LU 8.5 8.8 8.8
MT 25.8 25.9 26.0
NL 9.6 10.2 10.3
AT 8.1 8.5 8.7 11.0
PT 18.7 19.5 19.7 22.5
SI 24.0 24.6 25.0 17.0
SK 16.0 16.8 17.3 13-15
FI 13.8 14.2 14.3 4.2
BG 32.1 32.5 32.9 22-30
CZ 16.6 16.9 17.2
DK 13.9 14.3 14.4 5.5
LV 26.5 27.1 27.3 11.7
LT 29.1 29.6 30.0 15-19
HU 23.0 23.5 23.8 15-20
PL 25.3 25.9 26.1
RO 29.4 29.4 30.2 30.0
SE 14.9 15.4 15.6 4.5
UK 10.1 10.9 11.1 1.7
EU-27 15.2 15.7 15.9 10.7
EA-17 15.3 15.9 16.0 13.0
Country
Size of shadow economy (in % of GDP) Undeclared work (share 
of GDP or employment, 
2002-2006)
Note: The size and development of the shadow economy is calculated 
with the MIMIC (Multiple Indicators and Multiple Courses) estimation 
procedure. The currency demand approach was only used for a few 
countries (Austria, Germany and Poland). These values have been 
calibrated into absolute ones. 
Source: Schneider (2010), Employment Committee (EMCO) and 
Eurostat. 
 
Firstly, the design of the tax system should be as 
neutral as possible as regards the source of 
revenues so as to minimise interference in the 
allocation process. 
Secondly, the quality of governance and better 
understanding of taxpayers’ behaviour are of key 
importance for optimising the overall performance 
of the tax system, and at the same time reduce tax 
administration costs. 
                                                          
(254) See Schneider (2004), and Perry et al. (2007). 
Thirdly, the effectiveness of enforcement activities 
will mainly depend on the resources put into 
detecting breaches of the rules, the penalties 
associated with violating rules, and the extent of 
corruption in the enforcement process. 
As mentioned in sub-section 5.3.2, Reckon (2009) 
provides estimates for the VAT gap in 25 Member 
States, which includes, among other things, fraud, 
legal avoidance (255) and unpaid VAT liability due 
to insolvencies (see Table 5.13). Although the 
exact amount involved in VAT fraud is difficult to 
quantify, it is believed that filing of false returns 
and unauthorised deductions of VAT are a key 
factor in revenue loss. For this reason, some 
Member States have tightened their measures to 
combat VAT fraud, by imposing new obligations 
on taxpayers in the chain of production and 
distribution to submit additional information to the 
tax authorities. 
In addition, new legislative measures have been 
introduced with the goal of improving the 
efficiency of tax administration and controls. 
Similarly, effective project management 
arrangements have been implemented to align tax 
compliance management more closely with 
businesses’ life-cycles, as well as anti-evasion 
plans to restore tax discipline and improve 
compliance. Procedural rules should also be 
strengthened in order to assure an efficient and 
timely tax litigation system. (256) 
However, new innovative forms of evasion are 
constantly under development, often with a high 
degree of sophistication. As a result, fiscal 
cooperation and tax information exchange and 
transparency have been considerably strengthened. 
This has resulted in a large increase in the number 
of bilateral agreements to exchange tax 
information. However, there is still scope for 
further strengthening compliance improvement 
strategies and reinforcing tax legal frameworks. 
                                                          
(255) Although legal, tax avoidance involves the abusive 
exploitation of ‘loopholes’ in national or international laws, 
allowing companies to shift profits from one country to 
another with the intention of reducing the amount of taxes 
they pay. 
(256) Other proposals include: modernising tax processes and 
systems through state-of-the-art information and 
communication technology, integrating tax services and 
operational activities, and streamlining the structures and 
functions of the organisation. 
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In order to identify which euro-area Member 
States face particular challenges in the area of tax 
compliance costs, tax administration costs and the 
effectiveness of tax collection, a wide set of 
indicators is available. The most commonly used 
indicator for the measurement of tax compliance 
costs for small and medium-sized enterprises is the 
‘paying taxes’ indicator (257) published annually by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, the World Bank and 
IFC. According to the latest available information 
for the year 2010, in particular Portugal, Italy, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland have high tax 
compliance costs as compared to the euro-area 
average of 198 hours (see Graph 5.6). 
Graph 5.6: Administrative burden of tax systems for a medium-
sized company 
0
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Note: Total hours to comply across the EU include: corporate income 
tax time, labour income tax time, and consumption tax time. Data for 
Malta are not available. 
Source: PwC et al. (2010). 
Another aspect that is important in the area of tax 
governance is the question of how costly tax 
collection is for the public administration. 
According to OECD (2011c), the average costs of 
tax collection in euro-area countries for which data 
are available amounted to 1.1 (costs per 100 units 
of revenue). No clear trend is discernible for the 
period 2005-2009. (258) In 2009, Cyprus, Portugal, 
Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg were 
characterised by rather high costs of tax collection. 
                                                          
(257) As measured by the time to prepare, file and pay (or 
withhold) corporate income tax, value added or sales tax 
and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social 
contributions, based on a case study company (see PwC et 
al., 2010). 
(258) The trend in the ‘cost of collection’ ratio is influenced by a 
series of factors, such as: (i) changes in tax rates over time; 
(ii) macro-economic changes; (iii) abnormal expenditure 
by the tax administrations; and (iv) changes in the scope of 
taxes. As a consequence, its value as an indicator of 
effectiveness is rather limited. 
Slovakia had high costs in 2007, the latest year for 
which data are available. 
Graph 5.7: Administrative cost per net revenue collection (costs 
per 100 units of revenue, 2007 to 2009) 
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Note: No data available for Greece. Data for Slovakia are limited to year 
2007. 
Source: OECD (2011c). 
Revenues have also been eroded, as poor payment 
compliance and weak enforcement during the 
economic crisis gave rise to a large stock of unpaid 
tax debt. At the end of 2009, the value of tax debt 
for the euro-area countries amounted to 20 % of 
annual net revenue, an increase of 3.4 percentage 
points as compared to 2008. (259) Facing this steep 
increase, the vast majority of national tax 
administrations have significantly reinforced their 
debt collection functions. 
The following two criteria are applied to identify 
those countries that appear to have a particular 
need and scope for improving the revenue 
collection system: (i) the size of the shadow 
economy is estimated to be above the euro-area 
average; and (ii) either the administrative burden 
of tax systems for mid-sized companies, or the 
administrative costs per net revenue collection is 
above the euro-area average. These criteria apply 
to Belgium, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. 
Measures planned: the example of 
programme countries 
Member States under financial assistance 
programmes are a valuable source of information 
given the detailed scrutiny they have received. 
While Ireland did not show special needs in the 
                                                          
(259) Excluding Italy, Luxembourg and Malta due to data 
constraints; un-weighted average; see OECD (2011c). 
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field, the economic adjustment programmes for 
Greece and Portugal state the need to make 
progress in tax administration reform and put an 
end to the de facto impunity for tax evaders, which 
is seen as a crucial priority to gradually limit the 
risks of revenue shortfalls, and also to 
progressively increase fairness in sharing the 
adjustment burden. 
Greece plans to implement a number of additional 
reforms to address its high tax gap in line with the 
economic adjustment programme agreed between 
Greece, the European Commission, the ECB and 
the IMF. (260) In particular, the programme 
includes: (i) specific measures to combat tax 
evasion and tax avoidance (e.g. short-term anti-tax 
evasion plans), (ii) reorganising the audit and 
enforcement mechanisms (by transforming the 
administrative body for tax audits into an 
operational service, instead of advisory bodies, and 
by establishing a central directorate-general for 
debt collection and a large taxpayers unit), (iii) 
strengthening the administrative dispute resolution 
mechanisms and the judicial systems (by setting up 
a fast-track administrative dispute resolution 
process for large dispute cases, making a newly 
created arbitration agency operational and creating 
dedicated court chambers for tax cases) and (iv) 
improving the legal and administrative framework 
(by simplifying and improving the taxation 
framework, as well as correcting distortions and 
facilitating entrepreneurship). 
In Portugal, the Memorandum of Understanding 
on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality 
agreed between the EC, the ECB and the IMF (261) 
includes several measures aimed at improving the 
revenue administration. Among other things, a 
simplification of Portugal’s tax structure will be 
implemented by the end of 2012. The government 
also plans to set up a new entity, by merging the 
tax administration, the customs administration and 
the information technology service. The share of 
total tax administration staff devoted to auditing is 
also to be raised to at least 30 % by the end of 
2012, and a review of audit performance, based on 
both qualitative and quantitative indicators, is to be 
carried out by the end of 2011. Last but not least, 
                                                          
(260) An overview of the revenue effects of key changes in the 
tax system can be found in Greece’s adjustment 
programme. See European Commission (2010i). See also 
European Commission (2011k). 
(261) See European Commission (2011g). 
the MoU calls for specific bottlenecks in the tax 
appeal system to be addressed. 
5.4. OVERVIEW OF TAX POLICY CHALLENGES 
The chapter analysed three types of potential 
challenges that euro-area countries are currently 
facing in the area of tax policy: (i) the need to 
address severe fiscal consolidation challenges also 
on the revenue side, (ii) the need to make the tax 
structure more growth-friendly and (iii) the need to 
improve the design of the tax system for individual 
types of tax. This analysis focused on fiscal and 
efficiency aspects of national tax policies, rather 
than looking at taxation as one of the available 
policy instruments in e.g. environment, labour 
market or innovation policy. Table 5.17 provides a 
synoptic overview of euro-area Member States that 
may need to consider tax policy measures in the 
different areas. 
According to the quantitative screening in section 
5.1, at least three countries (Ireland, Spain and 
Cyprus) could consider making use of taxation — 
in addition to expenditure control — to consolidate 
their public finances and bring them onto a more 
sustainable path (see column one of Table 5.17). 
These countries show unsustainable initial 
budgetary situations (taking account also of 
ageing-related implicit liabilities) but, at the same 
time, appear to have some room for increasing tax 
revenues. Two other euro-area Member States 
(Portugal and Greece) are identified as borderline 
cases, where some room is still available for tax 
revenue increases to respond to fairly demanding 
consolidation needs. Finally, focusing on the initial 
budgetary component of the sustainability gap 
yields Slovakia as an additional country displaying 
both a need and scope for raising tax revenues. 
Clearly, the need to raise tax revenues might also 
be addressed by improving tax compliance and 
administration rather than by discretionary tax 
hikes. It has to be noted that the assessment is 
subject to an implementation risk, in that it is 
based on the projected consolidation path for 2011 
and notably includes the measures agreed — but 
not necessarily implemented yet — under the 
adjustment programmes for countries receiving 
financial assistance. An in-depth assessment of the 
microeconomic effects of increasing specific types 
of tax remains beyond the scope of this report but  
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would be imperative before drawing firm tax 
policy conclusions. 
According to the analysis in section 5.2, about one 
third of euro-area Member States might enhance 
economic growth by shifting their tax structure 
away from labour (Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, Italy; see column two of Table 5.17). In 
these Member States, a high tax burden on labour 
is matched by a relatively low share of revenues 
from consumption and other indirect taxes (such as 
real estate taxes in the case of Germany and 
Finland). Similarly, while the level of consumption 
and overall indirect taxes is already somewhat 
above the euro-area average, increasing housing 
taxation could be a way to alleviate the high tax 
burden on labour in Austria. Any reduction in the 
tax burden on labour should be focused on low-
skilled workers and/or second earners, given that 
these groups often face particularly strong 
disincentives to work. 
Moreover, high tax burdens on vulnerable groups 
in the Netherlands and Slovenia might call for re-
profiling labour taxation away from low-skilled 
workers and second earners towards other 
categories of taxpayers. Given the room for 
increasing the level of indirect taxation in the 
Netherlands and of recurrent housing taxation in 
Slovenia, shifting taxes away from labour income 
of vulnerable groups towards indirect/housing 
taxes might also be considered. 
Apart from the countries mentioned so far, six 
others (Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovakia) either have low revenue shares 
from consumption/indirect taxes or display below-
average implicit tax rates on consumption (or 
both). Optimising tax structures through revenue-
neutral tax shifts might be indicated in these cases, 
even if the tax burden on labour is not excessive 
from a euro-area perspective, particularly where 
room for higher consumption taxes is accompanied 
by unsatisfactory labour market performance. 
Section 5.3 analysed more specific challenges, 
related to the design of individual types of tax. 
As argued in Chapter 4, tax expenditures lower the 
efficiency of the tax system. The combined 
analysis of OECD estimates of tax expenditure and 
a comparison of statutory and ‘actual’ tax rates in 
sub-section 5.3.1 is suggestive of a need to review 
tax expenditure in either personal or corporate 
taxation (or both) in Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Austria and, according to a country- 
specific study by the OECD, also in Portugal. 
However, several other euro-area countries are 
likely also concerned by this challenge, given that 
 
Table 5.17: Overview table: Tax policy challenges in euro-area Member States 
Reduced 
VAT on 
energy
Company 
car 
taxation
Excise duty 
rates on 
fossil fuels
BE X X X X X X X X
DE X X X
EE X
IE X X
EL (X) X X X X X X X X
ES X X X X X
FR X X X X X X
IT X X X X X X X
CY X X
LU X X X X X
MT X X X
NL (X) X X
AT (X) X X X
PT (X) X X X X X X X
SI (X) X X
SK (X) X X X X
FI X X X
Tax 
governance 
challenges
More environmentally friendly 
taxation: ReviewContribution 
of tax 
increases to 
consolidation
Country
Need and 
room for 
tax shift
Cutting tax 
expenditure 
in direct 
taxation
Debt bias in 
corporate 
taxation
Debt bias in 
housing 
taxation
Increasing 
VAT 
efficiency
Note: (X) depicts borderline cases, i.e. where the applied criteria or sub-criteria are either not strictly met or the assumed values remain very close to 
the thresholds. 
Source: Commission services. 
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the estimates of tax expenditure compiled by the 
OECD cover only less than half of the euro-area 
Member States. 
The ‘debt bias’ in direct taxation affecting both 
corporate finance and investment in housing is also 
an issue that needs to be addressed to enhance 
macroeconomic stability, by limiting possibly 
excessive expansions of credit in good times and 
harmful credit tightening in bad times. 
Most euro-area countries share a ‘debt bias’ in 
corporate finance, as their tax system subsidises 
debt-financed investment, chiefly via the 
deductibility of interest payments. As the recent 
crisis has made clear, the debt bias creates  
economic distortions and leads to excessive 
corporate debt-to-GDP ratios, with harmful 
economic effects. This is especially true in the 
banking sector as spillover effects are stronger and 
moral hazard issues more pervasive due to 
systemic risks of bank failures. While the effective 
marginal tax rate for debt-financed investment was 
actually negative in almost all euro-area 
economies, the effective marginal tax rate for new 
equity-financed investment was positive 
everywhere. A simple approach to identify the 
countries that face the biggest challenges in this 
area is to take the difference between the two rates. 
It turns out that, in 2010, France, Malta and 
Luxembourg showed a gap clearly larger than the 
euro-area average, although not as wide as in the 
case of Greece. (262) Viable policy options to 
address the debt-bias issue are either to eliminate 
interest deductibility from taxes via a 
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) or to 
introduce an equivalent (tax deduction) allowance 
for corporate equity (ACE) or a mixture of both. 
Despite recent measures to reduce the tax subsidy 
for homeownership in some Member States, the  
general picture that tax systems tend to favour 
mortgage debt financing of homeownership 
remains valid. Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Finland are found to have a debt-biased tax system 
favouring housing investments, although the extent 
of this bias differs widely between them. 
                                                          
(262) The data for Greece could be subject to revision due to a 
special surcharge that was first introduced in 2010 and later 
withdrawn.  
In many euro-area Member States, VAT revenues 
actually collected are far below the level that could 
theoretically be collected if a uniform consumption  
tax was established. The revenue shortfall can in 
particular be due to the application of reduced 
VAT rates or tax exemptions to a wide range of 
goods and services. Italy, Greece, Spain, France, 
Belgium and Portugal seem to have particular 
scope for increasing VAT revenues by broadening 
the VAT base. Moreover, the revenue shortfall can 
be driven by a high collection gap that is at least 
partly attributable to VAT fraud. There are 
indications that deficiencies in VAT collection 
have a negative impact on VAT revenues in 
Greece, Slovakia, Italy, Austria and, to a lesser 
extent, Malta. 
In the current economic climate, it is important to 
utilise the taxation framework as efficiently as 
possible in environmental policy. Hence, 
environmentally harmful tax subsidies should be 
phased out, while environmental taxes need to be 
properly designed. At present, several Member 
States subsidise different energy products through 
reduced VAT rates. Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal tax consumption 
of natural gas and electricity at a reduced VAT 
rate, while Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Portugal (also) apply reduced rates for fuel oil 
and/or solid fuels. Support to vulnerable 
households could potentially be provided more 
efficiently through more targeted welfare 
payments. 
Company car tax rules tend to have an adverse 
environmental impact as they encourage car 
ownership and private use of company cars. 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and 
Portugal provide generous tax subsidies to 
company cars and may benefit most from 
reviewing their schemes. 
The current excise duty rates on energy do not 
properly reflect the environmental and energy 
properties of the various fuels (e.g. fossil and 
renewable fuels). In particular, diesel is generally 
favoured by a relatively low tax compared to 
petrol. All euro-area Member States provide such 
preferential treatment to some extent. However, 
the tax subsidy to diesel drivers is especially high  
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in Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia 
and Finland. 
Last but not least, the chapter addressed tax 
governance issues. A number of euro-area Member 
States face the challenge of undertaking incentive-
oriented policy measures to reduce tax gaps, by 
improving the efficiency of their tax collection and 
more effectively preventing tax evasion. In this 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
respect, the analysis made use of the following two 
conditions: (i) the size of the shadow economy is 
estimated to be above the euro-area average; and 
(ii) either the administrative burden of tax systems 
for medium-sized companies, or the administrative 
cost per net revenue collection is above the euro-
area average. The analysis indicates that there 
seems to be particular scope for improving revenue 
collection systems in Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
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Table A1.1: Total taxes (including social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 2000-2009, EU-27 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Structure by type of tax
Indirect taxes 14.0 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.8 13.4 13.1
    VAT 7.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.9 6.6
    Excise duties and consumption taxes 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6
    Other taxes on products (incl. import duties) 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5
    Other taxes on production 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4
Direct taxes 13.9 13.5 13.0 12.8 12.7 13.0 13.5 13.7 13.6 12.6
    Personal income 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.5
    Corporate income 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.7 1.9
    Other 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2
Social contributions 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.7 12.5 12.5 12.4 12.2 12.5 12.8
     Employers´ 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.4
     Employees´ 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8
     Self- and non-employed 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6
Total taxes (including SSC) 40.5 39.6 39.0 39.0 38.8 39.1 39.6 39.6 39.3 38.4
Structure by economic function
Consumption 11.4 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.0 11.1 11.0 11.0 10.8 10.6
Labour 20.3 20.1 19.9 20.0 19.6 19.6 19.4 19.3 19.7 20.0
    Employed 18.7 18.6 18.3 18.3 17.9 17.9 17.8 17.8 18.1 18.3
          Paid by employers 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.8 8.0
          Paid by employees 10.9 10.8 10.6 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.1 10.3 10.3
    Non-employed 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7
Capital 8.9 8.5 8.1 8.0 8.2 8.6 9.3 9.4 8.9 7.9
    Capital and business income 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.1 5.3
           Income of corporations 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.3
           Income of households 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9
           Income of self-employed (incl. SSC) 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0
    Stocks of capital / wealth 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6
Note: GDP-weighted EU-27 averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.2: Total taxes (including social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 2000-2009, EA-17 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Structure by type of tax
Indirect taxes 13.9 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.8 13.8 13.3 13.1
    VAT 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.6
    Excise duties and consumption taxes 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4
    Other taxes on products (incl. import duties) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7
    Other taxes on production 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
Direct taxes 12.9 12.5 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.8 12.3 12.7 12.5 11.7
    Personal income 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.5 8.5 8.7 8.9 9.1 9.0
    Corporate income 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.5 1.7
    Other 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
Social contributions 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.4
     Employers´ 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.2
     Employees´ 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3
     Self- and non-employed 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9
Total taxes (including SSC) 41.1 40.2 39.8 39.7 39.4 39.6 40.1 40.2 39.7 39.1
Structure by economic function
Consumption 11.1 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.5 10.4
Labour 21.5 21.3 21.2 21.2 20.7 20.6 20.5 20.3 20.8 21.1
    Employed 19.6 19.5 19.4 19.3 18.9 18.7 18.6 18.6 19.0 19.3
          Paid by employers 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.9
          Paid by employees 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.3 10.4
    Non-employed 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9
Capital 8.7 8.2 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.3 9.0 9.3 8.6 7.7
    Capital and business income 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.3 6.6 6.2 5.3
           Income of corporations 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.2
           Income of households 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8
           Income of self-employed (incl. SSC) 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2
    Stocks of capital / wealth 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.5
Note: GDP-weighted EA-17 averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.3: Development of implicit tax rates, in % 
1995 2000 2009 1995 2000 2009 1995 2000 2009
BE 43.6 43.6 41.5 20.5 21.8 20.9 25.6 29.6 30.9
BG 30.8 38.1 25.5 17.3 18.5 21.4 : : :
CZ 40.5 40.7 36.4 22.1 19.4 21.6 26.3 20.9 19.3
DK 40.2 41.0 35.0 30.5 33.4 31.5 29.9 36.0 43.8
DE 39.4 40.7 38.8 18.8 18.9 19.8 21.8 28.4 22.1
EE 36.9 37.8 35.0 20.3 19.5 27.6 14.1 6.0 14.0
IE 29.7 28.5 25.5 24.8 25.5 21.6 : : 14.9
EL : 34.5 29.7 : 16.5 14.0 : 19.9 :
ES 31.0 30.5 31.8 14.2 15.7 12.3 : 29.9 27.2
FR 41.2 42.0 41.1 21.5 20.9 18.5 32.5 38.4 35.6
IT 38.2 42.2 42.6 17.4 17.9 16.3 27.4 29.5 39.1
CY 22.1 21.5 26.1 12.6 12.7 17.9 : : :
LV 39.2 36.6 28.7 19.4 18.7 16.9 20.5 11.2 10.3
LT 34.5 41.2 33.1 17.7 17.9 16.5 12.7 7.2 10.9
LU 29.3 29.9 31.7 21.0 23.0 27.3 : : :
HU 42.3 41.4 41.0 29.6 27.5 28.2 14.8 17.1 18.8
MT 19.0 20.6 20.2 14.8 15.9 19.5 : : :
NL 34.6 34.5 35.5 23.3 23.8 26.2 21.4 20.7 15.4
AT 38.5 40.1 40.3 20.5 22.1 21.7 27.1 27.7 27.0
PL 36.8 33.5 30.7 20.7 17.8 19.0 20.9 20.5 20.5
PT 22.3 22.3 23.1 18.1 18.2 16.2 21.3 31.3 33.8
RO 31.4 33.5 24.3 : 17.0 16.9 : : :
SI 38.5 37.7 34.9 24.6 23.5 24.2 12.7 15.7 21.0
SK 38.5 36.3 31.2 26.4 21.7 17.3 35.0 22.9 17.1
FI 44.2 44.0 40.4 27.6 28.5 25.7 27.1 36.4 29.9
SE 46.8 46.8 39.4 27.8 26.3 27.6 20.0 42.8 33.5
UK 25.7 25.6 25.1 19.6 18.9 16.8 34.6 44.0 38.9
EU-27 average
GDP-weighted 37.0 37.0 36.0 : 19.9 18.9 : : :
arithmetic 35.2 35.7 32.9 : 20.8 20.9 : : :
EA-17 average
GDP-weighted 38.4 39.3 38.2 19.4 19.6 18.5 25.8 30.4 28.9
arithmetic 34.2 34.5 33.5 20.4 20.4 20.4 24.2 25.9 25.2
EU-25 average
GDP-weighted 37.1 37.1 36.1 20.0 19.9 18.9 26.8 32.9 30.2
arithmetic 35.5 35.7 33.5 21.4 21.0 21.0 23.5 25.5 24.9
Implicit tax rate on labour Implicit tax rate on consumption Implicit tax rate on capital
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.4: Statutory tax rates, in % 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011
BE 60.6 60.6 53.7 53.7 53.7 20.5 21 21 21 21 40.2 40.2 34.0 34.0 34.0
BG 50.0 40.0 24.0 10.0 10.0 18 20 20 20 20 40.0 32.5 15.0 10.0 10.0
CZ 43.0 32.0 32.0 15.0 15.0 22 22 19 20 20 41.0 31.0 26.0 19.0 19.0
DK 63.5 59.7 59.0 51.5 51.5 25 25 25 25 25 34.0 32.0 28.0 25.0 25.0
DE 57.0 53.8 44.3 47.5 47.5 16 16 16 19 19 56.8 51.6 38.7 29.8 29.8
EE 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0 21.0 18 18 18 20 20 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0 21.0
IE 48.0 44.0 42.0 41.0 41.0 21 21 21 21 21 40.0 24.0 12.5 12.5 12.5
EL 45.0 45.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 18 18 19 23 23 40.0 40.0 32.0 24.0 20.0
ES 56.0 48.0 45.0 43.0 45.0 16 16 16 18 18 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0
FR 59.1 59.0 53.5 45.8 46.7 18.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 36.7 37.8 35.0 34.4 34.4
IT 51.0 45.9 44.1 45.2 45.6 19 20 20 20 20 52.2 41.3 37.3 31.4 31.4
CY 40.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 8 10 15 15 15 25.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
LV 25.0 25.0 25.0 26.0 25.0 N/A 18 18 21 22 25.0 25.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
LT 33.0 33.0 33.0 15.0 15.0 18 18 18 21 21 29.0 24.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
LU 51.3 47.2 39.0 39.0 42.1 15 15 15 15 15 40.9 37.5 30.4 28.6 28.8
HU 44.0 44.0 38.0 40.6 20.3 25 25 25 25 25 19.6 19.6 17.5 20.6 20.6
MT 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 15 15 18 18 18 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
NL 60.0 60.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 17.5 17.5 19 19 19 35.0 35.0 31.5 25.5 25.0
AT 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 20 20 20 20 20 34.0 34.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
PL 45.0 40.0 40.0 32.0 32.0 22 22 22 22 23 40.0 30.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
PT 40.0 40.0 40.0 45.9 46.5 17 17 21 21 23 39.6 35.2 27.5 29.0 29.0
RO 40.0 40.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 18 19 19 19 24 38.0 25.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
SI 50.0 50.0 50.0 41.0 41.0 N/A 19 20 20 20 25.0 25.0 25.0 20.0 20.0
SK 42.0 42.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 23 19 19 20 40.0 29.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
FI 62.2 54.0 51.0 49.0 49.2 22 22 22 23 23 25.0 29.0 26.0 26.0 26.0
SE 61.3 51.5 56.6 56.4 56.4 25 25 25 25 25 28.0 28.0 28.0 26.3 26.3
UK 40.0 40.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 20 33.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 27.0
EU-27 arithmetic 47.3 44.7 39.9 37.6 37.1 : 19.2 19.6 20.1 20.7 35.3 31.9 25.5 23.3 23.1
EA-17 arithmetic 49.0 47.1 41.9 41.4 41.8 : 18.1 18.9 19.2 19.7 36.8 34.4 28.1 25.6 25.3
Adjusted top corporate income tax rateStandard VAT rateTop personal income tax rate
Note: The top PIT rates reflect the statutory tax rate for the highest income bracket. The rates include surcharges, state and local taxes. Only the 'basic' 
(non-targeted) top CIT rate is presented here. Existing surcharges and averages of local taxes are included. For details of the calculation of the top PIT 
rates and CIT rates see European Commission (2011a). 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.5: Energy tax revenues in relation to final energy consumption 
1995 2000 2005 2009 1995 2000 2005 2009
BE 91.6 92.4 116.3 119.0 BE 97.9 92.4 106.9 103.3
BG 14.7 40.6 62.7 108.4 BG 429.9 40.6 51.9 72.0
CZ 38.7 55.2 95.9 130.8 CZ 50.0 55.2 93.0 125.1
DK 200.3 301.0 315.7 330.7 DK 219.3 301.0 290.2 285.6
DE 168.3 192.7 209.3 215.5 DE 172.4 192.7 202.2 202.8
EE 6.3 31.6 75.3 127.8 EE 9.6 31.6 63.8 89.9
IE 112.2 140.7 170.8 199.2 IE 136.5 140.7 154.0 176.5
EL 157.7 117.3 115.7 135.5 EL 206.1 117.3 100.4 105.8
ES 128.1 137.9 140.3 157.5 ES 147.5 137.9 119.3 122.7
FR 169.6 174.2 176.1 182.2 FR 177.6 174.2 163.8 158.3
IT 236.3 245.8 229.2 259.6 IT 268.7 245.8 201.7 207.8
CY 26.4 43.1 145.8 142.1 CY 30.6 43.1 129.4 113.8
LV 10.1 48.2 71.8 96.5 LV 13.7 48.2 54.8 51.9
LT 12.3 57.9 81.7 116.5 LT 14.9 57.9 78.4 94.9
LU 140.9 164.4 193.7 210.1 LU 173.8 164.4 174.0 166.2
HU 58.5 79.7 100.8 : HU 111.6 79.7 85.0 :
MT 67.5 180.8 135.5 202.4 MT 78.8 180.8 128.5 170.3
NL 110.4 153.4 197.9 230.3 NL 121.0 153.4 182.1 201.7
AT 122.9 141.6 155.7 171.5 AT 128.5 141.6 145.9 149.7
PL 20.6 59.0 96.1 107.3 PL 34.7 59.0 84.5 83.8
PT 164.6 111.8 167.5 : PT 191.4 111.8 149.2 :
RO 15.1 58.2 59.4 86.0 RO 160.3 58.2 24.7 26.6
SI 126.2 118.6 145.4 226.8 SI 180.2 118.6 114.6 163.2
SK 29.9 42.4 77.2 100.8 SK 40.1 42.4 64.7 80.3
FI 96.7 108.7 115.4 129.9 FI 103.1 108.7 110.6 118.4
SE 133.5 179.7 211.0 210.0 SE 140.3 179.7 196.8 178.6
UK 142.6 245.8 233.8 221.1 UK 152.3 245.8 211.5 177.4
EU-27 averages EU-27 averages
GDP-weighted 157.5 187.8 191.7 200.3 GDP-weighted 171.1 187.8 175.5 170.5
base-weighted 96.4 123.1 144.3 168.7 base-weighted 133.0 123.1 129.0 137.1
EA-17 averages EA-17 averages
GDP-weighted 165.0 178.6 185.5 199.7 GDP-weighted 177.7 178.6 170.7 172.6
base-weighted 115.0 129.3 151.0 175.6 base-weighted 133.2 129.3 135.9 145.7
Nominal Real (2000 deflator)
Note: Nominal: EUR per tonne of oil equivalent; Real: EUR per tonne of equivalent, deflated with cumulative % change in final demand deflator 
(2000 = 100). 2009 are provisional data. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.6: The composition of tax wedge in 2010, single average income worker 
Country Tax wedge Income tax Employee SSC Employer SSC Tax wedge Income tax Employee SSC Employer SSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
BE 55.4 21.6 10.8 23.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
BG* 33.8 7.4 11.0 15.5 -1.3 0.1 0.2 -1.6
CZ 42.2 8.6 8.2 25.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
DK 38.3 27.9 10.7 0.0 -1.2 -0.9 0.0 0.0
DE 49.1 15.7 17.2 16.2 -1.8 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1
EE 40.0 12.3 2.1 25.6 0.8 -0.2 0.8 0.3
IE 29.3 13.0 6.6 9.7 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.0
EL 36.6 2.2 12.5 21.9 -1.6 -1.6 0.0 0.0
ES 39.6 11.7 4.9 23.0 1.4 0.1 0.0 1.3
FR 49.3 9.9 9.6 29.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
IT 46.9 15.4 7.2 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY*** 13.9 2.1 5.9 5.9 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0
LV** 41.6 14.9 7.3 19.4 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 0.0
LT* 40.7 10.1 6.9 23.8 -0.9 -5.5 4.6 0.0
LU 34.0 12.7 10.9 10.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
HU 46.4 11.0 13.2 22.2 -6.6 -4.6 0.4 -2.5
MT* 22.3 8.5 6.9 6.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
NL 39.2 14.5 15.3 9.4 1.2 -0.5 1.4 0.3
AT 47.9 11.4 14.0 22.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
PL 34.3 5.9 15.5 12.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
PT 37.7 9.7 8.9 19.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
RO* 44.4 9.3 12.8 22.3 2.0 -0.2 0.5 1.7
SI 42.4 9.5 19.0 13.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
SK 37.8 6.4 10.6 20.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
FI 42.0 18.0 5.8 18.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.7 -0.5
SE 42.7 13.5 5.3 23.9 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0
UK 32.7 14.7 8.3 9.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
EU-27 arithmetic 39.3 11.8 9.9 17.6 -0.3 -0.6 0.3 0.0
EU-17 arithmetic 39.0 11.4 9.9 17.7 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1
Income tax plus employees' and employers' social security contributions 
(as % of labour costs, 2010) Annual change 2010/09  (in percentage points)
Note: *Data for non-OECD-EU countries (SI, LT, EE and MT, BG and RO) are only available for 2009; ** LV data for 2008; *** CY data for 2007. 
For these countries, changes in tax wedge refer to period 2009-2010 (for LV to period 2007-2008, CY to period 2006-2007). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
